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Relationality in the Thought of Mary Midgley
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 June 2020
Abstract
For over 40 years, Mary Midgley has been celebrated for the sensibility with which she approached some of the most challenging and pressing issues in philosophy. Her expansive corpus addresses such diverse topics as human nature, morality, animals and the environment, gender, science, and religion. While there are many threads that tie together this impressive plurality of topics, the thread of relationality unites much of Midgley's thought on human nature and morality. This paper explores Midgley's pursuit of a relational notion of the self and our connections to others, including animals and the natural world.
- Type
- Papers
- Information
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 87: A Centenary Celebration: Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, Murdoch , July 2020 , pp. 235 - 248
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2020
References
1 This paper is adapted from portions of McElwain, Gregory S., Mary Midgley: An Introduction (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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7 Midgley, Mary, The Myths We Live By (London: Routledge, [2004] 2011), 132CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This coincides with her critique of traditional individualist conceptions of the self as largely masculinist (see McElwain, Mary Midgley, 107–20).
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