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FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF DEPENDENCE AND GROUNDEDNESS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2019

EDOARDO RIVELLO
EDOARDO RIVELLO*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, Università degli Studi di Torino
*
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TORINO VIA SANT’OTTAVIO, 20 10124, TORINO, ITALY E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We study, in an abstract and general framework, formal representations of dependence and groundedness which occur in semantic theories of truth. Our goals are (a) to relate the different ways in which groundedness is defined according to the way dependence is represented and (b) to represent different notions of dependence as instances of a suitable generalisation of the mathematical notion of functional dependence.

Keywords

Primary 03E20Secondary 03E75dependencegroundingmonotone operator
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 105 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2019 

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References

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