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REASSURANCE FOR THE LOGIC OF PARADOX

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2011

MARCEL CRABBÉ
MARCEL CRABBÉ*
Affiliation:
Institut supérieur de Philosophie Université catholique de Louvain
*
*CENTRE DE LOGIQUE/INSTITUT SUPÉRIEUR DE PHILOSOPHIE, UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, PLACE MERCIER 14, 1348 LOUVAIN-1A-NEUVE, BELGIUM. E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

Counterexamples to reassurance relative to a “less inconsistent” relation between models of the logic of paradox are provided. Another relation, designed to fix the problem in logic without equality, is introduced and discussed in connection with the issue of classical recapture.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 479 - 485
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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References

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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