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Still the Century of Corporatism?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Philippe C. Schmitter
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Extract

Until recently, Manoilesco's confident prediction could easily be dismissed as yet another example of the ideological bias, wishful thinking and overinflated rhetoric of the thirties, an événementielle response to a peculiar environment and period. With the subsequent defeat of fascism and National Socialism, the spectre of corporatism no longer seemed to haunt the European scene so fatalistically. For a while, the concept itself was virtually retired from the active lexicon of politics, although it was left on behavioral exhibit, so to speak, in such museums of atavistic political practice as Portugal and Spain.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , January 1974 , pp. 85 - 131
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1974

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References

1 Manoilesco, Mihail, Le Siède du Corporatisme, rev. ed. (Paris, 1936).Google Scholar The original edition was published in 1934.

2 Ibid., p. 7.

3 For an example of such a definition by ideology, see Malloy, James, “Authoritarianism, Corporatism and Mobilization in Peru,”Google Scholar elsewhere in this volume. Also Wiarda, Howard, “The Portuguese Corporative System: Basic Structures and Current Functions” (Paper prepared for the Conference Group on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.H., 10 10–14, 1973).Google Scholar In both cases the authors were heavily, if not exclusively, influenced by “Social Christian” versions of corporatist thought.

4 To this article I have appendixed a working bibliography of some 100 titles which seem important to an understanding of the ideological and praxiological bases of corporatism up to and including the interwar period.

5 Baudin, Louis, Le Corporatisme. Italie, Portugal, Allemagne, Espagne, France (Paris, 1942), pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

6 Murat, Auguste, Le Corporatisme (Paris: Les Publications Techniques, 1944), p. 206.Google Scholar For excellent critical treatments of corporatist practice in the 1930's, see Pré, Roland, L'Organisation des rapports économiques et sociaux dans les pays à régime corporatif (Paris, 1936)Google Scholar; Rosenstock-Franck, Louis, L'Economie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait (Paris, 1934Google Scholar; and Perroux, François, Capitalisme et Communauté de Travail (Paris, 1937), pp. 27–178.Google Scholar

7 For a subtle, institutionally sensitive presentation of this argument, see Newton, Ronald “On ‘Functional Groups,’ ‘Fragmentation’ and ‘Pluralism’ in Spanish American Political Society,” Hispanic American Historical Review L, no. 1 (02, 1970), 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an approach which relies essentially on an ill-defined, Catholic weltanschauunglich argument, see Wiarda, Howard, “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition,” World Politics XXV, no. 2 (01, 1973), 206–235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See especially the argument by Silvert, Kalman, “The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina,” in Silvert, K., ed., Expectant Peoples (New York, 1967) pp. 358–61.Google Scholar Also his Man's Power (New York, 1970), pp. 59–64, 136–8Google Scholar; “National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers,” International Social Science Journal XV (1964), 560–70Google Scholar; “The Politics of Economic and Social Change in Latin America,” The Sociological Review Monograph XI (1967), 47–58.Google Scholar

9 As Max Weber scornfully put it to earlier advocates of political cultural explanations, “the appeal to national character is generally a mere confession of ignorance.” The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 88Google Scholar, as cited in Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait [New York, 1962] p. 63, fn. 29).Google Scholar

10 Such reasoning has been particularly prevalent among Anglo-Saxon students of Latin America where, from the start, these area specialists seem to have drawn the following syllogism: “Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans; Latin America was colonized by Spain and Portugal; North America by Great Britain; Latin Americans are Catholics, North Americans are predominantly Protestant; ergo, Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans because of their Catholic-Iberian heritage!”

