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TRUTH AND SPEED-UP

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2014

MARTIN FISCHER
MARTIN FISCHER*
Affiliation:
Mathematical Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich
*
*MUNICH CENTER FOR MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITY 80539 MUNICH, GERMANY E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the phenomenon of speed-up in the context of theories of truth. We focus on axiomatic theories of truth extending Peano arithmetic. We are particularly interested on whether conservative extensions of PA have speed-up and on how this relates to a deflationist account. We show that disquotational theories have no significant speed-up, in contrast to some compositional theories, and we briefly assess the philosophical implications of these results.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 319 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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