Theories of social justice are either hegemonic (defending a single determinate standard), skeptical (finding social justice to be radically indeterminate if not meaningless), or pluralistic (claiming that we can disqualify all but a handful of standards, but that we cannot definitively adjudicate among these). I offer here a variation of the pluralistic view, arguing that a single standard cannotbe definitive because of what is termed the antinomies of social justice. These antinomies arise where the demands of justice collide with elements of the gratuitous that are morally valid or are practically unavoidable. Where this occurs, all possible distribution rules turn out to be unfair. An important implication of the argument is that liberal democracies cannot find their grounds for consensus, as John Rawls contends, in a common attachment to principles of justice. Instead, common interests and civic friendship will always be necessary supplements to the sense of justice as a source of social bonds in a free society.

The article examines the setting, in the broadest terms historically, for our contemporary sense of privacy. Given our obvious preoccupation with privacy, there is no need to recite why such an examination might pay dividends. The article has three parts, a consideration of the ancient perspective on privacy by way mostly of Plato and Aristotle, a shorter consideration of the Old Testament perspective, and a consideration of the New Testament and Christian perspective, which is taken to be the primary impulse to our present viewpoint. I conclude with a brief suggestion about a contemporary political problem inherent in this viewpoint.

Classical political philosophy does not claim to be superior to philosophy nor to revelation. Political philosophy is the highest of the practical sciences, itself a unique and legitimate source of specific knowledge that would limit politics to be politics. For the things beyond politics to be free to be confronted in their own nonpolitical order, the polity must itself be constructed in such a way as not to kill its saints or philosophers. Traditionally, theology has been its own science, not the queen of the practical sciences, but the queen of the sciences. This meant that theology, as an articulated statement of revelation, performed a needed check when politics itself became a substitute metaphysics. Since so much theology is itself modeled on the ideologies of modernity, classical political philosophy serves a double purpose, not only to limit the city to its own area, but to restrain those theologies based on modern ideologies. Thus political philosophy serves to allow revelation to be itself.

Though little understood in the Western world, the Eastern Orthodox tradition of Christianity has a distinctive approach to politics which might well be labelled “iconic.” Based on the belief that God's kingdom is capable of having an earthly manifestation, and that the Christian empire is in some sense the image of God's omnipotent rule in the heavens, this iconic ethic has often contributed to a tradition of political absolutism in those countries shaped by Orthodox beliefs. However, more recent reflection, which sees human society as image of the Triune God himself, could serve to shape an approach which is conducive to more participatory political arrangements.

Much of what states do in the international system they do as a response to their perceived obligations, commitments, or responsibilities. Not all of these obligations are owed to the same sort of recipient, however: some may be owed to other identifiable parties with whom one has arrived at a bargain or an exchange of benefits, but obligations may also be owed to a chosen rule of conduct or guide to action, as in the case of deterrence, and to oneself, as in the case of selfpreservation or one's sense of honor. All three types of international obligation have been recognized in international law and practice, but no one of the three categories encompasses all the duties of states. A complete understanding of international relations requires attention to all three parties to which international obligations may be owed.