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The foundational efficiency of love: reconciling with Aquinas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2015

Sharon L. Putt
Sharon L. Putt*
Affiliation:
Messiah College, 1 College Avenue, Box 3053, Mechanicsburg, PA 17055, [email protected]
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Abstract

Anabaptist theologians who vie for the most convincing theory of divine non-violence in the contemporary ‘atonement debate’ quite often fail to appreciate the contributions of medieval scholars such as St Thomas Aquinas. Of course, that failure does have a rationale. Aquinas does, indeed, support various systematic expressions of a satisfaction theory of atonement. In doing so, he insists upon God's violent solution to the problem of sin and also employs language fraught with quid pro quo, mercantile and penal images. Aquinas does attempt to ‘correct’ Anselm and rearticulate the satisfaction theory of atonement; however, his expression of that motif still hinges upon the divine demand for remuneration, balanced accounts or an economic transaction in order to repair the damage done by sin. God's desire for this redemptive reparation results in the necessity of the violent death of an innocent man. Consequently, although Aquinas expresses the notion of necessity differently than Anselm, his theory also necessitates, at best, divine complicity with violence and, at worst, divine insistence on violence. Anabaptist theologians who remain true to the tradition's pacifist roots rightfully cry ‘foul’ in response to Aquinas’ theory. If Jesus of Nazareth fully reveals the character of God as indicated in John 14:7 with the words, ‘if you have seen me, you have seen the Father’, theories of atonement which depict God as condoning or requiring violence do not harmonise with the life and teachings of the man Christians call the Prince of Peace, especially if that violence pertains to the redemption of a loving God's good creation. As a result, those who oppose the implicit divine violence embedded in Aquinas’ satisfaction theory of atonement may opt to disengage with him, to expel him completely from the conversation. Yet I suggest that non-violent atonement theologians pause and rethink their indictment of the angelic doctor. Satisfaction remains the prevalent theme surrounding Aquinas’ atonement motif, but it is not by any means the only image he brings to bear on the topic. In fact, throughout his ruminations on the passion of Christ, St Thomas focuses explicitly on the unfathomable, extravagant and immeasurable divine love as the primary motivation for God's desire and subsequent actions to redeem and restore a sinful humanity. I suggest that, given Aquinas’ emphasis on divine love, Anabaptist theologians may well discover a satisfying interlocutor for further theological conversation which carries significant implications for the life of the church. Indeed, scholastic savants such as Thomas Aquinas still do warrant a place at the communal table.

Keywords

Aquinasatonementcrosslovenon-violenceredemptionsoteriology
Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 68 , Issue 2 , May 2015 , pp. 143 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 2015 

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References

1 Fiddes, Paul S., Past Event and Present Salvation (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), pp. 4–5, 83Google Scholar.

2 Michael Hoonhut agrees that, in order to address the passion of Christ, one must first place the ‘paschal mystery of Christ’ in the context of God's providence as it relates to ‘the problem of moral evil and suffering’. See Hoonhut, Michael, ‘Grounding Providence in the Theology of the Creator: The Exemplarity of Thomas Aquinas’, Heythrop Journal 43 (Jan. 2002), p. 19Google Scholar.

3 See Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Charles J. O’Neil (Notre Dame, IN, and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 4.54.6; 4.55.14 (hereafter cited as SCG). Here Aquinas argues that we know the invisible God through the visible Christ so that through our familiarity with God in Christ, we can develop a friendship with God. It is interesting to note here that Aquinas is concerned more, not with satisfaction, but with the union and friendship with God through Christ. In SCG 4.54.4–5, Aquinas credits Jesus with demonstrating (revealing) God's love to humanity. See also Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars edn (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964–66), ST III, q. 46, a. 10, ad 3 (hereafter cited as ST).

4 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, r: ‘[Q]uia per hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientiae, humilitatis, constantiae, justitiae et caeterarum virtutum . . .’; SCG 4.54.7 to mark just a few. See also Quinn, Philip L., ‘Abelard on Atonement’, in Stump, Eleonore (ed.), Reasoned Faith (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 282Google Scholar. Eleonore Stump asserts that, in making satisfaction, Christ became the ‘template representing the desired character or action, in accordance with which the sinner can align his own will’ and, consequently restore his or her relationship with God. As a template, then, Christ acts as the example. Stump, , Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 437Google Scholar.

