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AN ARGUMENT FOR CONJUNCTION CONDITIONALIZATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2013

LEE WALTERS  and
J. ROBERT G. WILLIAMS
LEE WALTERS*
Affiliation:
Somerville College, Oxford
J. ROBERT G. WILLIAMS*
Affiliation:
University of Leeds
*
*SOMERVILLE COLLEGE OXFORD, OX2 6HD, UK E-mail: [email protected]
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS WOODHOUSE LANE, LEEDS LS2 9JT, UK E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: (X ∧ Y) ⊃ (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 573 - 588
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2013 

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