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The Soviet Union and the United Nations: the Changing Role of the Developing Countries*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

George A. Brinkley
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Extract

WithRespect to its international prospects the leadership of the Soviet Union entered this decade with enthusiasm; it is ending the decade on a note of disillusionment. And there is no area in which this phenomenon is more striking than that of the triangular relationship among the Soviet Union, the United Nations and the emerging “third world.” Both the “ups” and the “downs” of this relationship are to some extent attributable to the remarkable influence (and abrupt departure) of a single dynamic and quixotic personality, Nikita Khrushchev. Associated with his rise and fall, however, were objective historical factors which had a significant impact on the course of Soviet foreign relations. Read in the context of the origins and development of Soviet attitudes on international organization and on the role expected of nations liberated by the downfall of imperialism, this decade may well have marked a turning point in history. The outcome is not yet clear, but it is evident that Soviet policy has gone through another of those remarkable shifts from optimistic certainty to pragmatic reassessment which have marked historic moments in the past. The transition is both interesting and instructive.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , January 1970 , pp. 91 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1970

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References

1 Lenin, V. I., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (5th edition, Moscow, 1960–1965), Vol. 45, 241Google Scholar.

2 Ibid., Vol. 31, 90; Vol. 41, 235; Vol. 42, 42, 72, 107.

3 Ibid., Vol. 42, 76, 101.

4 Ibid., Vol. 42, 56.

5 Ibid., Vol. 42, 78. The debate over whether Lenin ever actually used the term “peaceful coexistence” is largely a semantic one. When using the adjective “peaceful” he apparently preferred the term “cohabitation” (sozhitel'stvo)(see Vol 40, 145 and Vol. 45, 241); otherwise he spoke of “existing side by side” (sushchestvovanie riadom) with the capitalist countries (see Vol. 39, 197; Vol. 42, 22, 101; Vol. 44, 4). There is a difference, of course, between speaking of peaceful cohabitation of peoples after a revolutionary transformation of society on the one hand and peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist governments and states on the other hand, but in fact Lenin did not consistently follow any such distinction in his use of the terminology. The reader is thus left to depend on the context to determine which he meant when he used “peaceful cohabitation” (there being no such ambivalence in his use of “existing side by side” since he specifically refers to capitalist countries). It is useful in this respect to note that his Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, did use the exact Russian equivalent of “peaceful coexistence” (mirnoe sosushchestvovanie) and furthermore used it interchangeably with “peaceful cohabitation” (i.e., “with bourgeois states”) (see Chicherin, G. V., Stat'i i Rechi, Moscow, 1961, pp. 135, 145)Google Scholar. Chicherin also spoke of “peaceful competition” (mirnoe sostiazanie) to add one more variant (see Dokumenty uneshnei politiki SSSR, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, 669). Since the late Stalin period “peaceful coexistence” has been the commonly used term, and when the meaning is understood there is no apparent reason not to use it in connection with Lenin's nameGoogle Scholar.

6 There are many statements of this sort: see Lenin, , op. cit., Vol. 30, 30, 36, 40Google Scholar; Vol. 39, 197; Vol. 40, 145; Vol. 41, 163; Vol. 42, 22, 56, 78, 101; Vol. 44, 4.

7 Ibid., Vol. 36, 11, and Vol. 39, 197, respectively.

8 Ibid., Vol. 26, 354.

9 Ibid., Vol. 41, 246.

10 Ibid., Vol. 42, 107.

11 Ibid., Vol. 30, 36.

12 Ibid., Vol. 37, 520; Vol. 41, 235.

13 See Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RSDRP(b), August 1917-Fevral' 1918 (Moscow, 1958), p. 208Google Scholar.

14 One of the earliest indications of Stalin's attitude (in spite of the fact that he was then closely identified with appeals to colonial and semicolonial peoples) may be found in ibid., pp. 244, 266.

15 Stalin, J., Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1953), pp. 73, 74, 242Google Scholar. Lenin's statement is in Lenin, , op. cit., Vol. 35, 251Google Scholar.

16 Stalin, , op. cit., p. 147Google Scholar. The reference to Lenin is from Lenin, , op. cit., Vol. 35, 392Google Scholar.

17 See Stalin, J. V., “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” and the Central Committee report by Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress in 1952, in Gruliow, L., ed., Current Soviet Policies (New York, 1953), pp. 6–8, 99–106Google Scholar.

18 Reversing Stalin's policy the Soviet Union also began entering previously boycotted U.N. specialized agencies such as UNESCO and the ILO in 1954. This trend continued in successive years to the extent that the Soviet Union entered such newly established agencies as IAEA and the Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), but it has not joined the FAO, IBRD, IFC, IDA, IMF, ICAO or GATT. Further treatment of this aspect of Soviet policy may be found in Jacobson, H. K., The USSR and the UN's Economic and Social Activities (Notre Dame, 1963Google Scholar) and Rubinstein, A., The Soviets in International Organizations (Princeton, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Khrushchev, N. S., “Report of the Central Committee to the Twentieth Party Congress,” New Times (Moscow), No. 8, 02 16, 1956, special supplementGoogle Scholar.

