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“Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2017

Christian Piller
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Extract

In the first section of this paper I draw, on a purely conceptual level, a distinction between two kinds of reasons: content-related and attitude-related reasons. The established view is that, in the case of the attitude of believing something, there are no attitude-related reasons. I look at some arguments intended to establish this claim in the second section with an eye to whether these argument could be generalized to cover the case of preferences as well. In the third section I argue against such generalizations and present a case in favour of accepting attitude-related reasons for preferences. In the fourth section I present an objection to which I react in the fifth section where I try to strengthen my case for attitude-related reasons for preferences. Finally, I discuss and reject criticisms raised by two opponents of the view defended here.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 59 , December 2006 , pp. 155 - 181
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2006

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