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A NOTE ON TWO THEOREMS BY ADAMS AND McGEE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2009

MORITZ SCHULZ
MORITZ SCHULZ*
Affiliation:
Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
*
*MORITZ SCHULZ, INSTITUT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN, UNTER DEN LINDEN 6, D-10099 BERLIN E-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

Three-valued accounts of conditionals frequently promise (a) to conform to the probabilistic view that conditionals are evaluated by conditional probabilities, and (b) to yield a plausible account of compounds of conditionals. However, McGee (1981) shows that probabilistic validity, the conception of validity most naturally associated with the probabilistic view, cannot be characterized by a finite matrix. Adams (1995) indicates a further generalization of this result. Nevertheless, Adams (1986) provides a description of probabilistic validity in three-valued terms by going beyond the standard framework. Yet the language Adams considers is severely restricted: it does not contain compounds of conditionals. Thus, a natural question arises: Is there a plausible three-valued account of compounds of conditionals which agrees with probabilistic validity on the restricted language? In this note, I develop a general framework in which to address this question. The answer will be negative.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 509 - 516
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2009

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References

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