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On Being Obliged to Act1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2010

Alan R. White
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Extract

There are various ways in which a person's freedom of action may be diminished or restricted. Instead of acting, he may be acted upon; or he may be unable to help doing what he does. He may suffer from some disability, have a duty imposed on him or do something because he is obliged to do it. In this essay, I wish to examine the notion of being obliged to do something. I shall investigate the differences between ‘being obliged by A to do X’ and ‘being obliged to A for X’; between ‘being obliged to do X’ and ‘having (or being under) an obligation to do X’; between being physically obliged and being morally, legally and logically obliged; and between saying ‘X is something I am obliged to do’, ‘X is something I choose to do’ and ‘X is something I ought to do’.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 1 , March 1968 , pp. 64 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1968

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References

page 68 note 1 Baier, K., ‘Moral Obligation’, Am. Philos. Quarterly (1966), p. 220a,Google Scholar note 24, asserts that ‘being obliged cannot be used to explain having an obligation’; but his assertion lacks argument.

page 78 note 1 , Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963), p. 170,Google Scholar calls a feeling of obligation ‘a desire to do what one ought’. Wright, Von, in The Varieties of Goodness (1963),Google Scholar ch. 8, assimilates ‘ought’ and ‘must’; in Norm & Action (1963),Google Scholar ch. v, sect. 12, he says ‘it is obvious’ that ‘ought to be done’ means ‘must not be left undone’ and ‘ought to be left undone’ means ‘must not be done’. But this does not fit the ordinary use of the term, e.g. ‘With all that grass you ought to get another mower’ does not mean ‘You must not omit to get another mower’. ‘You ought to leave the rest of your work till tomorrow’ does not mean ‘You must not do the rest of your work now’; ‘There ought to be a law against it’ does not mean ‘There must not not be a law against it’. Baier, K., The Moral Point of View (1958), p. 283,Google Scholar holds that there is one use of ‘must’ in which it is equivalent to ‘ought’. Prichard, H. A., Moral Obligation (1949), pp. 89–90,Google Scholar thinks that ‘is morally bound’ is a useful synonym for ‘ought’ because ‘“ought” does not admit of difference of tense’. He also (90–1) seems to think that the ‘ought’ in ‘If you want X, and Y is necessary to do X, then you ought to do y’ means ‘ought’, whereas the ‘ought’ in ‘you ought to tell the truth’ means ‘(morally) obliged’. The reverse of this is nearer the truth.

page 79 note 1 Wright, Von, The Varieties of Goodness, p. 160,Google Scholar assimilates informing that a necessity exists and giving advice.

page 79 note 1 , Black, Phil. Rev. (1964), pp. 165–81.Google Scholar Black's position depends on his holding (p. 170) ‘the differences between the meanings of the two words “must” and “should” are unimportant here’. He also talks of ‘evaluating’ an action as ‘preferable or obligatory’.

page 81 note 1 Thus, , Moore, Principia Ethica, sec. 89,Google Scholar held that ‘the assertion “I am morally bound to perform this action” is identical with the assertion “This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe”.’ Baier, K., The Moral Point of View,Google Scholar ch. 3, holds that ‘What ought I to do?’ or ‘What shall I do?’ means ‘What is the best thing to do?’

page 82 note 1 Searle really admits this in his remark that ‘The whole proof rests on an appeal to the constitutive rule that to make a promise is to undertake an obligation’ (p. 56), for such a constitutive rule involves recognition of a moral system.