5 ST III, a. 46, a. 3, r and ad 3; a. 1, ad 1; a. 11, ad 1. See also Quinn, ‘Abelard on Atonement’, pp. 163–4.

6 Although the satisfaction theory of atonement remains the most well-known of Aquinas’ motifs explaining the passion of Christ, some scholars admit that it is the one least emphasised by Aquinas.

7 Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man and the Virgin Conception and Original Sin, trans. Joseph M. Colleran (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1969), 1.25; 2.18–19. Anselm believed that satisfaction was a necessity as God could not redeem humanity in any other way. Aquinas does not want to place the divine will under any sort of absolute necessity.

8 ST III, q. 46, a. 2, r and ad 1–2; a. 2, r. Cf. Anselm, Why God Became Man, 1.9; 1.10. Aquinas believes that ‘there was no necessity of compulsion on God's or Christ's part for the passion’, and that ‘there were other ways open [for the salvation of humanity to occur]’.

9 ST III, q. 46, a. 2, r. I have concluded that the passion and its violence is part of God's antecedent will for Christ which allows for human freedom to act, placing the blame for Christ's death on responsible, human agents. See ST Ia, q. 22, a. 4, ad 1, where the movement of God's will does not impose upon the free actions of creatures.

10 ST III, q. 4, a. 1; III, q. 46, a.2; Torrell, , Le Christ en ses mystères: La vie et l’œuvre de Jesus selon Saint Thomas d’Aquinas, vol. 2 (Paris: Desclée, 1999), pp. 312–14Google Scholar. Torrell suggests that, for Aquinas, the necessity of the passion is of the type which utilises means which work towards a better end. In other words, God allowed the passion events not only out of respect for human freedom, but also because God ‘saw’ that the passion would better witness to the significance and depth of divine love.

11 ST III, q. 46, a. 2, ad 3: ‘Nam si voluisset absque omni satisfactione hominem a peccato liberare, contra justitiam non fecisset’.

12 Ibid. Torrell's interpretation of Aquinas’ theory of satisfaction leads him to claim that satisfaction was not the master model of atonement. Although Aquinas appeals to the satisfaction motif, it is only one of the efficacious modes by which God saves humanity from its sin. Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, pp. 297–8, 399–400. See SCG 4.55.22.

13 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, obj. 1–2: ‘Cum ergo Deus potuerit hominem liberare sola propria voluntate, non videtur conveniens fuisse quod ad liberationem humani generis Christi passio adderetur. Praeterea, ea quae fiunt per naturam convenientius fiunt quam ea quae fiunt per violentiam: quia violentia est quaedam excisio, seu casus ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut dicitur in libro de Caelo. Sed passio Christi mortem violentam induxit. Ergo convenientius fuisset ut Christus naturali morte moriendo hominem liberaret, quam quod pateretur.’ See also q. 47, a. 3, obj. 1.

14 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, sc and r. See also Sent. 4, d. 19, a. 5, q. 1: ‘Per satisfactionem Deo reconciliamur. Sed Christus per passionem suam pro nobis satisfecit. Ergo nos Deo reconciliavit’. Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’ satisfaction theory does not include a notion of placating a wrathful God, but instead satisfaction functions to restore sinners to harmony with God: ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, in Morris, Thomas V. (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 665Google Scholar.

15 SCG 4.54.9: ‘Satisfacere autem pro peccato totius humani generis nullus homo purus poterat: quia quilibet homo purus aliquid minus est tota generis humani universitate. Oportuit igitur, ad hoc quod humanum genus a peccato communi liberaretur, quod aliquis satisfaceret qui et homo esset, cui satisfactio competeret; et aliquid supra hominem, ut eius meritum sufficiens esset ad satisfaciendum pro peccato totius humani generis. Maius autem homine, quantum ad ordinem beatitudinis, nihil est nisi solus Deus . . . Necessarium igitur fuit homini ad beatitudinem consequendam, quod Deus homo fieret ad peccatum humani generis tollendum.’

16 ST III, q. 48, a. 2, r and ad 2: ‘Dicendum quod ille proprie satisfacit pro offensa qui exhibit affenso id quod aeque vel magis diligit quam oderit offensam. Christus autem ex charitate et obedientia patiendo majus aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius offensae humani generis . . . [Q]uod major fuit charitas Christi patientis quam malitia crucifigentium: et ideo plus potuit Christus satisfacere sua passione quam crucifixores offendere occidendo; in tantum quod passio Christi sufficiens fuit et superabundans ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis crucifigentium ipsum.’ Although Aquinas speaks here of Christ's satisfaction more than balancing the wickedness of his killers, he also contends that Christ's satisfaction more than compensates for the wickedness and sin of the entire human race. See ST III, q. 46, a. 5, r and ad 1, 3.

