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CAN MODALITIES SAVE NAIVE SET THEORY?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2017

PETER FRITZ ,
HARVEY LEDERMAN ,
TIANKAI LIU  and
DANA SCOTT
PETER FRITZ*
Affiliation:
IFIKK, University of Oslo
HARVEY LEDERMAN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University
TIANKAI LIU*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, University of Utah
DANA SCOTT*
Affiliation:
Visiting Scholar, University of California, Berkeley
*
*IFIKK UNIVERSITY OF OSLO PO BOX 1020 BLINDERN 0315 OSLO, NORWAY E-mail: [email protected]
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRINCETON, NJ 08544, USA E-mail: [email protected]
‡DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84112, USA E-mail: [email protected]
§VISITING SCHOLAR UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY, CA 94720, USA E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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To the memory of Prof. Grigori Mints, Stanford University

Born: June 7, 1939, St. Petersburg, Russia

Died: May 29, 2014, Palo Alto, California

Keywords

03B45set theorynaive comprehensionmodal logic
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 21 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017 

References

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