20 Ibid. The official stenographic report may be found in XX S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow, 1956), Vol. I, 8 ff.

21 Viskov, S. I., ed., Sovetskii Soiuz v Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsii (Moscow, 1965), Vol. II, 209Google Scholar.

22 See the compilation of Khrushchev's, speeches in the United States in 1959, Let Us Live in Peace and Friendship (Moscow, 1959), pp. 146–150Google Scholar. The U.N. record may be found in the Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, 799th plenary meeting (09 18, 1959)Google Scholar.

23 The Soviet Union-Faithful Friend of the Peoples Fighting for Independence: Speeches of N. S. Khrushchev During His Asian Tour, February–March 1960 (London, 1960), pp. 62, 63Google Scholar. Upon his return to Moscow he declared that “the day is not far off when representatives of the capitalist world will be even more staggered and amazed.” Ibid., p. 97.

24 See the compilation of Khrushchev's, speeches in Khrushchev in New York (New York, 1960), pp. 27, 219, 244Google Scholar. The U.N. record is in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, plenary meeting Nos. 869 (Sept 23), 881 (Oct. 1), 882 (Oct. 3), 900 (Oct. 11), 902 (Oct. 12), 903 (Oct. 13), and 904 (Oct. 13).

25 Khrushchev in New York, p. 185 (Oct. 11).

26 Ibid., p. 212 (Oct. 12).

27 As Khrushchev, put it in his January 6, 1961, speech, without the growth of Soviet power “there could have been no question of the abolition of colonialism.” Kommunist, Vol. 37, No. 1 (01, 1961), 3–37Google Scholar.

28 Further discussion of the African states' role may be found in Kay, David A., “The Impact of African States on the United Nations,” International Organization, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1969), 20–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 All data given here is from U.N. sources, including annual budget reports and the reports of the Secretary General. On economic development, see particularly UN Press Release DEV/312, December 9, 1968. To put U.N. expenditures in a slightly different perspective, however, it might be noted that the $600 million total is still only one-tenth as much as the budget of the city of New York.

30 See Dallin, Alexander, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York, 1962Google Scholar), chapter IX, and Mosely, Philip E., “The Soviet Union and the United Nations,” in Padelford, N. and Goodrich, L., eds., The United Nations in the Balance (New York, 1965), pp. 302–313Google Scholar.

31 See his speech to the Assembly on October 3, 1960, and on his return to Moscow on October 20, in Khrushchev in New York, pp. 126 and 242.

32 On the background of the financial crisis see Stoessinger, J. G. and Associates, Financing the United Nations System (Washington, 1964), especially chapters 6 and 7. The Soviet role is discussed in Dallin, loc. cit.Google Scholar

33 I n connection with vote counting, it should be noted that, practically speaking, the only votes which can be counted are roll call votes which constitute only a fraction of all votes taken. Moreover, a roll call is conducted only when requested, which means that some bias is likely to be involved. A comparison of the records from year to year, however, does offer one measure of “success.”

34 For an analysis of the various twists and turns in Soviet efforts to redefine their attitude toward the developing countries, see Mosely, Philip E., “Communist Policy and the Third World,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (04, 1966), 210–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Cattell, David T., “The Soviet Union Seeks a Policy for Afro-Asia,” in London, Kurt, ed., New Nations in a Divided World (New York, 1963), pp. 163–179Google Scholar.

35 “Report of the Central Committee” on March 29, 1966, 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1966), p. 54Google Scholar. On pp. 34–40 he discusses setbacks in many developing countries where “some strata, supported by imperialism, are trying to direct the development of the liberated countries along the capitalist road.” The official transcript is in XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1966), Vol. I, 18 ffGoogle Scholar.

36 Pravda, November 4, 1967; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIX, No. 44 (11 22, 1967), 3–20Google Scholar.

37 The quotation is from Lenin, , op. cit., Vol. XXXV, 247Google Scholar.

38 General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Sixteen Hundred and Seventy-ninth Meeting, October 3, 1968 (speech by Mr. Gromyko). Since the permanent records of the 23rd session are not available at this writing, this and subsequent references apply to the mimeographed records issued during the session. However, transposition to the printed record, when available, can easily be made by use of the meeting or document number indicated. All references will use the abbreviated form appearing on the document, as A/PV.1679 for Mr. Gromyko's speech.

39 See the remarks by Mr. Mendelevich in plenary meeting, A/PV.1741.

40 Ibid. A typical Soviet newspaper commentary on this Assembly session concerned itself almost entirely with attacks on West Germany and supposed threats to the “socialist commonwealth.” See “Na General'noi Assamblee OON: otvetstvennost' za sud'by mira,” Pravda, October 21, 1968.

