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Republican Ideals and Contemporary Realities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Jack P. Geise
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Extract

Despite its enduring appeal, the republican vision of political life has been the subject of numerous recent criticisms. Both its relevance to an age of large-scale organizations and its desirability in an era which professes concern for individual autonomy has been questioned. However, a reconsideration of these challenges to republicanism suggests that they can be effectively met without sacrificing the core values of republicanism. Consequently, by adapting it to contemporary political realities the republican ideal can in fact serve as an apt antidote against many current political ills. Admittedly, though, any form of republicanism that is going to be viable today will assume a character at odds with either republicanism's classical or commercial modes.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , January 1984 , pp. 23 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1984

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References

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16 There is, of course, a problem in this formulation, for it is haunted by a certain circularity of argument. Specifically, there is a sense in which worthy acts are necessary if one is to create a public space. Likewise, a public space is to some degree necessary if there are to be worthy acts. In this sense, a public space is both precondition for and consequence of the practice of virtue. Occasionally, republicanism has avoided confronting this issue by simply circumventing it: by invoking an event whose consequences or a person whose actions set the republican experience in motion. Hence, the recourse to “explanation” by way of the sagacious lawgiver or the founding experience. Just as often, though, republicans have contented themselves with a more mundane and less-heroic rendering – one which relies more fully on an evolutionary conception of the republic's rise. To some extent, Machiavelli's account of (or better yet, well-nigh silence on) the rise of Venice fits this pattern, as indeed, with emendations, does his discussion of Rome.

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