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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
I understand Pluralism to be the doctrine that, either generally or with reference to some particular area of judgement, there is more than one basic principle. It endorses the possibility that some particular case may arise which will be adjudicated in one way if one principle is applied while another principle points otherwise and to an answer which, at least in practice, is incompatible. Thus in morality, according to pluralism there may be more than one correct answer to the question of which of the decisions available in some particular situation is the best (Kekes, 1993, esp. pp. 9–15; see also the valuable collection of essays Paul, Miller and Paul, 1994).
1 This idea is of immense—but inadequately examined—importance in contemporary ontology.
2 These observations are intended to encapsulate the hunch that such texts as De Anima F5, Metaphysics A7–2, and Nichomachean Ethics K7 represent an unusual tendency in Aristotle's philosophy. Despite that, the tendency is not dissonant from its wider setting. See Evans, 1987, pp. 171–2.
3 The attentive reader could reasonably expect a simple and single account of how to live, individually and socially, from such texts as Nichomachean Ethics K7–2, Politics Bl.
4 The interpretation of the second sentence is uncertain. Aristotle is clearly making a point about the conventional and variable character of economic measures; and I believe that he does so by way of an anti-commercial joke.
5 A fuller discussion than is possible here would need to comment explicitly on the somewhat different positions advanced by such figures as Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus in Republic 1. But I believe that all the positions against which Socrates reacts share the significant leading feature of underestimating the power of rational enquiry to explore questions concerning value.
6 The considerations canvassed here seem to me to tell decisively against the influential view that Socrates had a specialised concept of knowledge as something certain and infallible. See Vlastos, 1994, pp. 39–2, and Reeves, 1989, pp. 43–2. If that idea were right, the central role assigned to knowledge in testing claims about value would be untenable.
7 This is the message of Republic 5–2, see esp. 505a, 531–2. The posthumous reports of Plato's lecture on The Good indicate that he did not abandon this ideal of knowledge. See Cherniss, 1962, pp.1—3.
8 Although Aristotle distinguishes practical and theoretical rationality, he also marks very extensive similarities between the two. A good example is the account of the practical syllogism, De Motn Animalium 7, 701a8–2. So there is no reason not to apply the ideas of Metaphysics M10, 1086b32—7, Posterior Analytics A24, about the importance of generalisation, to practical reason as well.
9 Earlier versions of this paper were given to audiences at Notre Dame University, the University of Toledo (Ohio), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Shanghai, Hebei University in Baoding (PR China). Janos Pannonius University in Pecs (Hungary) and Uludag University in Bursa (Turkey), during 1990–2. A more remote ancestor was a reply to Garrett Barden at the Irish Philosophical Club in November 1979. I also benefited from discussions at the Royal Institute of Philosophy conference, and I am particularly indebted to Alasdair Maclntyre, Eric Snider, Dajian Xu, Gyorgy Andrassy and Sevgi Iyi.