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“Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2017

Philip Pettit
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Extract

In his famous lecture on ‘The Concept of Preference’ Amartya Sen (1982) opened up the topic of preference and preferencesatisfaction to critical, philosophical debate. He pointed out that preference in the sense in which choice reveals one's preference need not be preference in the sense in which people are personally better off for having their preferences satisfied. And on the basis of that observation he built a powerful critique of some common assumptions in welfare economics.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 59 , December 2006 , pp. 131 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2006

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