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Perception and Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

M. R. Ayers
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Extract

There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 3: Knowledge and Necessity , March 1969 , pp. 91 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1969

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