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PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2015

PETER FRITZ
PETER FRITZ*
Affiliation:
University of Oslo
*
*POSTBOKS 1020 BLINDERN 0315 OSLO, NORWAY E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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According to propositional contingentism, it is contingent what propositions there are. This paper presents two ways of modeling contingency in what propositions there are using two classes of possible worlds models. The two classes of models are shown to be equivalent as models of contingency in what propositions there are, although they differ as to which other aspects of reality they represent. These constructions are based on recent work by Robert Stalnaker; the aim of this paper is to explain, expand, and, in one aspect, correct Stalnaker’s discussion.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 123 - 142
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

References

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