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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
ONE of the major issues over which the Russians and the Chinese have disagreed is the emphasis to be placed on violent or nonviolent tactics in the “national liberation movement” in underdeveloped countries. Recent developments in Viet Nam have focused new attention on this dimension of the Sino-Soviet conflict. American bombings of North Viet Nam have elicited widespread protests in the West based on the fear that this militant response to the South Viet Nam “Liberation Front” portended the involvement of the United States in a major war on the Asian continent that might escalate into a nuclear holocaust. Some commentators have also expressed the fear that the American military reaction might close the split in the Sino-Soviet alliance and drive the two Communist giants together. It is perhaps timely then that we turn our attention to the study of the major features of Soviet strategy regarding Asia and reexamine the earlier phases of Moscow's involvement in underdeveloped countries as they emerged after the Second World War. This reexamination might provide insight into the conditions prompting the Soviet militant strategy between 1948 and 1951 and the subsequent tempered withdrawal and retreat from the risk of a direct confrontation with the West; it might also shed light on Moscow's formula for calculating costs and consequences and illuminate the roots of present conflicting Russian and Chinese approaches to the national liberation movement in underdeveloped countries.
1 Shulman, Marshall D., Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, 1963), p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Ibid., p. 264. The “right” strategy, which had originally developed in the 1920's as a defensive posture — and a form of retreat from the orthodox “left” offensive line — began to be viewed in a different light. The new policy turn in Stalin's last years resulted from a reappraisal of the possibilities of advancing Soviet interests. It was an attempt to adjust to an “essentially nonrevolutionary reality,” or as Shulman states it:
“… to a reality in which the revolutionary impulse came from nationalism and from technology, not from the proletariat. As the Soviet leaders began to take the measure of the historical forces of the postwar world, they became aware that the policy which had served for defense, postponement, and consolidation now appeared to have offensive possibilities. Not proletarian revolutions, but a closer identification of Soviet interests with the historical forces of nationalism and economic, political and social change — this became the preferred means for the further conversion of the world to socialism … and the further ascendancy of Soviet power and influence.” Ibid., p. 9.
3 For a study of the developing Soviet reaction to Mao's victory and Moscow's sanction for what the author has termed “Neo-Maoism” see, Kautsky, John, Moscow and the Communist Party of India (New York, 1956)Google Scholar.
4 Shulman, , op. cit., pp. 101–103 and Chapter VGoogle Scholar.
5 “On Peace Negotiations with the Kuomintang — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Selected Works of Mao Tsetung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1961), IV, 50Google Scholar.
6 Typical of the Soviet attitude toward “bourgeois nationalism” was this statement from the authoritative Cominform journal: “The Communist Parties are combatting nationalism in their ranks as a dangerous expression of bourgeois influence submitting ‘general interests’ for the class interests of the proletariat, obliterating the boundary between the Party, the working class, and the people. By dulling the consciousness of Party members, nationalism threatens the Party with loss of its class orientation.…” “Against Nationalism, For Proletarian Internationalism,” For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, May 15, 1949. Henceforth the Cominform journal will be cited as FLPPD.
7 As illustrative of the Maoist appeal consider the following:
“We are the army of the Chinese people and in all things we take the will of the Chinese people as our will. The policies of our army represent the urgent demands of the Chinese people and among them are the following … Unite the workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government. …” “Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, October 1947, pp. 149–50. Also see, “On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry,” March 1, 1948, ibid., pp. 207–210.
8 This meeting took place in June, 1949. A summary of the papers presented and the discussion that took place appeared in Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 10, 1949, 74–93Google Scholar. The major paper was by E. Zhukov and was soon published; see, “Voprosy Nationnal'no-Kolonial'noi Bor'ba Posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny,” Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 9, 1949Google Scholar.
9 Zhukov, , op. cit., p. 60Google Scholar.
10 FLPPD, December 30, 1949, p. 2. Liu Shao-chi had delivered his speech in Peking on November 29 to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries. The conference was organized under the auspices of the Asian branch of the World Federation of Trade Unions. For a discussion of how Moscow was making use of similar “front” organizations in Western Europe see Shulman, , op. cit., pp. 123–38Google Scholar.
11 FLPPD, December 30, 1949, p. 2.
12 Ibid., p. 2.
13 For a later example of Moscow's approval of the militant Chinese line see, “The People of the Colonial and Dependent Countries in the Struggle Against Warmongers,” FLPPD, May 19, 1950.
14 See Carlisle, Donald S., “Soviet Policy in the United Nations and the Problem of Economic Development 1946–1956,” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1962), Chapters III, IVGoogle Scholar.
15 The election platform of the Indian Communist Party was published in Bolshevik, the major Soviet theoretical journal, in May, 1951. The draft program of the Indian Communist Party appeared in the Cominform journal on May 11, 1957. FLPPD also carried the election manifesto of the Indian Communist Party on August 31, 1951.
16 FLPPD, No. 35, August 31, 1951.
17 Ghosh, Ajoy, “Communist Party of India in Struggle for United Democratic Front, for People's Democratic Government,” FLPPD, No. 42, 10 19, 1951Google Scholar. Ghosh went on to state that the mistakes were due to “our failure to master and correctly apply the great teachings of Lenin and Stalin, our failure to learn from the rich experience of the International Communist Movement, from the great victory of the Chinese people under its glorious leader Comrade Mao Tse-tung.” However several months before in an important policy statement, the Indian Party had expounded on the “new path” that was to be followed, observing that it was “a path which we do not and cannot name as either Russian or Chinese.” A clear distinction was drawn between Indian and Chinese conditions, and in the central analysis it was emphasized: “… it would be a gross exaggeration to say that the country is already on the eve of armed insurrection or revolution, or that civil war is already raging in the country. If we were to read the situation so wrongly, it would lead us into adventurism and giving slogans to the masses out of keeping with the degree of their understanding and consciousness and their preparedness and the Governments' isolation. Such slogans would isolate us from the people and hand over the masses to reformist disruptors.” “Policy Statement of the Communist Party of India,” Cross Roads, Bombay, 06 8, 1951, p. 6 (italics in the original)Google Scholar.