17 Anselm, Why God Became Man, 1.12–13. Anselm explains that the root of sin (the committing of which brings condemnation to humanity) is to deprive God of the honour due him. Our obedience renders to God the honour due to him. By not obeying God, by not subjecting ourselves to God's will, we neglect to pay God his due (honour) and, thus, we dishonour God by taking from him what rightly belongs to him – an act which puts us at odds with God, which incurs a debt that we must pay. In order for humanity to be right with God, then, humans must give back to God even more than they took away from God, so that God is recompensed not only for the debt owed to him, but also for the pain caused by human disobedience. Anselm calls this payment satisfaction. We must make satisfaction for our sin, for the honour we stole from God.

18 Torrell, Christ en ses mystères, pp. 400–2.

19 ST III, q. 48, a. 2, sc. ‘Non autem exsolvit qui perfecte non satisfacit’; q. 49, a. 4, ad 2: ‘sublata est odii causa, tum per ablationem peccati, tum per recompensationem acceptabilioris boni’. In SCG 4.54.8, an earlier work by Aquinas, he uses language reminiscent of Anselm, speaking of sin as inducing disorder and of sin as an offence against God. Satisfaction here is a remedy for that offence and disorder caused by sin. See also SCG 4.54.9, where Aquinas states that the order of divine justice requires that God should not remit sin without satisfaction. He seems to have softened his views concerning a divine requirement in later works such as the ST. This may have been in order to preserve images of the sovereignty and providence of God. Cf. SCG 4.55.14; 4.55.22, 26, 30.

20 ST III, q. 48, a. 2, r. ‘Christus autem ex charitate et obedientia patiendo majus aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensation totius offensae humani generis . . . Et ideo passio Christi non solum sufficiens, sed etiam superabundans satisfactio fuit pro peccatis humani generis.’ Aquinas also speaks of the blood of Christ as the ‘price’ paid to remove the guilt of the entire human race. ST III, q. 49, a. 5, ad 1: ‘quod quidem remotum est pretio sanguinis Christi’ (emphasis mine). See also ST III, q. 48, a. 2, note a, which says: ‘Satisfaction: the paying of a sum equal at least to the debt that has to be paid. Christ's passion supplied what was sufficient to pay for the debt man had incurred by sin. The note of payment is uppermost.’

21 ST III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2. ‘[i]n tantum quod passio Christi sufficiens fuit et superabundans ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis crucifigentium ipsum’. Aquinas also asserts that Christ's passion satisfied the demands of justice. See ST III, q. 46, a. 6, ad 6: ‘quod Christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare non sola potestate, sed etiam justitia’.

22 ST III, q. 48, a. 5, ad 2: ‘[Q]uod pretium redemptionis nostrae homo Christus solvit immediate’; q. 48, a. 5, r: ‘Pretium autem redemptionis nostrae est sanguis Christi, vel vita ejus corporalis . . . quam ipse Christus exsolvit. Unde utrumque istorum ad Christum pertinet immediate’. Cf. q. 49, a. 1, r; q. 48, a. 4, r and ad 3: here the translator makes a note that ‘Christ's offering made up for the offense against God. There is then a question of justice, of righting the scales’ (emphasis mine).

23 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad 1: ‘In quo ostenditur et Dei severitas, qui peccatum sine poena dimittere noluit: quod signat Apostolus dicens, Proprio Filio suo non pepercit’. See Stump, Aquinas, p. 431. Here Stump speaks of Christ bearing the penalty we owed for sin. As a result of Christ undertaking our penalty, we are freed from the penalty.

24 SCG 4.55.22 and 4.55.14. ‘[Q]ui absque peccato erat, mortem peccato debitam pati voluit, ut in se poenam aliis debitam, pro aliis satisfaciendo, susciperet’ and ‘[U]t per poenam quam in carne pro peccato nostro sustinuit, peccatum a nobis auferret’. Granted, concepts of punishment do not dominate Aquinas’ theory of atonement; I am merely making the point that such language does come into play.

25 ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 3: ‘[A]git per modum satisfactionis, in quantum per eam liberamur a reatu poenae’. Aquinas also states that ‘once sufficient satisfaction has been made, the debt of punishment ceases’ and, therefore, ‘Christ's passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, and sin is the basis for the debt of punishment’. ST III, q. 49, a. 3, r: ‘exhibita autem satisfactione sufficienti, tollitur reatus poenae . . . inquantum scilicet passio Christi est causa remissionis peccati, in quo fundatur reatus poenae’.

