Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
The conventional wisdom on the basic philosophy of the constitutional concept of the separation of powers is well stated in The Federalist. In No. 47, citing the authority of the “celebrated Montesquieu,” James Madison wrote that “the accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Clearly the Founding Fathers feared the corrupting influence of power. As Madison asked in No. 51, “what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Another concise statement of the separation of powers concept is found in the famous remark made by Justice Brandeis in 1926, in his dissenting opinion in the Myers case, that “the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”
1 The Federalist, ed. Cooke, Jacob E. (Middletown, Conn., 1961), p. 324Google Scholar.
2 Ibid., p. 349.
3 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
4 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137, 177 (1803).
5 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 419 (1793).
6 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 (1857).
7 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
8 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (dissenting opinion). It was in the majority opinion of Justice Roberts that the remark was made: “When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty, to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former” (297 U.S. 62). The number of legal scholars who would accept this as a proper formulation of how judicial review works must be very tiny indeed.
9 Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 104 (1947).
10 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937).
11 Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
12 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
13 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The continuing vitality of this precedent was reflected in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) and in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
14 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
15 302 U.S. 634.
16 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
17 330 U.S. 91.
18 330 U.S. 90.
19 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. (1974).
20 See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 561 ( 1865 ); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 ( 1909 ); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
21 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Rr. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
22 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
23 See, e.g., Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 ( 1948 ); Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 ( 1952 ); Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
24 Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414. For the present statute see 8 U.S.C. § § 1421 (a) and 1443 (a).
25 Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 575 (1926). See also the decision of Chief Justice John Marshall in Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. (U.S.) 393 (1830).
26 For an interesting review of this and similar problems see Wheeler, Russell, “Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court,” Supreme Court Review, ed. Kurland, Philip B. (1973), pp. 123–158Google Scholar.
27 See Davis, Kenneth Culp, Administrative Law Text, 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1972)Google Scholar, chap. 28, “Unreviewable Administrative Action.” For examples of administrative acts which are not subject to judicial review because, in the language of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, “agency action is committed to agency discretion,” see Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, 356 U.S. 309 (1958) (Panama Canal tolls determined by the federal agency not subject to judicial review); Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2nd Cir. 1969) (termination of a research grant by the Veterans Administration not subject to judicial review).
28 Hughes, Charles Evans, Addresses,2nd ed. (New York, 1916), p. 185Google Scholar.
29 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 475, 499 (1867).
30 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
31 333 U.S. 111.
32 Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
33 135 U.S. 64.
34 See Schubert, Glendon A Jr, The Presidency in the Courts(Minneapolis, Minn., 1957)Google Scholar: “It is accepted as a political and legal fact today that the President of the United States is immune from prospective control by the judiciary. The principal reason for this is the president's power of direction over the Department of Justice and other national police agencies, and his position as commander in chief of the armed forces: therefore he cannot be forced to accept service of legal process” (p. 318).
35 United States v. Nixon, 417 U.S. 683 (1974). See Freund, Paul A., “Foreword: On Presidential Privilege,” Harvard Law Review, 88 (11, 1974), 13–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
36 SeeBerger, Raoul, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth(Cambridge, Mass., 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 41 L. Ed. 2d 1064.
38 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
39 343 U.S. 587.
40 343 U.S. 588.
41 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
42 Humphrey's Executor (Rathbun) v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
43 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355 (1958).
44 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
45 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
46 295 U.S. 533.
47 Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
48 Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932).
49 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
50 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
51 Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 154 (1872); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 128 (1872); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1867); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915); Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156 (D.C. Conn., 1925); Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927); Ex parteGrossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
52 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
53 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
54 Prize Cases, 2 Bl. (U.S.) 635 (1863).
55 The Grapeshot v. Wallerstein, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 129 (1870).
56 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 19 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U.S.) 1 (1849).
57 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2 ( 1866 ); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
58 Corwin, EdWard S., The President: Office and Powers,4th ed. (New York, 1957), p. 157Google Scholar. See Rodino, Peter W jr, “Congressional Review of Executive Action,” Seton Hall Law Review, 5 (1974), 489–525Google Scholar.
59 For a convenient collection of selected essays on this subject see Levy, Leonard W., ed., Judicial Review and the Supreme Court(New York, 1967)Google Scholar.
60 For a full list of such cases down through the 1963 term see The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, Sen. Doc. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1964 edition (Government Printing Office), pp. 1387–1402.
61 Ibid., pp. 1405–1537.
62 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 (1857). Missouri Compromise Act regarding slavery in the territories.)
63 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603 (1870) (Legal Tender Act), overruled in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (1871).
64 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1867) (Test Oath Act).
65 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (Anti-lynching Act). See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
66 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Civil Rights Act of 1875).
67 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (Income Tax Act of 1894).
68 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
69 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act).
70 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Guffey Coal Act).
71 1 Cr. (U.S.) 137 (1803).
72 The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 274 (1870).
73 Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 561 (1865); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 (1909); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
74 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
75 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
76 The Alicia, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 571 (1869); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 128 (1872); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
77 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
78 For an excellent summary see Abraham, Henry J., The Judicial Process, 2nd ed. (New York, 1968)Google Scholar, chap. 9, “ The Sixteen Great Maxims of Judicial Self-Restraint.” For a recent case on mootness, see De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
79 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
80 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
81 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
82 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See also Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
83 354 U.S. 187. See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
84 A broad power to investigate at the state level in the field of education was upheld in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), and in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). Both cases were decided by 5–4 votes.
85 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955). See the symposium on“Legislative Investigations: Safeguards for Witnesses,” Notre Dame Lawyer, 29, (1954), 157–285Google Scholar.
86 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969). See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 ( 1881 ); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
87 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972).
88 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616, 622 (1972).
89 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Exclusion from a state legislature was held justiciable in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
90 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 461 (1953).
91 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
92 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 ( 1932 ); Wood v. Brown, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
93 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
94 Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 ( 1963 ); Gojak v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966).
95 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
96 Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
97 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
98 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
99 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100 381 U.S. 509.
101 381 U.S. 520–1.
102 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 410 U.S. 221–2.
104 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (concurring opinion).
105 Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911).
106 H. F. Stone to W. Rutledge, January 24, 1944, quoted in Mason, A. T., Security through Freedom (Ithaca, 1955), p. 140Google Scholar.