41 See Soviet statements in A/PV.1743, 1748, 1750, 1752, and A/C.2/SR.1240, 1241 (Second Committee, Summary record, meetings Nos. 1240 and 1241).

42 On the development of the proposal to establish the Preparatory Committee, see A/C.2/SR.1242, 1243, 1248, and A/PV.1745.

43 A/C.2/SR.1242.

44 A/PV.1745.

45 A/SPC/SR.624 (meeting No. 624 of the Special Political Committee).

46 UN Doc. A/7359, Report of the Committee on the Reorganization of the Secretariat, November 27, 1968, Separate Opinions of Mr. Platon D. Morozov, p. 61.

47 A/PV.1752.

48 A/C.5/SR.1251 (Fifth Committee meeting No. 1251).

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 The figures cited here are based mainly on the report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, December 11, 1968, TD/B/C.3/61 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Board): “External Development Finance, Present and Future.” Additional material on Soviet aid may be found in the following articles: “The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, 01, 1968, p. 59Google Scholar; “The UN and the Urgent Problems of the Developing Countries,” ibid., No. 5, May 1968, 30; “Who is Responsible for Third World Economic Backwardness?” ibid., No. 8, August, 1968, 41; “Industrialization Problems in Developing Countries,” ibid., No. 11, November, 1968, 75.

52 On Soviet contributions to aid programs, see also Israelian, V. I., Sovetskii Soiuz i Organizatsiia Ob'edinennykh Natsii, 1961–1965 gg. (Moscow, 1968), pp. 332–354Google Scholar.

53 While this obligates the Soviet Union to contribute to such programs, it has not prevented it from paying its contributions in rubles rather than dollars, which is to say in a nonconvertible currency.

54 At the same time the Soviet Union was not above making proposals which would add to expenses when they were for its own benefit, as it did when it pushed through a proposal to make Russian a “working” language of the U.N. and another calling on the Secretariat to add more people from countries (mainly East European) which are still below their personnel quotas.

55 See note No. 33 above. It should also be noted that absences and abstentions lower the count for some countries, notably France (because of abstentions) and the African countries (because of absences). The countries in this sample have been listed in declining order corresponding to their respective contributions to the regular U.N. budget.

56 See, for example, A/PV.1752 and A/C.1/SR.1603. Cf. the review of the book by Ostrovskii, Ia. A., OON i Prava Cheleveka, in International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, 01 1969, 103–104Google Scholar.

57 A/C.5/SR.1241.

58 A/C.5/SR.128O.

59 A/C.5/SR.1264.

60 See Tarassov's statement in the Fifth Committee: A/C.5/SR.128O.

61 See Khrushchev's remarks on this subject in the U.N. and in Moscow in 1960 in Khrushchev in New York, pp. 126–139, 252–256.

62 UN Doc. A/7334, Personnel Questions: Composition of the Secretariat, Report of the Secretary General, Nov. 25, 1968, p. 8.

63 Morawiecki, W., “Institutional and Political Conditions of Participation of Socialist States in International Organizations,” International Organization, XXII, No. 2 (Spring 1968), 502Google Scholar.

64 A/C.2/SR.1243.

65 Ibid. This statement, by the representative of Sierra Leone, is quoted from the author's notes of the meeting; it is confirmed in UN Press Release GA/ER/1180, Dec. 9, 1968, but in the Second Committee summary record it was changed to “no pressure could change the unanimous position of the African States,” omitting any reference to the Secretariat.

66 See Mr. Gromyko's speech to the Assembly, A/PV.1679.

67 ibid.

68 A summary of United States views presented at the 23rd session may be found in the United States Mission press release, USUN-1 Jan. 13, 1969.

69 The New York Times, April 19, 1969.

70 Barišsić, M., “The United Nations and the Super Powers,” Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), XX, No. 450 (01 5, 1969), 20Google Scholar.

71 There is, of course, a sharp contrast between the long record of United States support of the United Nations and the almost unbroken record of Soviet opposition. The United States certainly does not share either the historical enmity or the ideological aversion toward the Organization which have been a fundamental part of the Soviet attitude. Nevertheless, the parsimonious attitude of the United States in recent years has prompted legitimate questions as to why the richest country in the world should complain when its total contribution to all U.N. and U.N.-related activities (about $230 million in 1968) comes to little more than one-tenth of one percent (.0012) of the federal budget, and, although the amounts greatly exceed those given by others, its U.N. contributions and aid to developing countries, when viewed as a percentage of GNP, are far from being the most generous.

72 Sh. Sanakoyev, , “U.N. General Assembly: Fact and Fiction,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 12, 12 1968, 18–22Google Scholar.