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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
We have inherited from the history of moral philosophy two very different proposals about how we ought to behave. According to one view, we are required to do what is morally right; on the alternative formulation, we are required to do what we believe to be morally right. Unless these twin demands on our moral decision-making can be made to coincide by definition, it is inevitable that in some cases our beliefs about what is morally right may be mistaken. In such cases, it is not clear what we are morally required to do. Are we obliged to follow our conscience in every situation, i.e. to act according to our moral beliefs, or is it sometimes permissible not to act according to our own moral beliefs?
1 The problem goes back at least to Aristotle's ethics. See Aristotle, (1915)Google Scholar El, 1129b. (I owe this reference to J. Evans, D. G., who discusses the text briefly in his (1977) 87.)Google Scholar
2 Aquinas, (1966) 63Google Scholar (Iallae, q. 19, art. 5).
3 Finnis, (1980) 125–6.Google Scholar See also D'Arcy, (1961)Google Scholar for a full exposition of Aquinas' theory of conscience.
4 Finnis, (1980) 133Google Scholar (note V.9) recognizes that it would be reasonable for the agent to reject his own moral evaluation of a proposed course of action and to ‘bow to contrary advice or instructions or norms’, if he were aware of having formed his practical judgment ‘inadequately’.
5 Aquinas, (1966) 67 (IaIIae, q. 19, art. 6).Google Scholar
6 Williams, (1973).Google Scholar
7 Williams, (1973) 167.Google Scholar
8 Cohen, Brenda (1967)Google Scholar discusses the inconsistency involved in claiming that some action is morally wrong and, at the same time, that it is morally right for others to act in that way. (I am grateful to Jim Brown for bringing this and other relevant material to my attention.)
9 Prichard, (1966).Google Scholar
10 Prichard, (1966) 56.Google Scholar
11 Prichard, (1966) 41.Google Scholar
12 Prichard, (1966) 48.Google Scholar
13 Aquinas, (1966) 60 (IaIIae, q. 19, art. 5).Google Scholar
14 Finnis, (1980) 125–6.Google Scholar
15 Cf. Aristotle, (1915) H2, 1146a27–31.Google Scholar
16 Williams, (1973) 172ff.Google Scholar, and the discussion of agent-regret in his (1981b).