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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
At the present time the Church is frequently exhorted to give an ethical lead. Yet what would be the nature of such direction—the dissemination of practical wisdom from the Scriptures, the provision of a blue-print for the realisation of the Kingdom of God on earth, or just emotional encouragement to moral effort? Theological colleges offer courses on ‘Christian Ethics’, and for certain degrees there are papers bearing this title, yet what exactly is the nature of the discipline? Is it any more than the retailing of the moral judgments of distinguished Christians in the past, and information concerning certain important areas of life in regard to which Christians ought to come to some sort of practical decision? Is Christian Ethics a discipline at all, or just an unmapped, and possibly an unmappable, field between dogmatics and practical theology?
page 157 note 1 At least one of these, Paul Ramsey, now shows that he is repentant in this matter—see the introduction of Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics.
page 157 note 2 The Divine Imperative, chaps. 4 & 5.
page 159 note 1 This is at least the usual way that Moore has been interpreted, though in fairness to him it must be allowed that his main aim was to show that the term ‘good’ had an entirely different function in discourse from terms like ‘pleasant’. For this reason it might be claimed that Moore is also the father of modern linguistic subjectivism because his principal aim is to show that ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ are not equivalent forms of commendation.
page 159 note 2 ‘If we are to justify the analogy between moral properties and empirical properties which is implied by the use of objective terminology, we must show that there is a contrast in moral matters between “is right” and “seems right”. … But this is exactly what the intuitionist cannot do: for in making direct awareness the test of real ethical properties he eliminates the whole point of the “objective-subjective” contrast.’ (Nowell-Smith, P., Ethics, p. 56.)Google Scholar
page 160 note 1 Influential works in Britain of the subjectivist school are R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason; P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics; and S. Toulmin, Reason in Ethics. These writers would possibly reject the subjectivist label, reserving it for the more unsophisticated type of theory as represented by C. L. Stevenson's Ethics and Language.
page 162 note 1 This is clearly recognised in a recent book on the subject, H. P. Owen's The Moral Argument for Christian Theism, in the first chapter of which the author argues strongly for the objectivity of moral values.
page 162 note 2 A recent forceful expression of this argument is found in Ewing's, A. C. article ‘The Autonomy of Ethics’ in Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ramsey, I. T..Google Scholar
page 163 note 1 e.g. K. Barth: ‘If power by itself were the omnipotence of God it would mean that God was evil, that He was the spirit of revolution and tyranny par excellence’ (Church Dogmatics, II.1, p. 524).
page 163 note 2 Deity and Morality, p. 124f.
page 164 note 1 ‘Moral Arguments’ in Mind, 1958, vol. 67. See also her article ‘Moral Beliefs’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1958/1959.Google Scholar
page 164 note 2 ‘God and Ought’ in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, ed. Ramsey, I. T..Google Scholar
page 164 note 3 A Defence of Theological Ethics, p. 94.
page 164 note 4 Taylor, A. E.The Faith of a Moralist, series I, p. 61f.Google Scholar
page 165 note 1 Though he will certainly learn a great deal from them, vide the use made of them by A. N. Prior in his Logic and the Basis of Ethics, chaps. 2–6.