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Since the end of military operations Danubian Europe has been undergoing a social and political upheaval in which, paradoxically, both Communism and a resurgent nationalism seem to be powerful elements. The most significant contributing factor in this atmosphere of political unrest is the all-too-direct domination of the Soviet Union whose policies are guided by conflicting motivations and divergent objectives, results of the flexible strategic and economic considerations of the Kremlin.
Hungary today is in the twilight zone of liberated states; her domestic politics are a mirror-like reflection of the fundamental tensions among the world powers. The post-war era has undoubtedly seen hopes for a real moral and economic transformation of the country spurred on by a series of significant, if temporary, liberal reform moves. Fair national elections resulting in a decisive Communist defeat and in an acceptable coalition government based on the Smallholders, a national party neither ultra-conservative nor revoluntionary, a thorough land reform, a reasonably free press, a stabilized currency, and a moderately successful process of industrial nationalization were promising landmarks at the beginning of the road toward reconstruction.
* This article, completed before the Communist putsch of late May, 1947, remains timely as a description of the methods used by a Communist minority to seize power.
1 Soviet policies in Danubian Europe center around three major objectives: 1) to prevent the use of Danubian states as bases for future aggression against Soviet territory; 2) to achieve farreaching social reforms in most of these countries; and 3) to compensate the Soviet people at the expense of the vanquished, who will be forced to contribute heavily to the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union. Cf. “The Danubian States, Soviet Aims in South-East Europe,” The Times, London, 11 11, 1946, pp. 5 ff.Google Scholar
2 Cf. Bilbó, István, “A Magyar Demokrácia Válsága, (The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy)” in Valóság, October-December, 1945, p. 39.Google Scholar
3 According to Oscar Jászi's brilliant description, Bela Kun's “Communistic revolution followed a pure Russian world-revolutionary model, with chaotic experiments in socialization, dreams of the sovfchozes, and occasional hysterical outbursts of terrorism. It was short-lived, but it made a deep impression on Hungary's conservative soul.” “The Choices in Hungary,” Foreign Affairs, April, 1946, p. 456.
4 This provisional government represented all the parties which had taken part in the national resistance movement up to the time of the collapse of the country after a period of German occupation. A detailed party-breakdown of this provisional government headed by General Béla Miklós of the Hungarian Army, shows the following picture among the members of the Cabinet: 3 Social Democrats, 3 Communists, 2 Smallholders, 2 Conservatives, 2 Army Generals who were members of the first Armistice Commission to Moscow when the Horthy Government, in its last desperation, was negotiating for peace with the Red Army. It is interesting to note that of the two portfolios given the Smallholders Party, one was the all-important Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the portfolios of the Communists included the bases of economic reconstruction, trade, agriculture and communications.
5 A series of conferences and meetings held in January, 1946 among members of Hungary's leading political parties decided on the abolition of the Monarchy and on the establishment of a Hungarian Republic. These decisions were later endorsed by the new Hungarian National Assembly in its first parliamentary sessions. Cf. issues of the Hungarian daily, Magyar Nemzel, for January and February, 1946. Also Haire, John, “Hungary Today,” New Statesman and Nation, 11 10, 1945, pp. 314–315.Google Scholar
6 Lanyi, George A., “Hungary Aims at Liberty For All in Republic,” The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 5, 1946, pp. 1 and 6.Google Scholar
7 Cf. Public Law No. 1, officially published on May 27, 1946, under the title of Act on the Protection of Human Rights; official translation by Hungarian Legal News Service, Budapest, 08 1, 1946.Google Scholar
