This article uses the relationship between George Kennan and Dean Acheson as a lens to track a classic debate over the main lines of postwar American foreign policy, especially in regard to Europe and over such related issues as negotiations with the Soviets, German unification, and the size of and necessity for American conventional and nuclear forces. It clarifies that Kennan did not play the role of powerful architect whose planning provided the blueprint and instructions for building the structure of U.S. policy in Europe. Dean Acheson proved the essential builder of the structures which provided the framework for American foreign policy for four decades. In the process, this article clarifies the nature of the personal and professional dealings of the two men over the period from the end of World War II until Acheson's death in 1971.

This article examines the discussion among Russian scholars and activists concerning the principles of political liberalism in Soviet Russia during the Gorbachev era (1985–1991) and in independent Russia during the Yeltsin presidency (1991-present). After a review of the emergence of liberalism during the Gorbachev years, the analysis focuses on three models of political liberalism which have emerged in the context of Russian postcommunist state construction. Each competing model of liberalism—statist, rule of law, and social—offers a different vision of the principles of political liberalism and the strategies necessary to institutionalize liberalism as the foundation of the postcommunist polity.

The classical theory of totalitarianism provided unequalled insights into the nature of the Stalinist system. Its prevailing interpretation, however, proved grossly inadequate to conceptualize and explain the changes of the post-Stalinist period. Because of this, there appeared a strong tendency to reject the “totalitarian model” and, in addition, to discredit it politically, as serving the aims of the cold war. The present article tries to show that emphasizing the importance of changes did not require a wholesale dismantling of the totalitarian theory. On the contrary: the notion of totalitarianism should be preserved as an ideal-typical construct, adequately explaining the militantly ideological phase in the development of communism; the evolution of the system in its postideological phase should be explained as detotalitarization, that is, essentially, as a disintegrating process, paving the way for the so-called collapse of communism. The author analyzes the consecutive stages of the detotalitarization process in post-Stalinist Poland and thus explains the collapse of Polish communism not as a sudden, miraculous change, but as the last link in a long chain of events. He rejects the view that Polish People's Republic was “totalitarian to the end” as having no theoretical justification at all—although still being useful in the political struggle against postcommunist forces.

In his Defence (1787–1788), John Adams rebuts French criticism of the legislative checks and balances present in most American constitutions. His aim, however, is not merely to conserve the constitutional status quo. In addition, he seeks to challenge younger Americans to reform all American constitutions by improving the tripartite legislative balance in them. That reform will be possible only on the basis of a reformed political science. Adams designed his Defence to provide his younger audience with that corrected political science, but to do so without undermining the authority and constitutional achievements of their Fathers. He does this primarily by offering an improved specimen of the kind of “reading and reasoning” that had informed the Founding generation. In it he rehabilitates certain “gloomy” authors as useful to republican political science, especially in their understanding of the passion for distinction and its place in republican government.

Though indebted to the social compact for the basic features of his political thought, James Madison found the doctrine inadequate in one essential respect: its failure to provide an account of founding. Of course, this is no simple oversight in liberal political philosophy. It reflects deep misgivings about prudence—especially when understood in its “architechtonic” sense as the height of practical reason—and the inequalities that it implies. Madison addresses this problem in Federalist, Nos. 37–40, his fullest treatment of the activities of the Federal Convention. Here he defends the classical notion of prudence, describing its relationship to the modern science of politics and suggesting how it can be reconciled with modern egalitarian principles.