Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 August 2017
Since Augustine, western medieval thinkers have largely identified ‘simplicity’ as the most fundamental feature of the divine nature. Although the western tradition of thinking about God has often been regarded as relatively continuous, I will demonstrate in this paper that a separate line of thought developed amongst early thirteenth-century Franciscan thinkers. This new tradition stressed God's immensity or infinity. In doing so, I will argue, it instigated a fundamental shift in the way of conceiving the nature of God that holds profound promise for reconciling factions in systematic theology today, particularly between classical theists and panentheists.
1 This contribution is dedicated to Paul Fiddes.
2 See Doucet, Victorin, ‘The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa’, Franciscan Studies 7 (1947), pp. 26‒41, 274‒312CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 See the Prolegomena to Alexander of Hales, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica, 5 vols. (Florence: Quaracchi, 1924–48)Google Scholar, section IV: Patres Latini.
4 Senocak, Neslihan, The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order 1209–1310 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Peter Lombard, Sentences, vol. 1: simplicity (distinction 8); God's knowledge (distinction 35); God's omnipotence (distinctions 42–4); the will of God (distinctions 45–8).
6 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. Marmura, Michael E. (Salt Lake City, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005)Google Scholar. Wass, Meldon C. draws attention to the Avicennian influence on the Summa in his The Infinite God and the ‘Summa fratris Alexandri’ (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1964)Google Scholar.
7 Isidore of Seville, Sententiae, book I, chs 2, 3: Immensitas divinae magnitudinis ita est, ut intelligamus eum intra omnia, sed non inclusum; extra omnia, sed non exclusum. Et ideo interiorem, ut omnia contineat; ideo exteriorem, ut incircumscripta magnitudinis suae immensitate omnia concludat. Per id ergo, quod exterior est, ostenditur esse creator; per id vero quod interior, gubernare omnia demonstratur. Ac ne ea quae creata sunt sine Deo essent, Deus intra omnia est. Verum ne extra Deum essent, Deus exterior est, ut omnia concludantur. There are eight references to divine immensity in total in this work.
8 Bougerol, Jacques-Guy, ‘The Church Fathers and the Sentences of Peter Lombard’, in Backus, Irena (ed.), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 113–64, esp. pp. 133–7Google Scholar.
9 Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate [hereafter DT], in Patrologia Latina, vol. 196, ed. Migne, J. P. (Paris, 1855), 3.1, p. 115 Google Scholar. Page numbers taken from the translation by Angelici, Ruben, Richard of St Victor: On the Trinity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011)Google Scholar.
10 DT 1.5, p. 76.
11 DT 1.8, p. 79; cf. John Scotus Eriugena, De divisione naturae 1.1, 441b.
12 DT 1.14, p. 83.
13 DT 1.11, p. 81.
14 DT 2.5, p. 95.
15 DT 2.3, p. 93.
16 DT 2.6, p. 95.
17 DT 2.16, p. 104.
18 DT 2.18, p. 105.
19 DT 2.20, p. 107.
20 DT 6.6, pp. 209–10.
21 DT 5.1–2, pp. 171–3.
22 DT 6.7, pp. 210–11.
23 Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica [hereafter SH] (Florence: Quaracchi, 1924), tr 1, qu 3, ch 1, ad 2, p. 50. All references taken from volume 1 unless otherwise stated, and all translations are mine.
24 SH, tr 1, qu 3, c 2, respondeo, p. 52.
25 SH, tr 2, qu 1, c 1, pp. 54–7.
26 Augustine, De quantitate animae 3.
27 SH, tr 2, qu 1, c 1, ad 1, 2, 4, 5, pp. 54–5.
28 SH, tr 2, qu 1, c 1, solutio, p. 56; cf. Psuedo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 1.1: universaliter non audendum dicere aliquid de insuperabili et occulta divinitate, quam ea quae nobis divinitus ex sacris Eloquiis claruerint.
29 John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa 1.8: deus est incircumscriptus, increatus, infinitus.
30 SH, tr 2, qu 2, c 1, respondeo, pp. 59–60: dicendum quod potest appelari comprehensio cognitio intellectus apprehendentis sive adhaerentis veritati, vel potest appelari comprehensio cognitio intellectus includentis. Sumendo comprehensionem primo modo, dicendum quod Deus est comprehensibilis, quia intellectus noster adhaeret veritati quae Deus est . . . Et haec comprehensio nihil aliud est quam quaedam apprehensio. . . . Si dicatur comprehensio cognitio intellectus includentis . . . hoc modo impossibile est Deum comprehendi, quia impossibile est quod intellectus includat divinam essentiam.
31 Augustine, De videndo Deo 9.21.
32 SH, tr 2, qu 3, tit 1, c 1, a, p. 62; cf. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa 1.13: incircumscriptibile est quod nullo horum continetur.
