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A SOLUTION TO THE SURPRISE EXAM PARADOX IN CONSTRUCTIVE MATHEMATICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 May 2012

MOHAMMAD ARDESHIR  and
RASOUL RAMEZANIAN
MOHAMMAD ARDESHIR*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Sharif University of Technology
RASOUL RAMEZANIAN*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Sharif University of Technology
*
*DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, P.O. BOX 11365-9415, TEHRAN, IRAN E-mail:[email protected], [email protected]
*DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, P.O. BOX 11365-9415, TEHRAN, IRAN E-mail:[email protected], [email protected]
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Abstract

We represent the well-known surprise exam paradox in constructive and computable mathematics and offer solutions. One solution is based on Brouwer’s continuity principle in constructive mathematics, and the other involves type 2 Turing computability in classical mathematics. We also discuss the backward induction paradox for extensive form games in constructive logic.

Type
Research Articles
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 679 - 686
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2012

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References

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