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A Case for Philosophical Pluralism: The Problem of Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Dermot Moran
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Extract

In what sense can we speak of pluralism regarding the philosophical traditions or styles crudely characterised as ‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’? Do these traditions address the same philosophical problems in different ways, or pose different problems altogether? What, if anything, do these traditions share?

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 40 , March 1996 , pp. 19 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1996

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References

1 The first edition was published in 1874 in two books, w'th three other books to follow. The Foreword to the 1874 Edition (p. xv) also promised a Sixth Book on 'the relationship between mind and body'. Only some of the projected books were actually completed, though not in that precise form. The second edition of Psychology (1924) produced by Oskar Kraus contains these as additional essays and notes.

2 I am grateful to Daniel Dennett, Alan Montefiore and William Lyons for comments on earlier drafts of this paper and to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Kevin Mulligan and Richard Kearney for discussion of the issues.