Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 September 2008
This article focuses on the dialectic of metapsychology and hermeneutics in psychoanalysis. By combining the causal language of the former with the inten tional terminology of the latter, Freud's discourse continuously transgresses the narrowly conceived boundaries of scientific disciplines and places its stakes in both the humanities and the natural sciences. The argument is made that attempts to reduce psychoanalytic theory to either causal explanation or interpretation of meaning turn it into a closed thought system and rob it of its vitality. It is argued, moreover, that although Freud understood himself to be a scientist, by eschewing the dichotomous reductionism characteristic of both his orthodox followers and critics who tried and still try to turn psychoanalysis into either a natural-science- like discipline or a hermeneutics, Freud demonstrated that his self-understanding was far more sophisticated than admitted by either of these two groups. This argument is supported by a detailed discussion of Freud's epistemological pre mises, his conception of science and reality, and especially, the place he allocated to metapsychology in his interdisciplinary science. It is claimed that metapsy chology served Freud as a double-edged sword, both enabling creative and metaphorical thought about the mind's hidden reality and revealing the necessary incompleteness of hermeneutics. The article concludes with the claim that psy choanalysis needs metapsychology in order to pursue this dual task.