The few systematically comparative studies of attitudes which have included both Latin and North American samples have generally concluded that once one controls for education, class, center-periphery residence, age, etc., residual differences that could be assigned specifically to culture are statistically insignificant. See especially Kahl, Joseph, The Measurement of Modernity (Austin, Texas, 1968).Google Scholar

11 It is also worth mentioning that many, if not most, of the theorists of modern corporatism have not been Catholics. Many were in fact militantly secular. Even those who most publicly claimed to be inspired by “Social Christian” ideals, such as Salazar and Dollfuss, followed a much more bureaucratic, statist and authoritarian praxis. Also worth stressing is that among “Social Christians” or more broadly, progressive Catholics, not all by any means advocated corporatism. Such prominent figures as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier opposed it. See Guitton, Henri, Le Catholicisme Social (Paris, 1945).Google Scholar

Also worth mentioning is that corporatism has been considered quite compatible with many non-Catholic, non-Iberian cultures. See, for example, Beer, Samuel H., British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York, 1969)Google Scholar and Anton, Thomas, “Policy-Making and Political Culture in Sweden,” Scandinavian Political Studies IV (Oslo, 1969), 88–102.Google Scholar

12 See the concept of “limited pluralism” in Linz, Juan, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Allardt, E. and Rokkan, S., eds., Mass Politics (New York, 1970), pp. 251–83, 374–81.Google Scholar

In subsequent conversations with this author, Linz has advanced and defended the idea of an “organic state model” as the appropriate framework for the discussion of corporatism. See also the essay cited above (fn. 3) by James Malloy in this volume.

13 de Coulange, Fustel, La Cité Antique, 4th ed. (Paris, 1872).Google Scholar

14 Plato, , Laws 5–6.Google Scholar

15 Lousse, Emile, Organizaçāo e representaçāo corporativas (Lisbon, 1952)Google Scholar, a translation of his La Société d'Ancien Régime (Bruxelles, 1943).Google Scholar

16 Fourier, F. Charles, Théories de l'Unité Unité Universelle (1822)Google Scholar and Le Nouveau Monde industriel et sociétaire (1829).Google Scholar

17 LaFont, Robert, La Revolution Regionaliste (Paris, 1967).Google Scholar

18 Percival, and Goodman, Paul, Communitas (Chicago, 1947)Google Scholar and Alperovitz, Gar, “Notes toward a Pluralist Commonwealth,” Warner Modular Publications, Reprint No. 52 (1973).Google Scholar

19 In earlier works, I tended to define corporatism exclusively in relation to authoritarian rule. See the concluding chapter of my Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971)Google Scholar; also, “Paths to Political Development in Latin America,” Proceedings of the American Academy XXX, no. 4 (1972), 83–108Google Scholar and “The Portugalization of Brazil?” in Stepan, A. III, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven, 1973).Google Scholar

20 Rogowski, Ronald and Wasserspring, Lois, Does Political Development Exist? Corporatism in Old and New Societies (Beverly Hills, Sage Professional Papers, II, no. 01–024, 1971).Google Scholar

21 For example, Lijphart, Arend, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley, 1968)Google Scholar—where in all fairness the concept of corporatism itself does not appear. In a forthcoming essay by Martin Heisler, however, these “pillared” notions are expressly linked to a corporatist model of European politics: “Patterns of European Politics: The ‘European Polity’ Model,” in Heisler, M. O. et al. , Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes (New York, forthcoming).Google Scholar

Also relevant are Lijphart, Arend “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics XXI, no. 2 (01, 1969 ), pp. 207–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lorwin, Val R. “Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies,” Comparative Politics III, no. 2 (01, 1971), 14–75Google Scholar; Lembruch, Gehard, Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Österreich (Tübingen, 1967).Google Scholar

22 Roland Huntford, for example, argues that is is precisely social and economic homogenization which contributes to the thoroughness of Swedish corporatism; see The New Totalitarians (New York, 1972), pp. 86–87ff.Google Scholar Also Ruin, Olaf, “Participation, Corporativization and Politicization Trends in Present-day Sweden” (Paper presented at Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Study, New York, 05 5–6, 1972).Google Scholar

23 On the contrary, a recent analysis of Belgium's associational structure argues persuasively that multipillared conflicts in that polity serve to sustain a more pluralist (i.e., nonmonopolistic, competitive, overlapping) system of interest representation; see Brande, A. Van Den, “Voluntary Associations in the Belgian Political System 1954–1968,” Res Publica, no. 2 (1973), pp. 329–356.Google Scholar

