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The Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2010

Margaret A. Boden
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Extract

If the Trade Descriptions Act were applied to academic labels, cognitive scientists would be in trouble. For what they do is much wider than the name suggests—and wider, too, than most philosophers assume. They give you more for your money than you may have expected.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 48 , September 2001 , pp. 209 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2001

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