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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
Some years ago I came across the following question thrown out almost casually in the course of discussion: How many of us, it was asked, want to call a ‘bad work of art’ a ‘work of art’? The question was clearly rhetorical; the author quite obviously did not consider that anyone in his right mind would suggest that a bad work of art was a work of art. This struck me as rather odd. Surely there can be good and bad works of art, just as there can be good and bad apples or good and bad men. An apple does not cease to be an apple just because it is bad, unless perhaps it has become thoroughly rotten; but the gardener who says ‘The Coxes are bad this year’ does not mean that they have grown rotten on the trees, much less that they are not apples at all. Moreover, if so-called bad works of art are not works of art, what are they? You may not think highly of the works in the Royal Academy Summer Exhibition but they are not totally dissimilar to some works in Bond Street next door which are highly regarded.
page 182 note 1 Gregor, Sonia, ‘Presentational Theories Need Unpacking’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 159.Google Scholar
page 183 note 1 There is also the neutral sense which is more or less synonymous with ‘visual art’ or what the French call an objet d'art. We are not concerned with this here.
page 183 note 2 Kemp, J., ‘The Work of Art and the Artist's Intentions’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 4 no. 2, p. 147.Google Scholar Cf. Racy, R. F., ‘The Aesthetic Experience’Google Scholar, ibid., vol. 9 no. 4: ‘The point which one wishes to make is that good art and bad art all come under the classification of art, just as good machines and bad machines are all machines’ (p. 350).Google Scholar
page 183 note 3 Weitz, M., ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15, p. 34.Google Scholar
page 183 note 4 Khatchadourian, H., ‘Art Names and Aesthetic Judgments’, Philosophy, vol. 36, p. 31 n.Google Scholar
page 184 note 1 Collingwood, R. G., The Principles of Art (Oxford, 1938) p. 380.Google Scholar
page 185 note 1 There are various necessary conditions for something being a work of art: it must be man-made or at least chosen and displayed, it must be proposed for aesthetic enjoyment, etc. But if these alone were accepted, we would have to admit that every parlour mantelpiece, shrine and grave was a work of art, since they are intended as, and believed to be, objects of aesthetic delight. I am assuming that they would not be called works of art, much less bad works of art. If I am wrong in this, then my whole thesis falls to the ground.
page 186 note 1 Weitz, M., p. 32.Google Scholar
page 188 note 1 Citing the difficulties of the customs or inland revenue is only partially frivolous. Practical legal tests often give an edge to philosophical discussion. In this instance philosophical discussion might have practical fruit. For administrative convenience it has been decided, for instance, that ‘multiples’ shall be subject to tax on the grounds that they are commercial products (which is true). Yet not only are they original works of art (they are not copies or even prints) but they are by eminent artists, such as Vasarely, Le Pare, Soto (all of whom have won international prizes). (The fear is, presumably, that the manufacturers of garden shears will claim that their products are works of art too.)
page 188 note 2 Gallie, W. B., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1955–1956, pp. 167–98.Google Scholar
page 189 note 1 It is not within the scope of this paper to determine the meaning of the terms ‘aesthetic interest’ or (below) ‘aesthetic value’. In the discussion which followed this paper, Miss Ruby Meager, the chairman, suggested that one could say that ‘what accredited and paid critics regard as works of art are works of art’ and this would be an acquiescent, neutral definition of ‘work of art’. I agree. But the trouble is that accredited and paid critics do not agree among themselves, and if they did, it would still be open to a budding critic to disagree with their verdict (description) and win support for his views.
page 189 note 2 Gallie, ibid.
page 190 note 1 See p. 189, n. 1 above.
page 191 note 1 Richter, H., Dada (London, 1965) pp. 52 and 88–9.Google Scholar
page 191 note 2 I do not wish to deny that certain things can be declared not to be works of art by applying neutral criteria, e.g., that they are not man-made or not made with the intention of giving aesthetic pleasure or whatever. The point is that these conditions are not sufficient to guarantee that the thing in question is a. work of art.