33 SH, tr 2, qu 3, tit 1, c 2, solutio, p. 63.
34 SH, tr 2, qu 3, tit 2, c 1, solutio, pp. 64–5; cf. Augustine, Epist. 184, 4.11: sapientia replere sapientem.
35 SH, tr 2, qu 3, tit 2, c 1, solutio, p. 64, quoting Boethius, De Trinitate 4: ‘Deus est ubique’ ita dici videtur non quod sit in omni loco, sed quod omnis locus ei adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non capiatur in loco.
36 SH, tr 2, qu 3, tit 2, c 1, III.a, p. 64.
37 Peter Lombard also treats this topic in his Sentences, distinctions 36–7, which cover the presence of things in God and God in things.
38 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 1, pp. 70-1.
39 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 2, I.a, b, c, p. 71; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11; Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate 2.23; Anselm, Monologion 13.
40 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 2, pp. 72–3.
41 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 4, II, p. 74.
42 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 4, II, respondeo, pp. 75–6.
43 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 2, II.2, p. 72.
44 SH, tr 2, tit 3, memb 1, c 5, solutio, p. 76.
45 See Wood's, Rega article on Alexander's discussion of the divine ideas in his Gloss on Lombard's Sentences and Disputed Questions: ‘Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus’, Franciscan Studies 53/7 (1997), pp. 7–31Google Scholar. See also, Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Quaracchi, 1951–7).
46 SH, tr 5, sectio 1, qu 1, memb 3, c 6, ad objecta 1, p. 256: hoc est ex imperfectione intellectus nostril quod non potest intelligere singulare, non autem ex eius immaterialitate. Aliter tamen dicendum et verius quod intellectus humanus intelligit singularia; intellectus enim accipit speciem rei et intelligit rem ipsam . . . nota igitur quod intellectus humanus intelligit singulare per speciem vel similitudinem eius acceptam adminiculo sensus.
47 SH, tr 5, sectio 1, qu 1, memb 4, c 1, II, respondeo, p. 258.
48 SH, tr 5, sectio 1, qu 1, memb 3, c 2, respondeo, p. 252.
49 SH, tr 5, sectio 1, qu 1, memb 3, c 1, respondeo, pp. 250–1.
50 SH, tr 4, qu 2, memb 2, c 1, 1.1, p. 218.
51 SH, tr 4, qu 2, memb 2, c 2, ad objecta I.1–3, p. 220.
52 SH, tr 4, qu 2, memb 2, c 2, ad objecta III, p. 221. Another particularly interesting – and related – section treats that which is possible for the divine power (SH, tr 4, qu 3, pp. 229ff.). In discussing this matter, the Summist distinguishes between the usage of the term ‘possible’ de dicto or de re. On his understanding, the de dicto application of the term does not apply here, because it refers to general categories rather than specific beings or states of affairs. Possibility de re in his view can be defined either as proper or characteristic of a thing (proprie) or as appropriated by it (appropriate). What is appropriate is made possible by a superior cause, but what is proper is possible by its inferior or intrinsic cause. While it is not possible for a virgin to conceive or a blind person to see in terms of an inferior cause, it is possible by way of a superior cause (SH, tr 4, qu 3, c 1, respondeo, p. 231). Thus, such things are only possible unconditionally (simpliciter) where there is a superior cause.
53 SH, tr 5, sectio 1, qu 1, memb 4, c 1, VI, respondeo, p. 260.
54 SH, tr 5, sectio 1, qu 1, memb 3, c 3, respondeo 1, p. 253.
55 SH, tr 6, qu 4, c 1, respondeo, p. 403.
56 SH, tr 6, qu 4, c 3, respondeo, p. 404.
57 SH, tr 3, qu 1, memb 1, c 1, respondeo, p. 113: ‘Ens’ sit primum intelligibile, eius intentio apud intellectum est nota (Avicenna, Metaph. I.6); primae ergo determinationes entis sunt primae impressiones apud intellectum: eae sunt unum, verum, bonum, sic patebit; non poterunt ergo habere aliqua priora specialiter ad sui notificationem. Si ergo notificatio fiat eorum, hoc non erit nisi per posterior, ut per abnegationem vel effectum consequentem.
58 See Hasse, Dag Nikolaus, Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West (London: Warburg Institute, 2001)Google Scholar.
59 Celano 2, in St Francis of Assisi: Omnibus of Sources, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Marion A. Habig, Paul J. Oligny, and Leo Sherley-Price (Cincinnati, OH: St Anthony Messenger Press, 2008), p. 369.
60 Celano 1, ibid., p. 296.
61 Ibid., p. 277.
62 Celano 2, pp. 494–5.
63 As an anonymous reader of this article helpfully pointed out, however, Whitehead's metaphysics is not the only means by which Christian theology has been introduced to panentheism. See e.g. Bulgakov, Sergius, Lamb of God, trans. Jakim, Boris (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008)Google Scholar.
64 Burrell, David, Aquinas: God and Action (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) (London: University of Scranton Press, 2008)Google Scholar; Weinandy, Thomas, Does God Suffer? (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000)Google Scholar; and Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation (Still River, MA: St Bede's, 2002).