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The “Neo-Realism” of Dean Acheson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Oscar William Perlmutter
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Extract

Acheson served in the Department of State under both Roosevelt and Truman, and the contrasts were striking as each President approached foreign affairs in strikingly different ways. FDR was keenly sensitive to the difficulties that foreign affairs can create in partisan politics. Having served in the Wilson administration, he was aware of the obstacles a president can face in achieving his foreign policy goals because of congressional opposition, an experience he meditated upon and took to heart. In appointing Cordell Hull as his Secretary of State, Roosevelt tried to neutralize and conciliate possible opposition in Congress. He was careful throughout his term of office to handle the Senate with tact and political prudence.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , January 1964 , pp. 100 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1964

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References

1 See “Acheson and the Diplomacy of World War II,” The Western Political Quarterly, XIV (12, 1961), 896–911Google Scholar.

2 McCamy, James L., The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations. A Report Prepared for the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, by the Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 56Google Scholar. “Byrnes was an individualist who ‘kept his office in his hat’ and made personal decisions without thorough consultation and the methodical clearance of ideas.”

3 Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 243Google Scholar: “A few months after I assumed office the personnel of the Department had been almost doubled by the transfer to it of all or part of such war agencies as the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Surplus Property Administration.”

4 Lansing Warren, the New York Times correspondent, reported that Byrnes was impressed with Acheson's work as liaison officer between the Department of State and the “Hill.” See New York Times, August 17, 1945, pp. 1, 9.

5 Review of Politics, XXII (01, 1960), 1–40Google Scholar.

6 Cantril, Hadley, Public Opinion, 1935–45 (Princeton, 1952), pp. 924–925Google Scholar. Congress was under pressure to bring the overseas forces back home and to demobilize the army. The War Department was sharply criticized for complying so slowly and General Marshall, in September of 1945, was called in by Congress to explain the situation. Proposals were introduced in Congress which would have cut the army to 5,000,000 men immediately, the German occupation force to half its size, and would have abandoned selective service altogether. See New York Times, September 23, 1945; IV, p. 2. Cf. Forrestal, James V., The Forrestal Diaries, ed., Millis, Walter and Duffield, E. S. (New York, 1951), pp. 89, 102, 129Google Scholar; McNaughton, Frank and Hehmeyer, Walter, Harry Truman, President (New York, 1947), p. 33Google Scholar; Stimson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), pp. 596–599Google Scholar.

7 See note 1.

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9 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Nomination of Dean G. Acheson, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

10 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XIII (11 18, 1945), 788Google Scholar.

11 “There are some who argue that isolationism would offer us a bargain basement security. But, in the long run, it would, in fact, cost us much more to keep up that level of armament which would be required if we were to try — and it would be a vain attempt — to remain an island of security in a Sovietdominated world.” Address delivered at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, June 13, 1950, and reprinted in the U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXII (June 26, 1950), 1038.

12 Acheson, Dean G., A Democrat Looks at His Party (New York, 1955), p. 64Google Scholar.

13 Ibid., p. 61.

14 Acheson, Dean, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, 1958), p. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Ibid., pp. 2–3.

16 Morgenthau, Hans J., In Defense of the National Interest (New York, 1951), p. ixGoogle Scholar.

17 Acheson, A Democrat Looks at His Party.

18 Morgenthau, , In Defense of the National Interest, p. 13Google Scholar.

19 See, for example, Pratt, Julius W., Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936)Google Scholar, “The Large Policy of 1898,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIX (09, 1932), 219–242Google Scholar; Weinberg, Albert, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore, 1935)Google Scholar; Millis, Walter, The Martial Spirit (New York, 1931)Google Scholar; Griswold, A. Whitney, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938)Google Scholar; Bemis, Samuel F., A Diplomatic History of the United States (3rd ed.; New York, 1950)Google Scholar. See also Hofstader, Richard, Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860–1915 (Philadelphia, 1944), Chapter IXCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kennan, , American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (Chicago, 1951)Google Scholar; Lippmann, Walter, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943)Google Scholar.

20 Acheson, , A Democrat Looks at His Party, pp. 63–65Google Scholar.

21 Ibid., p. 66.

22 Senate voting records indicate that McCarthy voted for the following: The Truman Doctrine, NATO, Displaced Persons Act, Foreign Aid, Inter-American Treaty, Economic Co-operation Acts, Yugoslav Relief, Trade Agreements Extension Act, Mutual Security Acts. He also voted for the confirmation of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State in 1949.

23 Acheson, , A Citizen Looks at Congress, pp. 75–76Google Scholar.

24 Acheson, , Power and Diplomacy, p. 6Google Scholar.

25 Ibid., p. 7.

26 Ibid., p. 17.

27 Kennan, George, American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (Chicago, 1951)Google Scholar.

28 Acheson, , A Democrat Looks at His Party, p. 91Google Scholar.

29 Ibid.

30 Acheson, Dean, “‘Instant Retaliation’: The Debate Continued,” New York Times Magazine, 03 28, 1954, p. 13Google Scholar; and quoted in A Democrat Looks at His Party, p. 90.

31 Ibid., p. 91. See also Power and Diplomacy, pp. 17 and 82.

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33 Ibid., pp. 88–93. See also Power and Diplomacy, Chapter IV, “Political Precepts for Coalition of Free States,” pp. 105–136.

34 Acheson, , A Democrat Looks at His Party, pp. 88–93Google Scholar; A Citizen Looks at Congress, p. 99.

35 Graebner, Norman A., The New Isolationism (New York, 1956), p. 12Google Scholar.

36 Acheson, , Power and Diplomacy, p. 108Google Scholar.

37 Ibid., pp. 107–108.

38 Ibid., p. 109.

39 Ibid., p. 109. “Finally, there is hardly a more lethal blow to any alliance than to have one ally join the enemies of other allies.”

40 Ibid., p. 72.

41 Ibid., p. 84.

42 Ibid., pp. 118–121.

43 Acheson, , A Democrat Looks at His Party, p. 94Google Scholar.

44 Ibid., p. 82.

45 Ibid., p. 83.

46 See Graebner, The New Isolationism.