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What's the point in Scientific Realism if we don't know what's really there?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2007

Sophie R. Allen
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Extract

The aim of this paper will be to show that certain strongly realist forms of scientific realism are either misguided or misnamed. I will argue that, in the case of a range of robustly realist formulations of scientific realism, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘realism’ are in significant philosophical and methodological conflict with each other; in particular, that there is a tension between the actual subject matter and methods of science on the one hand, and the realists' metaphysical claims about which categories of entities the world contains on the other.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 61: Philosophy of Science , October 2007 , pp. 97 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2007

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