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PREFERENCE BASED ON REASONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 November 2011

DANIEL OSHERSON  and
SCOTT WEINSTEIN
DANIEL OSHERSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Princeton University
SCOTT WEINSTEIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON NJ 08540 USA. E-mail: [email protected]
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA PA 19104 USA. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We describe a logic of preference in which modal connectives reflect reasons to desire that a sentence be true. Various conditions on models are introduced and analyzed.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 122 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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References

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