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Acting According to Conscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Desmond M. Clarke
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Extract

We have inherited from the history of moral philosophy two very different proposals about how we ought to behave. According to one view, we are required to do what is morally right; on the alternative formulation, we are required to do what we believe to be morally right. Unless these twin demands on our moral decision-making can be made to coincide by definition, it is inevitable that in some cases our beliefs about what is morally right may be mistaken. In such cases, it is not clear what we are morally required to do. Are we obliged to follow our conscience in every situation, i.e. to act according to our moral beliefs, or is it sometimes permissible not to act according to our own moral beliefs?

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 22: Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems , September 1987 , pp. 135 - 149
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1987

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References

1 The problem goes back at least to Aristotle's ethics. See Aristotle, (1915)Google Scholar El, 1129b. (I owe this reference to J. Evans, D. G., who discusses the text briefly in his (1977) 87.)Google Scholar

2 Aquinas, (1966) 63Google Scholar (Iallae, q. 19, art. 5).

3 Finnis, (1980) 125–6.Google Scholar See also D'Arcy, (1961)Google Scholar for a full exposition of Aquinas' theory of conscience.

4 Finnis, (1980) 133Google Scholar (note V.9) recognizes that it would be reasonable for the agent to reject his own moral evaluation of a proposed course of action and to ‘bow to contrary advice or instructions or norms’, if he were aware of having formed his practical judgment ‘inadequately’.

5 Aquinas, (1966) 67 (IaIIae, q. 19, art. 6).Google Scholar

6 Williams, (1973).Google Scholar

7 Williams, (1973) 167.Google Scholar

8 Cohen, Brenda (1967)Google Scholar discusses the inconsistency involved in claiming that some action is morally wrong and, at the same time, that it is morally right for others to act in that way. (I am grateful to Jim Brown for bringing this and other relevant material to my attention.)

9 Prichard, (1966).Google Scholar

10 Prichard, (1966) 56.Google Scholar

11 Prichard, (1966) 41.Google Scholar

12 Prichard, (1966) 48.Google Scholar

13 Aquinas, (1966) 60 (IaIIae, q. 19, art. 5).Google Scholar

14 Finnis, (1980) 125–6.Google Scholar

15 Cf. Aristotle, (1915) H2, 1146a27–31.Google Scholar

16 Williams, (1973) 172ff.Google Scholar, and the discussion of agent-regret in his (1981b).