Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
Some years ago, the editor of the Scottish Journal of Theology asked me to review what was, to me, an interesting and important book which amounted to a systematic attack on the existence of God, at any rate on the validity of the traditional theistic proofs of classical and modern systematic theology. In addition, such other bases of belief in God as authority revelation, historical event, and religious experience were treated, with the aim of showing that they cannot substitute for a failed philosophical theism. However, some mental block prevented me from completing the review proper. The root of the matter was that, in my Bachelor of Arts degree at Sydney University, my philosophical course had involved a system of atheism which I have recognised ever since to be more rigorous and cogent than any others, and I am not alone in this feeling. In particular, I felt that Professor Flew was in a stronger position than most philosophers of the prevailing modern British schools, but that this was because he approximated more than most to what I had learnt at Sydney, and that a still further approximation would tighten his case still more. The professor in question, the late John Anderson, was a Clydesider whose family background was the familiar Leftwing agnosticism and whose training was Absolute Idealism; in his later development, he reacted against both these elements, but his agnosticism hardened into a positive atheism.
page 271 note 1 God and Philosophy, by Flew, Antony, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Keele (Staffs., England)Google Scholar, in the series ‘Philosophy at Work’. London, 1966, pp. 194 + 14 bibl. aad indexes. Price in U.K., $1.50.
page 272 note 1 John Anderson, Studies in Empirical Philosophy; commemorative volume published by Angus & Robertson, Ltd., Sydney, 1962, for the Anderson Testimonial Fund Committee.Google Scholar
page 273 note 1 ‘Design’, Australasian Journal of Psychology & Philosophy, XIII: 4 (Dec. 1935)Google Scholar, reprinted in S.E.Ph. pp. 87–100. Philo is accepted as representing Hume's own position, as opposed to the orthodoxy of Cleanthes.
page 274 note 1 Early Greek Philosophy. See also the collected fragments from the Pre-Socratics in Diels's collection.
page 280 note 1 Realism and Some of its Critics, A.J.P.P., VIII: 2 (June 1930)Google Scholar; see Studies in Empirical Philosophy, p. 53.
page 281 note 1 The whole character of the philosophy of Hegel is due to the refusal to make this distinction, right at the beginning of the Logic.
page 282 note 1 In view of the controversy on the matter in Biblical theology, it is interesting to note that this is the very noun-sentence form that has been stated to be Hebraic and un-Hellenic. It is strange that this is the form used here, and also in places in Aristotle, in the logical analysis of the sentence.
page 287 note 1 See Classicism, St. Emp. Ph. 189 ff., and Fourth Report, Australian Humanities Research Council, and references therein to Matthew Arnold.
page 289 note 1 As an Australian who is now in South Africa, I feel that a few comments are in order, even at the risk of being parochial or intrusive. I do not feel that Professor Anderson's failure in this regard is primarily due to his lateness in understanding the importance of classicism. Even more important, I do not think that it is due to the character of his adopted country, in spite of the stereotype that is apparently being revived in recent decades. The Australians are really a quiet and orderly people, with a certain scepticism and a keen sense of the ridiculous that is a good antidote to immoderation, and in spite of great difficulties have shown sufficient sense of conservatism for Anderson's type of classicism to make a powerful appeal. But this is not enough, least of all at the present day. The trouble is that these–in general–worthy characteristics of Australians seem to be capable of functioning only negatively, that is, in making any course of action, or even non-action, seem just a little ridiculous. Under these circumstances, Andersonianism is a most dangerous philosophy, as its natural effect would be (and has been) to exaggerate this tendency even to the extent of rendering a real classicising movement impossible, by dissolving both religious faith and the tradition of purposive activity. This is confirmed by the almost complete nullity of present-day Australia socially and politically, indeed, in every way beyond the sense which Metternich is said to have attributed to Italy, a geographical (not to say geological or minerological?) expression; the country counted for much more in the days when, by any formal criteria, it counted for much less. My friends and acquaintances, for what they are worth, feel that this decline is closely liked with the decline in religion, and the contrast with South Africa, whatever one thinks of what is actually done there, abundantly confirms this judgment. These two countries, as they are today, are excellent commentaries on the truth that, although the supreme fact of our election, justification, sanctification and effectual calling are reserved to God in Christ himself, Christian faith is, at all lower levels, the stimulus to action par excellence.
page 292 note 1 op. cit., p. 53.
page 292 note 1 Studies in Empirical Philosophy, p. 91.
page 292 note 2 op. cit., ch. 4.
page 292 note 3 Loc. cit. p. 90.
page 292 note 4 Flew, op. cit. p. 84 and reference
page 293 note 1 Especially in view of Malcolm's use of two types of Being.
page 294 note 1 C. Ar.II:41. ;