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Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

David Papineau
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Extract

A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states.

A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed.

What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of successful action. Conversely, the success-guaranteeing account of truth conditions is incomplete until it is placed in a teleological context.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 27 , March 1990 , pp. 21 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1990

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