26 Quodl. 2, q. 8, a. 2, ad 3: ‘[Q]uod satisfactio et est punitiv in quantum est actus vindicativae justitiae, et est etiam medicativa, in quantum est quoddam sacramentale’.

27 E.g. ST III, q. 48, a. 4, r; q. 49, a. 3, r; q. 49, a. 3, c; q. 49, a. 5, r and ad 1; q. 22, a. 2–3. In these instances, Christ's satisfaction removes punishment. Whether Christ removes the punishment by suffering the punishment himself is not clear in Aquinas. He does make the argument, however, that if one voluntarily submits to the penalty for sin by punishing oneself, one offers satisfaction. If one does not submit voluntarily to the penalty and is coerced or forced into punishment, that person has not offered satisfaction and has been punished only. See SCG 3/2.158.4–5; SCG 4.55. Stump argues that ‘this is because when a penalty for a sin is inflicted, the iniquity of the person who is punished is weighed; but, in the case of satisfaction, when someone voluntarily assumes a penalty in order to please someone who was wronged, the charity and benevolence of the person making satisfaction is considered’. See Stump, Aquinas, pp. 433–4. Cf. Stump, , ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, in Feenstra, Ronald J. and , Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (eds), Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 65Google Scholar.

28 E.g. ST III, q. 46, a. 1; q. 46, a. 6, ad 4. Aquinas states that the penalty to be paid (or the punishment) for sin is death (Rom 3:23). Since Christ did suffer death, Christ paid the penalty, or it could be said that Christ suffered the punishment. Stump, ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, pp. 72–3, indicates that the problem between God and humanity, for Aquinas, is not God's wrath which must inflict punishment for sin on someone. Rather, the problem lies in the broken relationship between God and humanity. Through satisfaction for sin Christ restores the relationship which was damaged by human withdrawal, not by the wrath of God. See ST III, q. 48, a. 2, r; SCG 4.55.14, 22, 26. Cf. Stump, Aquinas, pp. 432, 440.

29 E.g. ST III, q. 48, a. 4, r.

30 E.g. ST III, q. 48, a. 2, r.

31 E.g. ST III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2; q. 47, a. 2, r.

32 E.g. ST III, q. 48, a. 1, sc and r, note b; q. 49, a. 2, n. e and a. Cf., Stump, ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, p. 74.

33 E.g. ST III, q. 46, a. 6, ad 6.

34 Cf. ST III, q. 49, a. 4, ad 2, where Aquinas asserts that ‘sin has been wiped away and because compensation has been made in the form of a more agreeable offering’ (‘tum per recompensationem acceptabilioris boni’ emphasis mine).

35 ST III, q. 49, a. 4, r: ‘Deus placatus est super omni offense generis humani’; q. 47, a. 2, r: ‘mors Christi fuit quoddam sacrificium acceptissimum Deo’. Cf. ST III, q. 48, a. 3, r, where Aquinas contends that, ‘[t]his gesture, this voluntary enduring of the passion, motivated as it was by the greatest of love, pleased God’. See also Quinn, ‘Abelard on Atonement’, p. 161.

36 ST III, q. 48, a. 2, r and note a.

37 ST III, q. 47, a. 4, ad 1–2: ‘Christus . . . in cruce positus veniam pro persecutoribus postulavit’; q. 49, a. 1, ad 3: ‘Christus sua passione nos a peccatis liberavit causaliter, idest instituens causam nostrae liberationis, ex qua possent quaecumque peccata quandoque remitti, vel praeterita vel praesentia vel futura’. Cf. ST III, 49, a. 1, ad 4, where Aquinas maintains that Christ's passion is the universal cause of the forgiveness of sins. See also Stump, Aquinas, p. 431; Stump, ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, p. 74. Stump argues that Christ's satisfaction solves the problem of past sin, up until the point of baptism. Christ's merit gained from his passion provides the solution for future sin.

38 ST III, q. 48, a. 3, r and ad 1. Christ's sacrifice was perfect in that it was sinless human flesh offered in perfect love and, therefore, acceptable and pleasing to God. It also removed the cause for hatred, causing the forgiveness of sin by wiping sin away. Cf. q. 49, a. 4, r; q. 49, a. 5, ad 2. See also Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, p. 437.

