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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Three topics follow one another in the opening chapter of the twelfth volume of the old Cambridge Modern History (1910), the one proudly entitled, “The Latest Age.” The table of contents identifies them as: the spread of democracy in Europe; the heavy burden of armaments; and the continental preponderance of Germany. The author (Stanley Leathes) expressed no alarm over the threat to European stability of such incompatible developments. Instead, he chose to comment that “The Latest Age” had been prosaic and dull, as if to suggest that Europe had solved its main political problems, and that an era of unbroken progress beckoned to an enlightened humanity.
* Portions of this article were read at the Convention of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association at San Francisco, Calif., Dec. 28, 1957.
1 A continuing need emphasized in Thompson's, Kenneth W. “Toward a Theory of International Politics,” American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), 733–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 For an illustration see Samuel, Herbert, Liberalism, An Attempt to State the Principles and Proposals of Contemporary Liberalism in England (London, 1902), Chap. V, “Foreign Policy,” 346–54Google Scholar.
3 Repeated collisions between liberal governments and the Church deepened this impression. The western liberals' reluctance to confer full moral recognition on the supranational states — Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey — was consistent with it. On the nineteenth-century liberals' fear of a world state, see Schiffer, Walter, The Legal Community of Mankind (New York, 1954), Chap. VIII, 155 ffGoogle Scholar.
4 Carr, E. H. provides some examples at the outset of his The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939 (2nd ed.; London, 1949Google Scholar).
5 The prevailing temper is clearly revealed in the comment on the military arts in The Britannica Year-Book 1913 (London and New York, 1913), p. 35Google Scholar. Yet on the eve of the war, both Lord Morley and Sir Edward Grey had an intuition of a disaster to Europe's civil order.
6 Before 1914 Latin American liberals occupied the forefront of attempts to establish the rule of law in international affairs. The efforts of Rio Blanco (1845–1912), the Brazilian Foreign Minister, 1902–12, and the Brazilian jurist, Ruy Barbarosa (1851–1923), illustrate this attribute.
7 Cf. Watkins, Frederick, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 117, 271 ff., 296, 301–02, 303CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The subordination of an international mission has its testament in Ruggiero's aphoristic handling of the topic. Cf. The History of European Liberalism (London, 1927), pp. 412–16Google Scholar.
8 Halévy's, Elie perceptive lecture, The World Crisis of 1914–1918 (Oxford, 1930Google Scholar), deserves re-reading for its comment on the forces making for order and disorder on the eve of 1914.
9 SirZimmern, Alfred, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918–1935 (London, 1936), p. 98Google Scholar. Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a liberal jurist of Swiss-German antecedents, did note (1878) the possibility of a confederated Europe having an international parliament and a constitution based on codified international law. Hemleben, S. J., Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries (Chicago, 1943), pp. 116–17Google Scholar.
10 Brierly's, J. L.The Law of Nations (4th ed.; Oxford, 1949), pp. 42 ff.Google Scholar, offers some wise reflections. Schiffer believes that the positivist view of international law readily and frequently combines with the progressive liberal outlook. Op. cit., p. 166.
11 Cf. Quervain, Alfred de, Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Politik. Grundlinien einer politischen Theologie (Berlin, 1931), pp. 78, 80Google Scholar.
12 Meinecke eventually found his way to a profound view of history at once national and universal. His history of the Staatsräson also reviewed the spiritual means for counteracting it. Cf. Die Idee der Staatsräson (New ed.; Munich, 1957), pp. xix–xxi, 496, and 499 ffGoogle Scholar.
13 The standard biography is Theodor Heuss Friedrich Naumann, Der Mann, Das Werk, Die Zeit (2nd ed.; Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1949Google Scholar).
14 Brentano, Lujo, Mein Leben im Kampf um die soziale Entwicklung Deutschlands (Jena, 1931), p. 230Google Scholar.
15 Consult the author's study, “Friedrich Naumann: A German View of Power and Nationalism,” in Nationalism and Internationalism. Essays Inscribed to Carlton J. H. Hayes (Earle, Edward Mead, ed.; New York, 1950), pp. 352–98Google Scholar.
