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The ‘New Look’ Raises Old Problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

E. Raymond Platig
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Extract

The essence of the “new look” in the national security policy of the United States has been expressed by Administration spokesmen, Democratic critics, and analysts in key phrases which have heaped confusion upon ambiguity. The “new look” has been characterized as a policy of “instant retaliation,” of “massive retaliation,” of relying on the ability to “retaliate with great force by mobile means.” It has been described as a “strategy of detachment,” as an attempt to “hedge our strategic bets,” as preparing for the “long pull,” as “a reassessment of our strategic and logistic capabilities,” as preparing to take “whatever steps our national interest requires,” and as “an attempt by intelligent people to keep abreast of the times.” It has been called “less a policy than an idea,” “a misnomer,” “no ‘new look’ at all,” “merely an acceptance of the Old Look,” “a bluff to a certain extent,” a “gradual shift in emphasis,” and “revolutionary.” The “new look” has been distinguished from the “interim look,” but there has been some doubt as to whether the “interim look” referred to fiscal 1954 or fiscal 1955 or both. The term became so contagiously popular that even the alleged clean-up of the “security risks” in the Department of State was supposed to have brought about a “new look” there.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , January 1955 , pp. 111 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1955

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References

1 These descriptive and evaluative phrases may be found, in the order in which they appear in the text, in the following sources: Bowles, Chester, “A Plea for Another Great Debate,” New York Times Magazine, 02 28, 1954, p. 11Google Scholar; Vice-President Nixon in a radio-TV address, New York Times, 03 14, 1954, p. 44Google Scholar; Dulles, John Foster, “Policy for Security and Peace,” Foreign Affairs, XXXII (04, 1954), 359Google Scholar: Reston, James. “The President—After a Year,” New York Times Magazine, 01 17, 1954, p. 25Google Scholar; attributed to Admiral Robert B. Carney by Baldwin, Hanson, New York Times, 02 24, 1954, p. 13Google Scholar; U. S. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 2Google Scholar; Admiral Radford, Arthur W., “The ‘New Look’” Vital Speeches of the Day, XX (01 1, 1954), 171Google Scholar; Knowland, William F., “The ‘Instant Retaliation’ Policy Defended,” New York Times Magazine, 03 21, 1954, p. 74Google Scholar; President Eisenhower during press conference, New York Times, 03 21, 1954, p. E2Google Scholar; William S. White, ibid., July 18, 1954, p. E2; Senator Mansfield during radio debate, ibid., February 18, 1954, p. 30; Adlai E. Stevenson in an address at Miami Beach, ibid., March 7, 1954, p. 62; Goldwater, Senator, “The New Look in the United States Air Force,” Vital Speeches of the Day, XX (04 15, 1954), 395Google Scholar; Senator Saltonstall during radio debate, New York Times, 02 8, 1954, p. 30Google Scholar; Secretary of Navy Anderson's remarks to newsmen, ibid., March 10, 1954, p. 12; Krock, Arthur, “Bipartisanship—Theory and Fact,” New York Times Magazine, 03 14, 1954, p. 34.Google Scholar

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4 Dulles, John Foster, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Bulletin, XXX (01 25, 1954), 108Google Scholar. This was the first official policy statement by the Secretary in which he placed so much stress upon these aspects of deterrent power. Seven months before he took office as Secretary of State, however, Mr. Dulles had expounded clearly his views on the need “for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly … where it hurts [the aggressor], by means of our choosing.” See Dulles, John Foster, “A Policy of Boldness,” Life, XXXII (05 19, 1952), 151.Google Scholar

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15 The impact of new weapons upon these relationships was first officially stressed by the President in his 1954 State of the Union Message. See Bulletin, XXX (01 18, 1954), 71.Google Scholar

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24 Secretary of Defense Wilson first mentioned the possible need for a “second new look” on April 26, 1954. New York Times, 05 10, 1954, p. 1Google Scholar. Soon thereafter he began to try avoiding any reference to the “new look,” ibid., p. 10. It seems quite likely that a top-level review of the “new look” was made at the “second Quantico Conference” held in mid-June. See ibid., June 18, 1954, p. 26; June 19, 1954, p. 1; June 20, 1954, p. 29; June 21, 1954, p. 1.

25 On July 31, 1954, the New York Times reported that Assistant Secretary of Defense H. Struve Hensel had said in Madrid that he would return to the United States to propose a reconsideration, or review, of the United States political, economic and military policy “on a global basis,” and on all levels, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 14.

26 Radford, , “Defense for the ‘Long Pull’,” loc. cit., p. 48.Google Scholar

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30 Stevenson, , Miami Speech, New York Times, p. 62Google Scholar; Bowles, , “A Plea,” loc. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

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34 Bowles, , “A Plea,” loc. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

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42 See letter to the editor from Chester Bowles in New York Times Magazine, 04 4, 1954, p. 6Google Scholar; Stevenson statement in New York Times, 03 15, 1954, p. 17Google Scholar; and Pearson statement in ibid., March 26, 1954, p. 5.

43 Ibid., April 21, 1954, p. 4; June 27, 1954, p. 37; June 28, 1954, p. 2.

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46 See statements by Senator Lehman and Representative F. D. Roosevelt, Jr., as reported in ibid., May 17, 1954, p. 1, and July 13, 1954, p. 10, respectively. Also see Harriman, W. Averell, “Leadership in World Affairs,” Foreign Affairs, XXXII (07, 1954), 525–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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52 In spite of Mr. Dulles' firm contention that it was made there is little supporting evidence. First, none of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever referred to such a basic decision even though most of their significant statements concerning the “new look” were made after Mr. Dulles' speech in January (see references cited in note 51 above). Second, President Eisenhower said on the day following Dulles' speech that reliance on strong retaliatory power “didn't take much decision”; it rested on the “fundamental truth” that such power was the only deterrent to surprise atomic attack (see New York Times, 01 14, 1954, p. 12Google Scholar). Third, the only support Mr. Dulles ever received for his contention came from Walter B. Smith and Thurston B. Morton of the Department of State and Vice-President Nixon. Of these three, the only one who continued such support after the debate on the “new look” got underway was Vice-President Nixon in his obviously partisan speeches (see Bulletin, XXX [02 22, 1954], 265Google Scholar; ibid., March 8, 1954, pp. 363–64; New York Times, 03 14, 1954, p. 44Google Scholar; and references cited in note 43 above). Fourth, Dulles himself tended, in the course of his clarifying statements, to back away from his own very positive contention of January 12 (see Dulles, , “Policy for Security and Peace,” loc. cit., p. 362Google Scholar; and U. S. Congress, Senate, Statements of Dulles and Radford, pp. 23–25, 42).Google Scholar

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55 Bulletin, XXVIII (02 9, 1953), 207.Google Scholar

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59 U.S. Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act of 1954, p. 502.Google Scholar

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61 Ibid., February 20, 1953, p. 353. Italics added.

62 Ibid., p. 354.

63 Ibid., XXIX (July 27, 1953), 11.

64 Ibid., September 28, 1953, p. 406.

65 Ibid., January 26, 1953, pp. 129–30.

66 Ibid., March 23, 1953, p. 430.

67 Ibid., February 9, 1953, p. 207.

68 Dulles, , “Policy for Security and Peace,” loc. cit., p. 360.Google Scholar

69 New York Times, 04 1, 1954, p. 12.Google Scholar