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The Western Frontiers of Russia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Extract

Russian foreign policy is characterized by matchless simplicity of conception and persistence of effort. By comparison the foreign policies of the Great Powers of modern times appear vacillating and ambiguous. There is in the history of Russian foreign policy no counterpart for that Hamlet-like indecision which gripped German expansionism confronted by the fateful choice between a western and eastern “orientation,” of the pull and counter-pull of British Empire commitments and continental interests, and of the contradictions between French colonial aspirations and French European policies.

Russian foreign policy is dominated by the strategic factor; its objectives, under the direction of the Czars and Soviet leaders, have remained the same: attainment of strategic frontiers and, wherever racial affinities re-enforce strategic geography, ethnographic frontiers. The principal theatre of operations is now, as it has been for nearly three centuries, eastern and southeastern Europe, and Russian policy in the Middle and Far East has been largely derivative. Only when Russia was blocked in Europe, on the Baltic and Moldavian Plains, only then did she turn to Asia. Russia exercised pressure on the Asiatic rimlands, especially on Britain's positions in southwestern Asia, in order to obtain concessions in Europe. Russian expansionism, although it harvested rich territorial gains in central and eastern Asia, did not let itself be deflected from its primary goals, to wit, Russia's strategic frontiers in the West. Indeed, it was the Russian advance upon Europe, the diplomatic set-backs of the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin and the military defeats in the Crimean War and World War I, which diverted Russia towards such secondary objectives as the Persian Gulf and the Yellow Sea.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1947

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References

1 For a concise description of the topography of eastern Europe, see Fitzgerald, Walter, The New Europe (New York and London, 1946), pp. 5160 and 6879.Google Scholar

2 For an analysis of the historic issues underlying the Soviet-Polish frontier dispute and its settlement by the Yalta Conference, see Shotwell, James T. and Laserson, Max M., Poland and Russia, 1919–1945, (New York), 1945.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 “It is true that Russia … has solemnly pledged herself to respect the new boundaries; but this is a matter of expediency only. From the nature of her diplomatic relations thus far we can but conclude that, given a favorable opportunity, she would not hesitate to denounce the treaties and reestablish the boundary lines in accordance with her own desire to regain possession of her former outlets on the Baltic.”— Bowman, Isaiah, The New World (Yonkers on Hudson and Chicago), 1928, p. 466.Google Scholar

4 Recent events confirmed David Dallin's remarkable projection of Soviet war aims. His prognosis was based on deductions from Czarist diplomatic history. See his Russia and Pottaar Europe (New Haven, 1943); particularly pp. 168170.Google Scholar

6 See Notestein, Frank W. and others, The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union, The League of Nations, Geneva and Princeton, 1944.Google Scholar