24 At this point it is perhaps worth repeating that this constructed definition does not correspond to any of the ones advanced by specifically corporatist theorists. Moreover, it ignores a number of institutional and behavioral dimensions they tended to stress. For example, it does not specify the existence of singular associations (corporations) grouping both employers and workers. (These rarely exist and where they have been formally established—Portugal, Spain and Italy—they do not function as units.) Nor does it say anything about the presence of a higher council or parliament composed of functional or professional representatives. (Many polities which are not otherwise very corporatist, France or Weimar Germany, have such a Conseil Economique et Social or Wirtschaftsrat; many heavily corporatist countries which do have them, e.g., Portugal, do not grant them decisional authority.) Nor does the definition suggest that corporatist associations will be the only constituent units of the polity—completely displacing territorial entities, parties and movements. (In all existing corporatist systems, parties and territorial subdivisions continue to exist and various youth and religious movements may not only be tolerated but encouraged.) These institutional aspects as well as the more important behavioral issues of how and who would form the unique and hierarchical associations, what would be their degree of autonomy from state control and whether the whole scheme really could bring about class harmony and constitute a tertium genus between communism and capitalism were the subject of extensive debate and considerable fragmentation among corporatist ideologues.

The ideological definition closest to my analytical one is Mihail Manoilesco's: “The corporation is a collective and public organization composed of the totality of persons (physical or juridical) fulfilling together the same national function and having as its goal that of assuring the exercise of that function by rules of law imposed at least upon its members” (Le Siècle du Corporatisme, p. 176).Google Scholar

25 Actually, the concept is more “a constructed type” than an ideal type. The former has been defined as: “a purposive, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases” (McKinnes, John C., Constructive Typology and Social Theory [New York, 1966], p. 3 ).Google Scholar

26 See my Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (fn. 19) and “Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal” (Paper presented at the Conference Group on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.H., 10 10–14, 1973).Google Scholar Also “The Portugalization of Brazil?” (fn. 19).

27 For example, Kariel, Henry (ed.), Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York, 1970)Google Scholar, and his, The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford, 1961)Google Scholar; also McConnell, Grant, Private Power and American Democracy (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

28 Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York, 1969).Google Scholar

29 Lowi, Theodore, The Politics of Disorder (New York, 1971).Google Scholar

30 The quotations are all from The Federalist Papers, no. 10.

31 See especially the article by Gar Alperovitz and works cited therein (fn. 18), even though the author associates his proposals with the tradition of pluralism, rather than that of syndicalism. Also Vanek, Jaroslav, The Participatory Economy (Ithaca, 1971).Google Scholar

32 Elvander, Nils, Interesse-organisationer i Dagens Sverige (Lund, 1966)Google Scholar; Thomas J. Anton (fn. 11), Olaf Ruin (fn. 22) and Roland Huntford (fn. 22). Also Meijer, Hans “Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation in Sweden,” Scandinavian Political Studies, no. 4 (Oslo, 1969), pp. 103–16.Google Scholar

33 Huber, Hans, “Swiss Democracy” in Ehrmann, H. W., ed., Democracy in a Changing Society (New York, 1964), esp. p. 106.Google Scholar

34 Kraemer, P. E., The Societal State (Meppel, 1966).Google Scholar Also Windmuller, John P., Labour Relations in the Netherlands (Ithaca, 1969).Google Scholar

35 Rokkan, Stein, “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism” in Dahl, R., ed., Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven, 1966), pp. 105–106ff.Google Scholar

36 Keller, Kenneth E., Government and Politics in Denmark (Boston, 1968), esp. pp. 169–70ff.Google Scholar

37 Diamant, Alfred, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic. Democracy, Capitalism and the Social Order 1918–1934 (Princeton, 1960).Google Scholar Also, Gehard Lembruch (fn. 21) and Engelmann, Frederick C., “Haggling for the Equilibrium: the Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959,” American Political Science Review LVI, 3 (09, 1962), 651–620.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38 In addition to Linz, Juan, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain”Google Scholar (fn. 12), see Linz, Juan and de Miguel, Armando, Los Empresarios ante el Poder Público (Madrid, 1966)Google Scholar; Linz, Juan, “From Falange to Movimiento-Organizacion: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936–1968” in Huntington, S. P. and Moore, C. H., eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York, 1970), esp. pp. 146–183.Google Scholar Also Witney, Fred, Labor Policy and Practices in Spain (New York, 1964).Google Scholar

39 Schmitter, , “Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal” (fn. 26).Google Scholar

40 Schmitter, , Interest Conflict and Political Change in BrazilGoogle Scholar and “The Portugalization of Brazil?” (fn. 26).