18 Even the most militant of the militants, the Malayan Communist Party, beat a tactical retreat and began to reach out to draw the masses to the movement. A directive issued by the Political Bureau of the Party issued on October 1, 1951, stated: “Serious errors have been committed in the past by state organizations, and many working methods have been diametrically opposed to accepted principles. Party members are reminded that their primary duty is to expand and consolidate the organization of the masses, which is to take precedence over the purely military objective of destroying the enemy. This is to be attained by creating a united front of all communists and classes, by acquiring the support of the bourgeoisie and capitalists and avoiding violent tactics which have antagonized peasants and workers.…” Document to be found in Hanrahan, Gene Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya (New York, 1954), pp. 130–133Google Scholar.
19 Sobolev, A., “Narodnaya Demokratia kak Forma Politicheskoi Organizatsii Obshchestva,” Bolshevik, No. 19, 1951, 38Google Scholar. Sobolev referred to the Indian program as “the model minimum program,” thus not excluding the alternative of a more militant maximum approach. The burden of my argument, however, is not to deny that such a maximum program existed — since it did in the Maoist model — or to deny that it had earlier been sanctioned for Asian Communists, but to contend that it was a minimum program that in 1951 was being urged on parties in underdeveloped countries. The new strategy was not directed at establishing coalitions with noncommunist parties, but called on Communists to make a direct bid for the masses, and in so doing to come forward as nationalists. Maoism had entailed Communists coming forward in the guise of nationalists; however, in a non-Chinese context, liberation war undercut the formation of the broad, united national front that was essential for capturing the nationalist movement. Thus, Moscow dispensed with the violent tactics and liberation armies. This is the justification for labeling the new policy “Soviet Maoism.”
20 See “On the Character and Attributes of People's Democracy in Countries of the Orient,” Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, IX, No. 1 (01–02, 1952)Google Scholar, (as translated in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IV, No. 20 (06 28, 1952), 3–7)Google Scholar.
21 Ibid., p. 3.
22 Herman, Leon, “The New Soviet Posture in World Trade,” Problems of Communism, III, No. 6 (11–12 1954)Google Scholar.
23 Ibid., p. 12.
24 The meeting took place on October 27–28, 1951. It was sponsored by the World Peace Council. See the Soviet journal New Times, No. 7, 1951, pp. 18–19Google Scholar.
25 See Report of the ECAFE Conference on Trade Promotion, E/CN.11/I&T/59.
26 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
27 Nesterov, M., “Na Mezhdunarodnoi Promyshlennoi Vystavke v Bombee,” Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, No. 2, 1952 (02), 20Google Scholar.
28 International Economic Conference (Moscow, 1952), p. 52Google Scholar.
29 Ibid., p. 53.
30 Ibid., p. 70.
31 Stalin, Joseph, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (New York, 1952)Google Scholar. This short but important work is divided into two sections. The first bears the date February 1, 1952; the second, September 28, 1952. The following citations are from the first section.
32 Ibid., p. 30.
33 Ibid., p. 27.
34 See for instance, Fituni, L., “Sovetskii Soiuz i Mezhdunarodnoe Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo,” Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 2, pp. 102–110Google Scholar, and the editorial “Za Vsestoronnee Razvitie Mezhdunarodnovo Sotrudnichestva,” Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 3, pp. 3–17. The Soviet interest in trade was reflected in the fact that the proceedings of the Moscow International Trade Conference were published in English; examples of other Soviet English-language publications on the trade issue are: Aleksandrov, M., International Trade and the Improvement of the Standard of Living in the West (Moscow, 1952)Google Scholar. Osipov, A., The Resumption and Development of International Economic Relations (Moscow, 1952)Google Scholar; and Fituni, L., The Soviet Union and International Cooperation (Moscow, 1952)Google Scholar.
35 Evidence of the changing Soviet attitude towards neutralism came in piecemeal fashion. It was reflected in expanding trade and comments in Russian periodicals on varied aspects of the “independent” foreign policy of the Asian states. A neutralist posture was usually juxtaposed to the policy of states such as Pakistan and Thailand that had, it was argued, lent themselves to imperialists' intrigues by joining SEATO and accepting American military aid. See particularly New Times for 1954; a Soviet commentator had noted “… the appearance in the political arena of another major Asian country, India, which only recently was a colony; the struggle of such countries as Burma and Indonesia for complete national independence — all these provide eloquent testimony of the fundamental transformation that has taken place in the political development of the Asian countries. The peoples of these countries are asserting their right to sovereign statehood and an independent national policy. And whoever refuses to take this into account is closing his eyes to the facts, turning his back on realities and ignoring the historic lessons and consequences of the second world war.” New Times, No. 19 (1954), 2Google Scholar.
36 For the materials on the Manila Conference see the United Nations document, E/CN.11/I 
T/84, p. 18. The Trade Conference opened on February 23 and closed on March 4, 1953.
37 Ibid., p. 39.
38 For a detailed analysis of the post-Stalinist phase of Soviet policy toward underdeveloped countries see Carlisle, Donald S., “The Changing Soviet Perception of the Development Process in the Afro-Asian World,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, VIII, No. 4 (11, 1964), 385–407CrossRefGoogle Scholar.