39 ST III, q. 48, a. 5, p. 2; q. 48, a. 4, sc and r; q. 48, a. 5, ad 1. Stump argues that Aquinas takes a different view than Anselm of the transaction between God and Christ in demanding satisfaction. Anselm couches the transaction in terms of God as accountant whereas Aquinas conceives of God as a parent. She employs the image of a mother and son relationship harmed because the son ruined her flower bed by kicking his soccer ball into it. For Anselm, someone would have to fix the garden, whether the son, the brother or the mother herself, to restore order. On Aquinas’ view, order is restored, not to balance the books, but to restore the relationship between the mother and the son. As long as the son aligns himself in heart and will with the one fixing the garden, the rupture in the relationship is healed. Important, however, is the fact that someone still has to make reparation. Stump, ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, pp. 67–8; Stump, Aquinas, p. 437. Although, in the Sent., Aquinas believes that fault must be remitted by satisfaction so that the universe is restored or kept in balance, Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, pp. 402, 405, expresses the notion of the restoration of a ruptured relationship. Citing ST III, q. 48, a. 2, c, Torrell states that ‘Thomas has not retained here the idea of a payment of a debt. He is more in line with the idea of a “rupture of friendship” . . . What is found here is not the sole reestablishment of the equalizing of justice as in vindictive justice, but rather a reconciliation of friendship.’ Cf. ST III, q. 46, a. 3. Still, Aquinas specifically employs the language of debt and payment in ST III, q. 49, a. 3, r; q. 49, a. 5, r.

40 ST III, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1; q. 47, a. 2, ad 1; q. 47, a. 5, ad 1–2; q. 48, a. 2, r. For Aquinas, form or substance actualises matter (materiam), it gives definition to matter. In the case of the incarnation and passion of Christ, the form – willing love – actualises the matter – Christ's incarnation and actions. The body of Christ acts as an instrument of the divine power of love which provides satisfaction. Cf. ST Ia, q. 75, a. 5, r.; ST III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 2.

41 ST III. q. 47, a. 4, ad 2.

42 ST III, q. 49, a. 1, r. ‘Primo quidem per modum provocantis ad charitatem’; ‘Per charitatem autem consequimur veniam peccatorum’; ‘[P]er passionem suam, quam ex charitate et obedientia sustinuit, liberavit nos tanquam membra sua a peccatis’.

43 Sent. III, d. 19, a. 5, sol. 1, ad 3: ‘fuit immensa caritas quae fecit passionem ex parte patientiae Deo acceptam; et sic per ipsam sumus reconciliati’.

44 ST III, q. 47, a. 2, r.; 1 Sam. 15:22.

45 ST III, q. 46, a. 4, ad 1.

46 ST III, q. 48, a. 3, ad 1. Some may argue that love itself serves as the coin of the realm in a transactional sense. I see it differently. Love moves God to forgive sin. Jesus did not ‘pay’ for sin with love; he saved humanity from sin and reconciled humanity to God with love and because of love.

47 ST III, q. 48, a. 3, ad 3.

48 ST III, q. 46, a. 6; SCG 4.55.27. See also Stump, ‘Atonement According to Aquinas’, p. 74.

49 ST III, q. 49, a. 4, r. Cf. ST III, q. 46, a. 5, r; q. 48, a. 2; SCG 4.55.17–18. Christ suffered all that human beings can suffer in a lifetime: betrayal, desertion, shame, blasphemies, beatings, pain, hunger, thirst, fatigue, mockery, etc. Cf. Stump, Aquinas, p. 452; Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, p. 327.

50 ‘No greater love has any person than this, that he lay down his life for his friends’ (John 15:13).

51 ST III, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1; q. 22, a. 2. I will discuss the human appropriation of Christ's satisfaction below.

52 ST III, q. 49, a. 4, ad 3: ‘Major autem fuit charitas Christi patientis quam iniquitas occisorum’. See ST III, q. 46, a. 2, r.

53 SCG 4.55.25. Aquinas admits that the love inherent in Christ's enduring injustice at the hands of human agents was ‘more than sufficient’ to satisfy for the sins of even those who crucified him. He can make such claims based on his previous statements that Christ warranted salvation for the human race ‘from the moment of his conception’, showing not only that the violent passion event was necessary, but that Christ had effected salvation even before his birth (ST III, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2). Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, pp. 405, 412, 437.

54 ST III, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2; q. 48, a. 2, r; q. 46, a. 5, r and ad 1, 3. ‘Christus autem ex charitate et obedientia patiendo majus aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius offensae humani generis’.