8 Decree 7300/1946 M.E., published June 28, 1946. H.G. 144.
9 Cf. Horváth, S. Szalai-Z., A Szociáldemokrata Pári Váiat Emel, (Budapest, 1946) p. 38.Google Scholar Other war-criminal trials followed in the footsteps of the Imrédy case. Most fascist leaders of pre-war Hungary were sentenced to death by unanimous verdicts of the courts. Only recently was the death-sentence of András Tasnádi-Nagy revised by the court of appeal and changed to a life-sentence. Tasnádi-Nagy was the president of the Lower House of Parliament, a former Minister of Justice who served in various cabinets between 1939 and 1945, particularly in the Sztójay Cabinet of 1944. He was also President of the Parliament under the Hungarian National Socialists whom he eventually followed to western Hungary and to Austria in their last-minute flight. Cf. “The Continuation of War Criminal Trials in Hungary,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 2. 1947, p. 2.Google Scholar
10 Cf. J. O., , “Hungary Between East and West,” The World Today, May, 1946, p. 214.Google Scholar
11 Cf. Száva, Istcan, New Hungarian Domestic Policy (Budapest, 1946), pp. 34–35.Google Scholar (Published in English). The author of this official account also gives a complete and significant summary of the principal objectives of Hungary's first “popularly elected” post-war government. These involved the following problems: to guarantee the food supplies, to break down the prices and inflation, to nationalize the mines and keyindustries, to guarantee order and public security, and to overcome the reaction. In the light of the recent conspiracy and the seemingly wholesale liquidation of all “reaction,” this early war-objective of the Government is certainly noteworthy.
12 According to official Hungarian interpretation, “The change in the person of the Premier did not affect the composition of the government; there were also minor changes in the cabinet without affecting the principles upon which the coalition was based.” I., Száva, New Hungarian Domestic Policy, p. 35. Despite several sharp political reversals, Ferenc Nagy is still Prime Minister in the present coalition government.Google Scholar
13 The present Smallholders Party has never represented the economically submerged or depressed elements of the peasantry. If it did speak for the agricultural classes at all (a doubtful premise in itself), it upheld primarily the interests of the “kulak” group. Not unlike other Danubian peasant groups it was run by typical townsmen, such as Tibor Eckhardt or Ferenc Nagy. Cf. “Danubian Peasant Parties,” The Economist, Jan. 11, 1947, pp. 54–55.Google Scholar
14 Cf. Hungarian Information Service, published by the Hungarian Legation, Washington, D. C, issue of Mar. 4, 1947, pp. 3–4. These desperate and embittered words were uttered in the course of the liquidation of the recent “reactionary” conspiracy. The conspiracy-scare finally led to a purge of the Smallholders Party and to a full-fledged domestic political crises.Google Scholar
15 The Smallholders have managed to retain several important portfolios, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Propaganda.
16 Cf. Népszava, official daily paper of the Social Democratic Party, especially in issues of Feb. 1–8, 1947, front-page accounts of the exact progress of the Party Congress. Cf. The Manchester Guardian, (Feb. 7, 1947, p. 4.) in a cautious but informative editorial which clearly raises the fundamental issue, “The question that remains is how far the Social Democratic Party, as at present led and constituted, can continue to exist independently … and yet in cooperation with the Communists.” The more recent behavior of certain Social Democratic leaders has dispelled all doubt concerning the outcome of this political dilemma.Google Scholar
17 This significant address was given at a plenary session of the Social Democrats' National Party Congress in Budapest, and reported in detail in Népszava, Feb. 12, 1947, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar
18 This item of political information is not generally known, for Rákosi's exchange was the result of secret negotiations between the two governments. Official biographies touch rather lightly on this transitional period in Rakosi's life. Cf. a recent press-release of the Hungarian Information Service, published by the Hungarian Legation in Washington, D. C., which simply states that “In 1940, due to the Soviet Union's intervention, Rakosi was freed. Then he emigrated to the Soviet Union.” Hungarian Press Release, No. 7, June 10, 1946.Google Scholar
19 Cf. Magyar Nemzel, issues of June, 1946. These comments were widely quoted and discussed in the Hungarian press, which faithfully records every Communist utterance, regardless of its political significance.
20 According to the terms of the peace treaty, ninety days after ratification all Soviet troops except for a few units guarding the lines of communication between Russia and Austria must be withdrawn from Hungary.