41 Menges, Constantine, “Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile,” Journal of International Affairs XX (1966), 343–65.Google Scholar Also Petras, James, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 199–203, 209–19.Google Scholar

42 Cotler, Julio, “Bases del corporativismo en el Peru,” Sociedad y Politica, I, no. 2 (10, 1972), 3–12Google Scholar; also James Malloy (fn. 3 ).

43 Legg, Keith, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, 1969).Google Scholar

44 Scott, Robert E., Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, Illinois, 1959)Google Scholar, esp. chapters 5 and 6.

45 International Labour Office, Workers' Management in Yugoslavia (Geneva, 1962).Google Scholar Also Sidjanski, Dusan, “La Representation des intérêts et la décision politique” in Moulin, L. (ed.), L'Europe de Demain et ses Responsables (Bruges, 1967).Google Scholar Something approaching the corporatist model has been implicitly but not explicitly advanced in describing certain “degenerate” varieties of totalitarian (“partialitarian”) rule in other Eastern European polities: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, even the U.S.S.R. itself. For an intelligent survey and critique of this literature's misuse of the pluralist paradigm, see Janos, Andrew, “Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model”Google Scholar in Huntington, S. P. and Moore, C. H., eds. (fn. 38), pp. 537–50.Google Scholar

46 In an even wider range of polities, authors have suggested that parts, if not substantial portions, of the interest group universe can be described as “corporatized”; e.g., the United States: Grant McConnell (fn. 27); Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberalism (fn. 28), pp. 59–100Google Scholar; Great Britain: Samuel Beer (fn. 11); Germany, Western: Dahrendorf, Ralf, Society and Democracy in Germany (London, 1968)Google Scholar; Canada: Presthus, Robert, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (New York, 1973)Google Scholar; France: Berger, Suzanne, “Corporative Organization: The Case of a French Rural Association” in Pennock, J. and Chapman, J. (eds.), Voluntary Associations (New York, 1969), pp. 263–84.Google Scholar

47 Huntford, R. (fn. 22), p. 86.Google Scholar

48 These hypotheses about the functioning of pluralist systems are developed further and contrasted with corporatist ones in my “Inventory of Analytical Pluralist Propositions,” unpublished MS, University of Chicago, 1971.Google Scholar

49 See the sources cited in fns. 19 & 26.

50 I am following here the advice (and occasionally the vocabulary) of Sartori, Giovanni, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review LXIV, 4 (12, 1970), esp. pp. 1034–5.Google Scholar

51 Le Siècle du Corporatisme, p. 92.Google Scholar Manoilesco also noted the existence of “mixed corporatism” combining the two ideal-types.

52 Pinto, Joāo Manuel Cortez, A Corporação, vol. I (Coimbra, 1955)Google Scholar; also Cardoso, José Pires, Questões Corporativas (Lisbon, 1958).Google Scholar

A somewhat similar distinction, but one which placed primary emphasis on its role in furthering class collaboration by different means, is Perroux, François's between corporatisme lato sensuGoogle Scholar and corporatisme stricto sensu in Capitalisme et Communauté de Travail (fn. 6 ), pp. 7–19.Google Scholar

53 Actually, Nazi Germany is an ambiguous case. For an excellent analysis of the struggles involving competing conceptions of interest politics and the eventual demise of corporatist tendencies after 1936 in that polity, see Schweitzer, Arthur, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Indiana, 1964).Google Scholar

54 Malherbe, Jean, Le Corporatisme d'association en Suisse (Lausanne, 1940), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

55 Although I do not have them with me in my current voluntary exile, I do not recall that any of the case studies to be published shortly under the editorship of Linz, Juan on “The Breakdown of Democracy”Google Scholar specifically concentrates on interest associations.

