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REFLEXIVE-INSENSITIVE MODAL LOGICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2015

DAVID R. GILBERT  and
GIORGIO VENTURI
DAVID R. GILBERT*
Affiliation:
State University of Campinas
GIORGIO VENTURI*
Affiliation:
State University of Campinas
*
*CENTRE FOR LOGIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE STATE UNIVERSITY OF CAMPINAS 13083-859, CAMPINAS SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL E-mail:[email protected], [email protected]
*CENTRE FOR LOGIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE STATE UNIVERSITY OF CAMPINAS 13083-859, CAMPINAS SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL E-mail:[email protected], [email protected]
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Abstract

We analyze a class of modal logics rendered insensitive to reflexivity by way of a modification to the semantic definition of the modal operator. We explore the extent to which these logics can be characterized, and prove a general completeness theorem on the basis of a translation between normal modal logics and their reflexive-insensitive counterparts. Lastly, we provide a sufficient semantic condition describing when a similarly general soundness result is also available.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 167 - 180
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

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References

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