16 Das Ideal der Freiheit (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1908), p. 5Google Scholar.
17 For a sympathetic portrayal see Sell, Friedrich C., Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus (Stuttgart, 1953), Chap. XIII, “Der Geistige Liberalismus,” pp. 299 ffGoogle Scholar. On the obstacles facing liberal idealism see Dorpalen, Andreas, “Wilhelmian Germany — A House Divided Against Itself,” Journal of Central European Affairs, XV (1955–1956), 240–47Google Scholar.
18 The typical liberal position had been revulsion against the “revolutionary” and the “democratic-mass” character of the Social Democrats. Mommsen had previously fought them “with an open visor”; even so, his endorsement of Barth's policy in “Was uns noch retten kann,” Die Nation, XX (1902), 163 ff.Google Scholar, provoked astonishment. Mommsen lacked a clear understanding of Naumann, whose Christian background and social welfare interests would probably have barred Mommsen's sympathy. For details and the citation above see Heuss, Alfred, Theodor Mommsen und das 19. Jahrhundert (Kiel, 1956), pp. 214–20Google Scholar; and the notes, p. 278.
19 Cf. Conze, Werner, “Friedrich Naumann Grundlagen und Ansatz seiner Politik in der nationalsozialen Zeit (1895 bis 1903),” in Schicksalswege Deutscher Vergangenheit (Hubatsch, Walther, ed.; Düsseldorf, 1950), esp. pp. 365–71Google Scholar.
20 This was unfortunate, since, in Sir Harold Nicolson's opinion the pre-1914 German ambassadors had an awareness of common European interests unmatched by their superiors in the Wilhelmstrasse. Cf. Nicolson's, Diplomacy (New York, 1939), p. 149Google Scholar.
21 By 1897 Naumann had disengaged foreign policy from social welfare issues. Cf. Hilfe, III (1897), Nos. 12–16Google Scholar.
22 Consult Meyer, Henry Cord, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815–1945 (The Hague, 1955), pp. 96–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Rohrbach's, Paul most substantial work, Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern. Materialen zur auswärtigen Politik (2nd ed.; Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1908Google Scholar), made effective colonial propaganda. On his contribution to German nationalism see Vermeil, Edmond, “The Origin, Nature and Development of German Nationalist Ideology in the 19th and 20th Centuries,” The Third Reich (London, 1955), p. 81Google Scholar.
24 Naumann's most fervent comment occurred in “Auf dem Wege zur Menschheit,” Patria, XIII (1913), 55–85Google Scholar.
25 See Gerlach, Hellmut von, Von Rechts nach Links (Zurich, 1937), p. 154Google Scholar.
26 Consult Meyer, , op. cit., pp. 194 ffGoogle Scholar.
27 Turkey's oppression of the Armenian minority in 1899 had brought Naumann's power-political outlook into focus. He distinguished between the Armenians' plight and the requirements of German policy. The German national interest, he said, also embraced moral values, whose survival depended upon Germany's world posture, not upon a sentimental attitude toward the Armenians. Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Nationalsozialen Vereins (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1899), pp. 33–34Google Scholar. On the same ground, Naumann defended the Kaiser's “Hunnenrede” of July 27, 1900 which had urged departing German troops to act mercilessly toward the Boxers. Cf. Hilfe, VI (1900), No. 31Google Scholar.
28 This development is traced in the author's article, “Friedrich Naumann: A Mirror of Wilhelmian Germany,” The Review of Politics, XIII (1951), 267–301Google Scholar.
29 Brief'e über Religion (3rd ed.; Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1904), p. 64Google Scholar.
30 See Hilfe, I (1895), Nos. 10, 28Google Scholar. Naumann developed his naval rationale most completely in Demokratie und Kaisertum. Ein Handbuch für innere Politik (4th ed.; Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1905Google Scholar).
31 Naumann elaborated his free trade argument in Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1906), pp. 184–211Google Scholar. Schulze-Gaevernitz had told the National Social convention in 1898 that German foreign policy must support commercial interests and to do this it needed military and naval backing. Naumann wholeheartedly accepted his view that armaments sustained commercial prosperity. Cf. Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Nationalsozialen Vereins (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1898), pp. 97–98Google Scholar.