56 For the theoretical model underlying these distinctions between “structural conduciveness” and “precipitating factors,” see Smelser, Neil, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57 Incompetence prevents me from even speculating about the tendencies toward corporatization which appears to exist among societies with a quite different system of economic exploitation, namely, bureaucratic-centralized socialism. For an initial treatment of these issues, see the excellent article by Janos (fn. 45) and the works discussed therein.

58 Keynes, John Maynard, Essays in Persuasion (London, 1952), p. 312.Google Scholar This essay was initially published as a separate pamphlet in 1926.

59 Ibid., p. 331. The title of this essay, a speech delivered in 1925, is “Am I a Liberal?” Keynes's answer was, “Yes, faute de mieux.”

60 Ibid., pp. 317–19.

61 Ibid., p. 319.

62 Ibid., pp. 313–14 (my emphasis).

63 The much later discussion of these issues in the United States was, as might be expected, even more privatistic and antistatist than that of Keynes. For a critical evaluation of this literature, see Draper, Hal “Neo-corporatists and neo-reformers,” New Politics (Fall, 1961), pp. 87–106.Google Scholar

64 Kraemer, (fn. 34), p. 83.Google Scholar

65 A study which illustrates this particularly well in a nicely controlled cultural and developmental setting is Evander, Nils, “Collective Bargaining and Incomes Policy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Analysis” (Paper prepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 09 4–8, 1973).Google Scholar

66 The work from which this primitive sequential account is drawn [Kraemer, (fn. 34), pp. 54–65]Google Scholar leaves off in 1958. No doubt further privatepublic interpenetration has occurred since then.

67 Not all treatments of the emergence of societal corporatism place as much emphasis as I do on the role of advanced capitalism and the imperative transformations it forces on the modern state. Huntford, (fn. 22), pp. 87 ff.Google Scholar, for example, places most of his explanatory emphasis on the traditional agricultural system of Sweden, the role of temperance societies and a particular type of industrial settlement (bruk). Thomas J. Anton bases his argument on a distinctive “Swedish policy-making style and elite culture” (fn. 11), pp. 92–99.Google Scholar

68 Shonfield, Andrew, Modern Capitalism (New York, 1965), p. 231.Google Scholar Shonfield goes on to remark: “It is curious how close this kind of thinking was to the corporatist theories of the earlier writers of Italian Fascism, who flourished in the 1920's. Corporatism got its bad name, which has stuck to it, essentially because of its association with the one-party state” (p. 233).Google Scholar

69 “The corporatist form of organization seems to be almost second nature to the Austrians. It is not that they are undemocratic; they nearly all belong to their business and professional associations, their trade unions, their religious and other groups, indeed membership in some of them is compulsory. And the Government is in turn under legal compulsion to consult these organizations before it takes legislative or administrative action of certain specified kinds” (Ibid., pp. 193–94).

70 “It is interesting to find the old corporatist ideal which was deeply embedded in Italian pre-war thinking—the ideal of a balanced and responsible economic group with quasi-sovereign powers administering itself—cropping up again in this new guise” (Ibid., p. 192).

71 “In Sweden there is a society in which interest groups are so strongly organized, their democratic basis so firm and their habit of bargaining with each one another independently of the government so well established … (yet) the Swedish Government still manages to act in a decisive fashion when circumstances require it … It just happens that it is the Swedish way to treat the process of government as being in large part an extended dialogue between experts drawn from a variety of bodies, official and unofficial, whose views are expected to be merely tinged rather than finally shaped by those who pay their salaries” (Ibid., pp. 199–200).

72 “The remarkable willingness of the trade unions to collaborate actively in this policy of wage restraint is to be explained by their anxiety about the future supply of jobs for Dutchmen” (Ibid., p. 212).

