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REVISION REVISITED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2012

LEON HORSTEN ,
GRAHAM E. LEIGH ,
HANNES LEITGEB  and
PHILIP WELCH
LEON HORSTEN*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
GRAHAM E. LEIGH*
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
HANNES LEITGEB*
Affiliation:
Ludwig Maximilians-Universität München
PHILIP WELCH*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
*
*LEON HORSTEN, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL, 43 WOODLAND ROAD, BRISTOL BS81UU, UK. E-mail: [email protected]
†GRAHAM LEIGH, FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 10 MERTON STREET, OXFORD, OX14JJ, UK. E-mail: [email protected]
‡HANNES LEITGEB, FAKULTÄT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE, UND RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT, LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN, GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-PLATZ 1, D-80539 MÜNCHEN, GERMANY. E-mail: [email protected]
§PHILIP WELCH, SCHOOL OF MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL, HOWARD HOUSE, UNIVERSITY WALK, BRISTOL BS81TW, UK. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.

Type
Research Articles
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 642 - 664
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2012

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References

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