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The Silence of Pope Pius XII

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

John S. Conway
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Extract

It Is hardly surprising that the play Der Stellvertreter (The Deputy) by the young German author Rolf Hochhuth should have aroused controversy ever since its first performance in February, 1963, in Berlin. For it aims to depict not merely historical characters in a fictional drama, but historical characters in a historical setting of almost unprecedented significance and consequence. The use of the drama as a vehicle for political attack is nothing new; but it is rare for the author to append, in the published version of his text, a historical essay of forty pages, seeking to give the evidence upon which his drama is based. Nor is it surprising that so pejorative is the portrayal in the play of the late Pope Pius XII that many of those who served under him during the nineteen years of his pontificate, as well as many others who came in touch with him through his literally thousands of private or public audiences, have sought to come to his defense, in challenging the historical accuracy of Hochhuth's portrayal.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , January 1965 , pp. 105 - 131
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1965

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References

1 The writer used the English edition of The Deputy. In London the published play was entitled The Representative (1963). The writer would like here to acknowledge indebtedness to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for a grant enabling him to visit Germany, to use German libraries, and to pursue relevant sources.

2 Reitlinger, Gerald, The Final Solution (London, 1953), pp. 353–357Google Scholar.

3 The title in German translation is Der Vatikan in Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin, E., 1954)Google Scholar.

4 For example, Lehmann, Leo, Vatican Politics in the Second World War (New York, 1945)Google Scholar.

5 Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series D, VI, no. 395. Later reference to these volumes will be given as DGFP. Even his name Pacelli symbolized this desire, and his coat of arms contained a dove holding an olive branch. His first diplomatic assignment was to try and negotiate peace terms with the German Kaiser in 1917.

6 This did not of course prevent many ardent Nazis from denouncing him as lacking in sympathy for Germany, or other critics for being subservient to the political ideology of fascism.

7 Kessler, Harry Graf, Tagebücher 1918–37 (Frankfurt/Main, 1961), p. 742Google Scholar. Brüning himself voted for the Enabling Law on March 23, 1933. This issue has been raised again in the present controversy about the role of the Catholic Church in 1933, see Müller, H., Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus (Munich, 1963)Google Scholar, and Amery, C., Die Kapitulation (Hamburg, 1963)Google Scholar.

8 DGFP, Series C, Vol. I.

9 Documents of British Foreign Policy, Second Series, V, no. 342.

10 Idem.

11 DGFP, Series C, II, no. 17.

12 After the war some of these were published in Series C and D in whole or in part from the files of the German Foreign Ministry; others were printed for private circulation amongst the German Catholic hirearchy, Dokumente betreffend die Verhandlungen zwischen der Hl. Stuhl und der Reichsregierung über die Ausführung des Reichskonkordat, 3 Vols.; also the Papal notes of 1942–3, 3261–PS, 3263–PS, 3264–PS, International Military Tribunal, Vol. XXXII.

13 For a partial English text, see Jones, A. S. Duncan, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany (London, 1938), pp. 290–297Google Scholar.

14 See the Allocution of Pope Pius XII to the Sacred College of Cardinals, June 2, 1945.

15 Ciano, G., Diaries 1939–43 (New York, 1946), p. 46–7Google Scholar.

16 DGFP, Series D. VI, no. 65.

17 DBFP, Series III, V, and DGFP, Series D, VI.

18 DBFP, Series III, VII, and DGFP, Series D, VII.

19 DGFP, Series D, VIII, no. 668; Giovannetti, A., Der Vatikan und der Krieg (Cologne, 1961), pp. 178–90Google Scholar.

20 For the details see Vollmacht des Gewissens, ed. by European Publications Society (Munich, 1960)Google Scholar and Watt, D. C., “Les Allies et la Resistance Allemande 1939–44” in Revue de deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, IX (1959), 65 ffGoogle Scholar.

21 It is now apparent that these efforts failed because of the reluctance of the highest military officers to engage themselves in the conspiracy.

22 For the text, see Cianfarra, C. M., The Vatican and the War (New York, 1944), p. 225Google Scholar.

23 Langer, W. and Gleason, R., The Undeclared War (New York, 1953), p. 547Google Scholar.

24 DGFP, Series D. XII, no. 674.

25 See for his messages to Mussolini, , I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Ninth Series (1939–1943), IV, nos. 189 and 232Google Scholar.

26 Petrus Blatt, Organ of the Catholic Church in Berlin, March 3, 1963.

27 In January, 1940, the Polish Cardinal Hlond published an extensive memorandum of the German crimes committed in Poland from September, 1939.

28 See the letters from the U.S. Government, Foreign Relations of the United States 1942, III (Washington, 1961), 772 ffGoogle Scholar.

29 See Giovannetti, Monsignor A., Der Vatikan und der Krieg, p. 254Google Scholar.

30 See the Pope's remarks on this subject to the College of Cardinals, Christmas, 1943.

31 According to the American diplomat, H. H. Tittman, one of the motives, “possibly the most compelling,” for the Pope's refusal to condemn the Nazi atrocities was his fear that “if he does so now, the German people, in the bitterness of their defeat, will reproach him later for having contributed, if only indirectly, to this defeat,” as had happened to Benedict XV. “When it is borne in mind that Pius XII had many years of conditioning in Germany, it will not seem unnatural that he should be particularly sensitive to this particular argument.” Foreign Relations of the United States 1942, III, 777Google Scholar.

32 See also the difficulties posed for the Vatican by the Japanese desire to establish a diplomatic mission in early 1942 at the height of their military aggression, ibid., pp. 778–91.

33 On the other hand, the reasons still have to be elucidated why Hitler in the summer of 1943 should have appointed as Ambassador to the Vatican, the most experienced diplomat in Germany, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker. Since the explanation in Weizsäcker's memoirs is palpably inadequate, it can only be presumed that Hitler wanted to keep open this possible channel for negotiations for a future peace.

34 DGFP, Series D, I, nos. 638, 640, 641, 642, 661, 677.

35 Petrus Blatt, loc. cit. Two diplomatic notes from the Vatican protesting about the conditions in the Warthegau are reprinted as 3263–PS and 3264–PS, see note 12 above. They were politely but firmly refused by Weizsäcker on the grounds that since the Vatican did not recognize the German conquests in the East, the Nuncio could have no right of representation with regard to events in those areas.

36 In August, 1942, the American Chargé noted the same far-reaching reserve among the Vatican officials. Although he pointed out that this might endanger the prestige of the Holy See, the answer was invariably that the Pope had already condemned offenses against morality in wartime, and that to be specific now would only make matters worse. Telegram of Tittman, , 07 30, 1942, in Foreign Relations, 1942, p. 772Google Scholar.

37 On the other hand the Nazis threatened reprisals against the Catholics if the Vatican Radio “interfered” in political affairs to the extent of broadcasting the names of German prisoners-of-war in Russia.

38 The same was true of course for Polish Catholics. The contrast with the situation in Denmark, where anti-Semitism was almost nonexistent, and where the population did all it could to protect the Jews, is illuminating.

39 Quoted in Bussmann, W., “Der Papst und die Diktatur,” in Monat, 176 (05, 1963), 18Google Scholar.

40 For the details see Leiber, R., “Pius XII und die Juden in Rom 1943–4,” in Stimmen der Zeit, 167 (1961), 428–36Google Scholar.

41 Father Leiber stated that the Vatican believed at the time that at least two million people had been exterminated.

42 Hochhuth, , op. cit., p. 285Google Scholar.

43 Berliner Sonntagsblatt, April 7, 1963.

44 International Military Tribunal, X.