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ON THE TRUTH-CONVERGENCE OF OPEN-MINDED BAYESIANISM

Part of: Foundational and philosophical topics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2021

TOM F. STERKENBURG  and
RIANNE DE HEIDE
TOM F. STERKENBURG
Affiliation:
MUNICH CENTER FOR MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITY MUNICH GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-PLATZ 1, 80539MUNICH, GERMANYE-mail: [email protected]
RIANNE DE HEIDE
Affiliation:
MACHINE LEARNING GROUP CENTRUM WISKUNDE & INFORMATICA SCIENCE PARK 123, 1098XG, THE NETHERLANDS and MATHEMATICAL INSTITUTE LEIDEN UNIVERSITY NIELS BOHRWEG 1, 2333CA LEIDEN, THE NETHERLANDS E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Wenmackers and Romeijn [38] formalize ideas going back to Shimony [33] and Putnam [28] into an open-minded Bayesian inductive logic, that can dynamically incorporate statistical hypotheses proposed in the course of the learning process. In this paper, we show that Wenmackers and Romeijn’s proposal does not preserve the classical Bayesian consistency guarantee of merger with the true hypothesis. We diagnose the problem, and offer a forward-looking open-minded Bayesians that does preserve a version of this guarantee.

Keywords

inductive logicBayesianismtruth-convergence

MSC classification

Primary: 62A01: Foundations and philosophical topics
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 64 - 100
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Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic

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