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Socially Constructed Conceptions of Distributive Justice: The Case of Affirmative Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Charles Lockhart
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Extract

In the last quarter-century Americans have carried on a lively argument over the nature of distributive justice, equality of opportunity and particularly the appropriateness of affirmative action. Indeed two distinct conceptions of equality of opportunity, drawing on conflicting underlying visions of distributive justice and adopting different stances toward affirmative action, have emerged in both academic and popular circles. Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky's Cultural Theory can be applied to explain the form and focus of this argument as a struggle between the conflicting preferences of rival—individualistic and egalitarian—ways of life. This analysis shows how the longevity and intractable character of the argument are consequences of the social embedding of preferences. That is, individualists and egalitarians cannot further their preferred ways of life with respect to these issues without engendering this conflict. The irreconcilable character of this clash is further underscored by Cultural Theory's capacity to illuminate oversights in the most sophisticated of extant efforts to bridge these opposing views.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , Winter 1994 , pp. 29 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1994

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References

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9. I am using the labels egalitarian and individualistic to denote precise concepts that I introduce gradually. Thus the reasoning underlying my claims for these concepts will be revealed progressively.

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12. By “affirmative action” I refer to public practices that favor persons held to be disadvantaged either individually or as members of particular groups defined by factors such as race, disability or gender in the attainment of scarce educational or occupational positions. Such practices are viewed by some to include distributive activities involving the preparation of disadvantaged potential applicants. In this article I will focus primarily on other, compensatory efforts aimed at attracting applications from the disadvantaged, applying favorable procedures in evaluating the applications of disadvantaged persons, and developing special programs to facilitate the advancement of disadvantaged persons who acquire educational or occupational positions. For background on this general issue see Burstein, Paul. Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the United States Since the New Deal (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), chaps. 2–5;Google Scholar and for an account of the development of affirmative action see Belz, Herman, Equality Transformed: A Quarter-Century of Affirmative Action (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991), chaps. 1–3.Google Scholar

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57. Ibid., p. 72.

58. See Jencks, Christopher et al. , Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effects of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic, 1972), p. 73.Google Scholar

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