73 “The general point is that German Verbände have traditionally seen themselves as performing an important public role, as guardians of the longterm interests of the nation's industries, and they continue to do so. The development one observes since the war is that the approach to problems of policy has become more consultative, with the emphasis on technical advice. Power and influence are still present; but the manner is different” (Ibid., p. 245).

74 Ibid., pp. 122 ff.

75 Ibid., p. 99; also pp. 231–33 for a more explicit contrast with the French tradition.

76 Ibid., pp. 298–329.

77 Green, Mark and Petkas, Peter, “Nixon's Industrial State,” The New Republic, 09 16, 1972, p. 18.Google Scholar

78 Shonfield concentrates almost exclusively on the post-World War II period. Only in the case of the United States does he systematically probe further back. Is it just a coincidence that those European countries which were neutral in World War I moved more rapidly and thoroughly towards corporization (except Austria), than the belligerents? Also worth exploring in greater detail are the diverse policy responses to the Great Depression—as our rapid sketch of the Netherlands illustrated.

For the concept of “dominant paradigm of public choice” and its effect in reducing alternative courses of action, see Anderson, Charles W., “Public Policy, Pluralism and the Further Evolution of Advanced Industrial Society” (Paper prepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 1973).Google Scholar

79 A partial exception would have to be entered for the Fascists: Bottai, Bortolotto, Papi and Vito but not, for example, for Ugo Spirito who even went so far as to suggest that corporazione should replace both private individuals and the state as the basis for property and decision-making, thereby causing a minor scandal at the 1932 Ferrara Congress on Corporatism. Capitalismo e Corporatismo, 3rd ed. (Florence, 1934).Google Scholar Interestingly, Spirito's works have been recently reedited.

80 For a brief description of his role in relation to Rumanian politics, see Janos, Andrew, “The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars”Google Scholar in Huntington, S. and Moore, C. H., eds. (fn. 38), pp. 213–14.Google Scholar

81 In the following summary of his argument I will not cite specific page references, except in the case of direct quotes, since the elements of his position are frequently scattered rather widely and I have synthesized them freely. All quotes are from the 1936 edition (fn. 1).

82 Ibid., p. 30.

83 Ibid., p. 35.

84 Ibid., p. 74.

85 Ibid., p. 131. This is the same author who thirty pages before had claimed: “Between the corporatist conception of the state and the pure individualistic one, there is a certain coincidence in outcomes. Both systems result (aboutissent) in a minimal state”!! (p. 101).Google Scholar

86 Ibid., p. 107–8.

87 Ibid., p. 108, fn. 1.

88 Ibid., pp. 108–9.

89 Ibid., p. 110.

90 Manoīlesco, Mihaīl, Le Parti Unique (Paris, 1937), p. 134.Google Scholar

91 Coornaert, Emile, Les Corporations en France avant 1789, 4th ed. (Paris, 1941), p. 293.Google Scholar

92 This and the following generalizations about the praxis of state corporatism draw on my case studies of Brazil and Portugal (fns. 19 & 26). The Italian Fascist case, however, does not appear to differ markedly. See Sard, Roland, Fascism and Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919–1940 (Berkeley, 1971).Google Scholar

93 The expression is from Marx, 's The Eighteenth Brumaire.Google Scholar For a further development of these ideas, see Thalheimer, August “Über den Faschismus” in Bauer, O. et al. , Faschismus und Kapitalismus (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 19–38Google Scholar; Mansilla, H. C. F., Faschismus und eindimensionale Gesellschaft (Neuwied u. Berlin, 1971)Google Scholar; and Poulantzas, Nicos, Fascisme et dictature (Paris, 1970)Google Scholar; also my “The Portugalization of Brazil?” (fn. 19).

94 These conclusions about the difficulties inherent in the transformation from one type of corporatism to the other are based on the study I have conducted on Portuguese corporatism and are discussed more fully therein; see “Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal” (fn. 26).

95 These and other tensions and contradictions of advanced societal corporatism are explored in Wheeler, Christopher, “The Decline of Deference: the Tension between Participation and Effectiveness in Organized Group Life in Sweden,” unpublished MS, Beloit College, 1972Google Scholar. Also Ruin (fn. 22).