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MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION LP AND DEFAULT CLASSICALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2011

JC BEALL
JC BEALL*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, and Department of Philosophy, University of Otago
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, STORRS USA AND DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO, NEW ZEALAND URL:entailments.netE-mail:[email protected]
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Abstract

Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of ‘default classicality’. With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such ‘default classicality’ is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , June 2011 , pp. 326 - 336
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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