21 Cf. Szabad Szó, organ of the National Peasant Party, Jan. 16, 1947, and Világ, Jan. 18, 1947. News of a “fascist” conspiracy quickly spread abroad where it caused immediate speculations concerning the future destinies of Hungary, involving the inevitability of a Communist dictatorship.Google Scholar Cf. “Die Verhaftungen in Budapest,” Neue Zürcher Zeilung, Jan. 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1947;Google Scholar“Hungarian Arrests, Alleged Foreign Aid to Conspirators,” The Manchester Guardian, Jan. 18, 1947;Google Scholar“Hungarian General Flees, and Hungarian Communist Demands,” The Times, London, 01 14, 1947;Google ScholarRodney, C. M., “The Hungarian Conspiracy,” The Central European Observer, Jan. 24, 1947.Google Scholar
22 Cf. “Die Verhaftungen in Budapest, Ein Communique des Innenministeriums,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 6, 1947,Google Scholar front page; Ross, Albion, “Hungary Reports Plot to Restore Horthy to Power,” The New York Times, Jan. 5, 1947, pp. 1 and 35.Google ScholarRajk, Laszló, Communist Minister of the Interior, controls the entire police system; he is not a Moscow emigre, but an extremist fanatic for whom even the Moscow-trained group of Communists is too slow. His brother was a Nazi stormtrooper, he himself is a fairly young ex-schoolteacher. Rajk was instrumental in carrying out the full-fledged purge of the Hungarian Army.Google Scholar
23 Cf. Magyar Nemzet, Jan. 19, 1947. p. 1. (Italics mine.)Google Scholar
24 Cf. MacCormac, John, “Russia Rejects U. S. Hungary Note,” The New York Times, Mar. 9, 1947.Google Scholar Although officially suppressed, the American note of protest gained wide publicity and circulation in Budapest. The American Government's information service distributed over 10,000 copies of the Hungarian translation of this note in an effort to influence future party strategies and to bolster up the morale of the Smallholders Party.
25 Cf. Világosság, Budapest, Dec. 1, 1946, p. 1, and several subsequent issues, invariably devoting front page space to such attempts at inter-party cooperation.Google Scholar
26 Cf. A Magyar Nemzet Naptára, Budapest, 1947, pp. 43–44.Google Scholar
27 Cf. Világotság, Jan. 17, 1947, p. 3.Google Scholar
28 Best known among these are Szabad Nép (Free People) and Szabadság (Freedom), both of them daily papers, and Szabad Föld (Free Land), a weekly for “the Agricultural Class of Hungary.”
29 Cf. Fogarasi, Béla, “A dunai népek együttmüködése (The Cooperation of Danubian Peoples),” Társadalmi Szemle, May, 1946, pp. 354et seq.Google Scholar
30 In December, 1946 Magyar Nemzel reported in detail on two important conferences. One of these was the meeting of the Social Democratic Parties of Central Europe in Prague, with representatives of the Socialist Parties of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania. The strong Hungarian delegation was led by Anna Kethly. The other meeting of international significance was the All-Slav Congress of Belgrade, held in order “to promote Slavic unity and brotherhood.” According to this report, the Congress was primarily a meeting of the cultural representatives of the Slavic peoples and did not aim at the establishment of an all-Eastern European Slavic bloc. Magyar Nemzel, Dec. 8 and 9, 1946, p. 1.Google Scholar
31 This drastic executive order was put into effect in December, 1946. Judges are in permanent sessions to deal with such cases without delay. In addition to Budapest tribunals, twenty-two provincial courts are handling “crimes” connected with black-market operations. Penalties range for a minimum of ten years' imprisonment to death sentences. Cf. Reggel, Dec. 2, 1946, p. 5.Google Scholar
32 Quoted in Világ, Nov. 23, 1946, p. 2.Google Scholar
33 Cf. Magyar Nemzet, Nov. 22, 1946, p. 3. The report indicates that there are over one hundred students in each course, the period of instruction covering about two weeks.Google Scholar
