This paper is a systematic exploration of non-wellfounded mereology. Motivations and applications suggested in the literature are considered. Some are exotic like Borges’ Aleph, and the trinity; other examples are less so, like time traveling bricks, and even Geach’s Tibbles the Cat. The authors point out that the transitivity of non-wellfounded parthood is inconsistent with extensionality. A non-wellfounded mereology is developed with careful consideration paid to rival notions of supplementation and fusion. Two equivalent axiomatizations are given, and are compared to classical mereology. We provide a class of models with respect to which the non-wellfounded mereology is sound and complete.

A normalization procedure is given for classical natural deduction with the standard rule of indirect proof applied to arbitrary formulas. For normal derivability and the subformula property, it is sufficient to permute down instances of indirect proof whenever they have been used for concluding a major premiss of an elimination rule. The result applies even to natural deduction for classical modal logic.

Valentini (1983) has presented a proof of cut-elimination for provability logic GL for a sequent calculus using sequents built from sets as opposed to multisets, thus avoiding an explicit contraction rule. From a formal point of view, it is more syntactic and satisfying to explicitly identify the applications of the contraction rule that are ‘hidden’ in proofs of cut-elimination for such sequent calculi. There is often an underlying assumption that the move to a proof of cut-elimination for sequents built from multisets is straightforward. Recently, however, it has been claimed that Valentini’s arguments to eliminate cut do not terminate when applied to a multiset formulation of the calculus with an explicit rule of contraction. The claim has led to much confusion and various authors have sought new proofs of cut-elimination for GL in a multiset setting.

Here we refute this claim by placing Valentini’s arguments in a formal setting and proving cut-elimination for sequents built from multisets. The use of sequents built from multisets enables us to accurately account for the interplay between the weakening and contraction rules. Furthermore, Valentini’s original proof relies on a novel induction parameter called “width” which is computed ‘globally’. It is difficult to verify the correctness of his induction argument based on “width.” In our formulation however, verification of the induction argument is straightforward. Finally, the multiset setting also introduces a new complication in the case of contractions above cut when the cut-formula is boxed. We deal with this using a new transformation based on Valentini’s original arguments.

Finally, we discuss the possibility of adapting this cut-elimination procedure to other logics axiomatizable by formulae of a syntactically similar form to the GL axiom.

We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of the logic of ‘actually’, as well as a two-dimensional semantics with respect to which our logics are sound and complete. Our completeness results are quite general, pertaining to all such actuality logics that extend a normal and canonical modal basis. We also show that our logics have the strong finite model property and permit straightforward first-order extensions.

Igor Douven establishes several new intransitivity results concerning evidential support. I add to Douven’s very instructive discussion by establishing two further intransitivity results and a transitivity result.

This paper develops a (nontrivial) theory of cardinal numbers from a naive set comprehension principle, in a suitable paraconsistent logic. To underwrite cardinal arithmetic, the axiom of choice is proved. A new proof of Cantor’s theorem is provided, as well as a method for demonstrating the existence of large cardinals by way of a reflection theorem.

Traditional geometry concerns itself with planimetric and stereometric considerations, which are at the root of the division between plane and solid geometry. To raise the issue of the relation between these two areas brings with it a host of different problems that pertain to mathematical practice, epistemology, semantics, ontology, methodology, and logic. In addition, issues of psychology and pedagogy are also important here. To our knowledge there is no single contribution that studies in detail even one of the aforementioned areas.

In this paper our major concern is with methodological issues of purity and thus we treat the connection to other areas of the planimetry/stereometry relation only to the extent necessary to articulate the problem area we are after.

Our strategy will be as follows. In the first part of the paper we will give a rough sketch of some key episodes in mathematical practice that relate to the interaction between plane and solid geometry. The sketch is given in broad strokes and only with the intent of acquainting the reader with some of the mathematical context against which the problem emerges. In the second part, we will look at a debate (on “fusionism”) in which for the first time methodological and foundational issues related to aspects of the mathematical practice covered in the first part of the paper came to the fore. We conclude this part of the paper by remarking that only through a foundational and philosophical effort could the issues raised by the debate on “fusionism” be made precise. The third part of the paper focuses on a specific case study which has been the subject of such an effort, namely the foundational analysis of the plane version of Desargues’ theorem on homological triangles and its implications for the relationship between plane and solid geometry. Finally, building on the foundational case study analyzed in the third section, we begin in the fourth section the analytic work necessary for exploring various important claims about “purity,” “content,” and other relevant notions.

This paper shows how to conservatively extend a classical logic with a transparent truth predicate, in the face of the paradoxes that arise as a consequence. All classical inferences are preserved, and indeed extended to the full (truth-involving) vocabulary. However, not all classical metainferences are preserved; in particular, the resulting logical system is nontransitive. Some limits on this nontransitivity are adumbrated, and two proof systems are presented and shown to be sound and complete. (One proof system features admissible Cut, but the other does not.)