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Presidential Statesmanship and the Constitution: The Limits of Presidential Studies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Thomas S. Engeman
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Extract

According to Publius (the nom de plume of The Federalist's authors), a primary task of the Convention was to create an executive of sufficient energy and independence. As he says in Federalist, No. 70: “There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation.” The president must be able to administer the government and defend the nation but he must do so without destroying or being destroyed by constitutional limitations or the political independence of Congress.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , April 1982 , pp. 266 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1982

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References

1 Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John, The Federalist Papers, ed. Cooke, Jacob E. (Wesleyan, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), #70, p. 471CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also, #23, p. 147; #25, p. 163; #47–51, pp. 323–53; #73, p. 493. See, below, note 24.

2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Basler, Roy P. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953), IV: 426Google Scholar.

3 Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power (New York, 1960), p. 9Google Scholar.

4 Ibid, p. 10.

5 Reedy, George, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York, 1970)Google Scholar.

6 Pious, Richard M., The American Presidency (New York, 1979), pp. 86, 111, 144–45Google Scholar.

7 Ibid., pp. 6, 16, 17, 47–86, 203–10, 384–85.

8 Ibid., p. 62.

9 Ibid., p. 62.

10 Federalist, #51, p. 349; #76, p. 494.

11 Ibid., #73, p. 483.

12 Ibid., #70, p. 471; #47–48, pp. 323–38; #51, 347–53; #64, p. 433; #66, p. 451, #68, p. 461.

13 Vile, M.J.C., Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, 1967), pp. 36–37Google Scholar.

14 Pious, , American Presidency, pp. 30–31Google Scholar.

15 Federalist, #68, p. 461; #78, pp. 522, 530; #79, pp. 531–32.

16 Pious, , American Presidency, pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

17 Ibid., p. 38.

18 Ibid., p. 84.

19 Ibid., p. 84. For an excellent discussion of presidential prerogative in various duties see Tatalovich, R. and Daynes, B. W. “Toward a Paradigm to Explain Presidential Power,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 9, no. 4 (Fall 1979), 428–41Google Scholar.

20 Pious, , American Presidency, p. 420Google Scholar.

21 Locke, John, Second Treatise of Civil Government, para., 159–60Google Scholar. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, part II, chap. 18.

22 Locke, para. 168. For a discussion of Locke's rejection of impeachment see Seliger, M., The Liberal Politics ofJohn Locke (London, 1968), pp. 350–72Google Scholar. See Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers (New York, 1957), p. 8Google Scholar: “What Locke gives us in the final analysis is not legislative supremacy really, but as his Whig commentators pointed out—‘a balanced constitution.’”

23 Aristotle Politics 1283b–1288b.

24 Federalist, #23, p. 148. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, The Imperial President (Boston, 1973), p. 5Google Scholar, argues that this right of prerogative is “being asserted for the national government as a whole—for, that is, Congress and the Presidency combined.” This is technically correct but a truer gloss could be obtained by considering Publius' view of the actual operation of the executive, especially in the defense of the nation (cf. #72, pp. 486–87). See, Pious, , American Presidency, p. 60Google Scholar, note 1, where he criticizes Raoul Berger for his naiveté concerning Publius' intention regarding executive prerogative.

25 Ibid., #25, p. 163. For Thomas Jefferson's view of prerogative see his letters to W. C. Claiborne, 3 February 1809, and John B. Calvin, 20 September 1810.

26 Collected Works of Lincoln, IV: 426.

27 Ibid., pp. 430–31.

28 Ibid., p. 430.

29 Ibid., VII: 281.

30 Havens, M. C. and McNeil, D. M., “Presidents, Impeachment, and Political Accountability,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 8: (Winter 1978), 5–18Google Scholar.

31 Pious, , American Presidency, p. 155–60Google Scholar. Rossiter, Clinton, Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton, 1948), pp. 238–39Google Scholar. Corwin, Edward S. and Koenig, Louis, The Presidency Today (Washington Square, New York, 1956), pp. 32–33, 20–21Google Scholar.

32 Federalist, #65, p. 439. M. C. Havens and D. M. McNeil, “Presidents, Impeachment, and Political Accountability.”

33 Havens and McNeil, “Presidents, Impeachment and Political Accountability,” conclude that the current method of presidential accountability, with impeachment as the ultimate weapon, is superior to any contemplated reform. “The threat of impeachment/removal must be viewed as a viable alternative but an extreme one. The very fact that the maintenance of presidential accountability is a near full-time task for the Congress implies that many methods of keeping the executive in line must be used so that the ‘spear of impeachment’ is left as an ultimate and infrequently utilized alternative.” Pious mentions that the Republican leadership considered if President Truman might be impeachable for his conduct of the Korean war. The Kennedy brothers also wondered whether their Cuban policy provided grounds for impeachment.

34 Federalist, #65, p. 439. “Political” appears in boldface to indicate the non-judicial character of impeachment proceedings.

35 Ibid., p. 440.

36 Dahl, Robert A., A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 1956), p. 31Google Scholar. Carey, George W., “Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics,” American Political Science Review, 72 (03 1978), 151–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Nixon-David, Richard M. Frost Interviews, New York Times, 22 05 1977Google Scholar.

38 Ibid., Federalist, #25, p. 163.

39 Ibid., #49, p. 340.

40 Collected Works of Lincoln, I: 112.

41 See Frisch, Morton J., “Franklin Delano Roosevelt,” in Frisch, Morton J. and Stevens, Richard G., ed., American Political Thought (New York 1971), pp. 219–35Google Scholar. Pious, , American Presidency, pp. 53–55, 66, 68, 393, 405Google Scholar. Corwin, and Koenig, , The Presidency Today, pp. 57–58Google Scholar.

42 Barber, J. D., The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1977)Google Scholar. All in all, it seems Pious is too pessimistic about the president's consensual power. See Karp's, Walter excellent review of Pious in the New Republic, 17 02 1979Google Scholar.

43 Corwin, and Koenig, , The Presidency Today, pp. 65–66Google Scholar.

44 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VII: 282. Lincoln added, “Whither it is tending seems plain.” For an excellent discussion of another Whig view of presidential power see Schultz, L. Peter, “William Howard Taft: A Constitutionalist's View of the Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 4 (Fall 1979), 402–14Google Scholar.