34 Decree 6270/1946 M.E., published June 4, 1946. H.G. 125.
35 In June, 1944, in a joint pastoral circular letter with the then Cardinal Justinian Seredi he stated that: “Precisely now, because we are in this dreadful world war, we are in the greatest need of the help of God. … In these very times we see with unutterable sadness that here, in Christian Hungary, successive orders were decreed which are opposed to the laws of GodT These edicts have infringed upon, and even totally taken away the inborn rights of a part of our Hungarian fellow-citizens … and they are persecuted exclusively on account of their racial origin, withcat proving their individual crimes, if any, and without the procedure prescribed by law. You also could readily understand the injustice of such action, if you were deprived of your rights in this manner.” This pastoral letter was ordered read in every Catholic church in the country. It has recently been reprinted in its full text, in English, as part of a documentary collection of Catholic speeches and statements, Important Declarations of Serédi, J., Taken From his Pastoral Letters and Speeches Which Refer to Actual EcclesiasticoPolitical Questions (Budapest, 1946), pp. 28–37.Google Scholar
36 Cf. Sulzberger, C. L., “Hungarians Hope to Avert Red Coup by 4-Power Rule,” The New York Times, Feb. 16. 1947.Google Scholar
37 Cf. Katona, Jenö, “Katolicizmus és politika,” “Valóslag, 03–05, 1946, Vol. II, Nos. 3–5, pp. 42–46. (Translation mine.)Google Scholar
38 This governmental decree was subsequently confirmed by Parliament and included in Law IX of 1946, officially published in May, 1946 as the Land Settlements and Conclusion of the Land Reform Act. The Act also states that “the land of persons who fled to Germany after October 15, 1944, and did not return therefrom by October 31, 1945, will without exception be confiscated.” (par. 17.) For further details on economic policies and administrative procedures, Cf. “Chiffres Sur le Ravage et la Résurrection de la Hongrie,” Cahiers de la Nouvelle Hongrie, Budapest, 1946, p. 17et seq.Google Scholar In English language, cf. Faragó, László, “Private Property and Nationalization,” New Hungary, 12 20, 1946, Vol. I No. 7, p. 3.Google Scholar
39 Cf. The Preamble to the decree and the ensuing Act which states that “the system of latifundia will be destroyed in its foundations by the reform of landed property.” Law IX-1946.
40 The land reform measure itself was hastily drawn up and carried out, yet it was the only way to induce peasants to undertake any cultivation in 1945. Consequently by 1946 over 90% of the agricultural land was sown. Cf. “Prospects for Agriculture, Danubian Outlook,” The Economist, Jan. 4, 1947, pp. 6–7.Google Scholar The land reform was at least as much of a political and social measure as an economic move. As such it had a number of further implications; “a radical change as this cannot be carried out without jolts and jerks. Only after all available lands have been distributed will it be possible to appraise the economic and social consequences.” Vambery, R., Hungary–To Be or Not To Be, pp. 177–178.Google Scholar For an official English language account cf. “Land Reforms and Reconstruction,” Száva, Istvan, New Hungarian Domestic Policy, pp. 29–32.Google Scholar
41 Cf. Magyar Nemzet, Nov. 24, 1946, p. 3, for the first official announcement of the government's action, under the heading “Forced Nationalization of Hungary's Heavy Industry.”
42 “The National Socialists arrested and later deported all the leaders of Jeaish political and business life and journalists, together with the Hungarian democratic and anti-Fascist politicians.” Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, U. S. Government Publication (Washington, D. C., 1947), Vol. I, Chap. XI, p. 955. (Italics mine.)Google Scholar
43 Cf. “Workers and Industry, Danubian Outlook,” The Economist, Jan. 25, 1947, p. 134.
44 N. Kaldor estimates that at least one-fourth of the total current production goes to the U.S.S.R. The reparations burden is further enhanced by a strict interpretation of the Potsdam agreement according to which the Russians continue to compute the reparations bill in “dollars of 1938 purchasing power.” Nevertheless, Professor Kaldor reaches the strange conclusion that “the picture of Soviet Russia as the ruthless economic exploiter of Hungary is far too one-sided.” Cf. “The Danubian States,” The Times, London, Nov. 19, 1946.
45 Elaborate executive decrees were issued to give adequate legal basis to these joint agreements and to earmark the use of most industrial production for reparations. The first four decrees were issued in July, 1946 and consist of the statutes of the Hungarian-Soviet Shipping Company, the Masovol Hungarian-Soviet Crude Oil Company, the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Company and the Danubian Alumina Industry.
46 There was a considerable counter-revolutionary vote in the conservative victory of November, 1945, observes Oscar Jászi, but “it should not be forgotten that the Smallholders Party is not reactionary, nor even conservative, it is a progressive party in favor of social and cultural reforms.” “The Choices in Hungary,” Foreign Affairs, April, 1946, p. 462.Google Scholar
47 Cf. Fogarasi, Béla, “A dunai népek együttmükódése,” Társadalmi Szemle (Social Survey), 05, 1946, p. 354. (Italics mine.)Google Scholar