55 ST III, q. 47, a. 4, ad 1–2.

56 SCG 4.55.22.

57 SCG 4.55.17: ‘quod animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis’. Although Aquinas argues that love effected satisfaction for forgiveness of sin to occur, I will argue against Aquinas below that God did not require satisfaction for sin in order to forgive.

58 SCG 4.55.24: ‘quod mors Christi virtutem satisfaciendi habuit ex caritate ipsius, qua voluntarie mortem sustinuit’.

59 ST III, q. 47, a. 4, ad 1–2; q. 48, a. 2, r.

60 Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, p. 367. ‘[L]a nécessité de la passion ne résulte pas d’un vouloir divin préalable et causateur elle n’a d’autre nécessité que ceel d’un fait historique qui ne s’est produit que par un enchaînement de causes contingents qui aurait pu être autrement. Le vrai vouloir de Dieu était de se réconcilier le monde en son Fils, mais cela aurait pu se réaliser par sa simple prédication et son témoignage d’amour.’

61 SCG 4.55.24: ‘Sciendum autem est quod mors Christi virtutem satisfaciendi habuit ex caritate ipsius, qua voluntarie mortem sustinuit’. See also ST III, q. 48, a. 2, c.

62 ST III, q. 46, a. 5, r and ad 3.

63 Aquinas considers Christ's suffering as part of the normal course of living a human life, which Christ did because he loved humanity, not because the suffering itself satisfied God.

64 ST III, q. 46, a. 5, ad 1–3; see also a. 6, ad 1–6.

65 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, r. See Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, p. 405.

66 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, r; q. 49, a. 2, r; SCG 4.55.14. See also Torrell, Christ en ses mystères, pp. 323, 425–48. Cf. ST III, q. 1, a. 2, c; Dodds, Michael J., ‘Thomas Aquinas, Human Suffering, and the Unchanging Love of God’, Theological Studies 52 (June 1991), p. 429CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 Schillebeeckx, Edward, ‘The Death of a Christian’, in The Layman in the Church and Other Essays (Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 1963), p. 82Google Scholar. See also Stump, Aquinas, p. 470. Because I do not believe that God is complicit with evil in any manner, I disagree with Stump's assertion that God reworks evil into good. Instead, I would rather say that God overcomes evil with good by interrupting the cycles of violence and evil with goodness and love.

68 When speaking of divine forgiveness, I do not in any form advocate the view that God was satisfied with Christ's sacrificial death and, therefore, forgave humanity its sin.

69 Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères, p. 413. ‘Si la mort du Christ revêt aux yeux de la foi une valeur unique, ce n’est pas en sa matérialité ni en raison du caractère pénal de cette mort ou de sa souffrance, comme on l’a trop souvent dit, mait bien parce qu’elle était de sa part la suprême prévue d’amour au terme d’une vie tout entière consacrée à la défense de la justice et à l’annonce de la vérité’.

70 ST II.I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1. St Thomas writes: ‘Consequently, the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the debt of sin’ (‘Unde reatus poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati’). Cf. ST II.I, q. 87, a. 1, r.

71 See ST III, q. 49, a. 3, r; q. 49, a. 4, ad 1; q. 50, a. 1, ad 3. In explaining the exchange between God and Jesus which appropriated reconciliation, Aquinas states: ‘Thanks to Christ's passion the cause for hatred has been removed, both because sin has been wiped away and because compensation has been made in the form of a more agreeable offering.’ ST III, q. 49, a. 4, ad 2: ‘[s]ed quia per passionem Christi sublata est odii causa, tum per ablationem peccati, tum per recompensationem acceptablilioris boni’. In ST III, q. 49, a. 5, ad 1, St Thomas further explains the economy and the reason for it: ‘Yet neither the faith nor the righteousness of any of the patriarchs sufficed to remove the obstacle of guilt for the whole human race; that impediment was removed at the price of Christ's blood’ (‘Non tamen alicujus fides, vel justitia sufficiebat ad removendum impedimentum quod erat per reatum totius humanae creatura; quod quidem remotum est pretio sanguinis Christi’).

72 Non-violent atonement theologians, as I call them, have good reasons for desiring to reinterpret the atonement for contemporary society. In the face of extreme religious violence inflicted by those who profess to follow God, they hope to change the theological focus from the violence of God to the peace-making image of God, even in the doctrine of atonement.

73 For a good treatment of metaphor and story telling in scripture see Seibert, , Disturbing Divine Behavior (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009)Google Scholar.