32 Demokratie und Kaisertum, p. 210.
33 Die Politik der Gegenwart (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1905), p. 21Google Scholar; also Hilfe, II (1896), No. 49Google Scholar; IV (1898), No. 14. Naumann also spoke of the navy as an insurance policy for commercial profit, Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 365. Helfferich, Karl expressed the same opinion — less eloquently — in Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth 1888–1913 (New York, 1914), p. 85Google Scholar.
34 Cf. Nationalsozialer Katechismus (Berlin and Leipzig, 1897), pp. 5, 8, 9, 11Google Scholar.
35 The dynamism of population growth also required it. Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Folgen der Bevölkerungsvermehrung (Munich and Berlin, 1904), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.
36 The Social Democrats' revisionist wing sustained Naumann's hope that a patriotic viewpoint would eventually prevail in the party. Young socialists such as Ludwig Quessel, Max Schippel, and Georg von Vollmar actively defended patriotism, colonialism, and armaments. Gustav Noske's Reichstag address of April 25, 1907 demanding “an armed nation” intensified their dispute with the orthodox wing. Naumann was on friendly terms with Vollmar, a young Bavarian Social Democrat. His speech of Aug. 21, 1912 in the Bavarian Diet on “Social Democratic patriotism” kept Naumann's hopes alive. Schorske, Consult Carl E., German Social Democracy 1905–1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), pp. 66 ffGoogle Scholar.
37 Das Blaue Buch von Vaterland und Freiheit (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 261, 263Google Scholar; Demokratie und Kaisertum, pp. 177–79.
38 “Das Wesen der politischen Macht,” Hilfe, VIII (1902), No. 32Google Scholar.
39 Zar und Weltfrieden (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1899), p. 7Google Scholar; also see Das Blaue Buch, pp. 51–53.
40 Consult Crothers, George, The German Elections of 1907 (New York, 1941Google Scholar); also Sell, , op. cit., Chap. XII, “Imperialismus und Liberalismus,” pp. 275 ffGoogle Scholar.
41 Cf. Dehio, Ludwig, “Ranke und der Deutsche Imperialismus,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXX (1950), 307 ff.Google Scholar; also Heinrich Heffter, “Vom Primat der Aussenpolitik,” ibid., CLXXI (1951), 9.
42 Max Lenz, Otto Hintze, Erich Marcks, and Friedrich Meinecke accepted this imperative. Dehio, , op. cit., p. 321Google Scholar.
43 Cf. Thimme, Annelise, Hans Delbrück ah Kritiker der Wilhelminischen Epoche (Düsseldorf, 1955), pp. 101–04Google Scholar.
44 Ibid., pp. 113–14, 115–16. Delbrück, presented his Mittelafrikaprogramm in the Preussischen Jahrbücher, CXLVII (1912Google Scholar).
45 Rohrbach, , op. cit., p. 22Google Scholar; also Rohrbach's, Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (Königstein i. T. and Leipzig, 1912), p. 9Google Scholar.
46 Naumann, Friedrich, Ausgewählte Schriften (Vogt, Hannah, ed.; Frankfort on the Main, 1949), p. 201Google Scholar.
47 Das Blaue Buch, p. 27.
48 Hilfe, II (1896), No. 13Google Scholar; Nationalsozialer Katechismus, p. 13. Consult Nürnberger, Richard, ‘Imperialismus, Sozialismus und Christentum bei Friedrich Naumann,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXX (1950), 537 ffGoogle Scholar.
49 Zar und Weltfrieden, p. 13.
50 “Expansion means great danger. But without such risks there is generally no political greatness. Without daring neither an individual nor a people has ever become strong.” Die Politik der Gegenwart, p. 16; also see ibid., pp. 14–15.
51 On the evidence of Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, especially pp. 184 ff., Naumann acknowledged that the international economy was more fundamental than his nationalistic emphasis on Germany's role in it. That acknowledgment also makes his optimism about armaments and war plausible — the international economy provided a continuum which diminished the consequences of political events, even wars between Great Powers. For comment on the economic aspects of prewar internationalism, see Rudin, Harry R., “Diplomacy, Democracy, Security: Two Centuries in Contrast,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXI (1956), 164–73Google Scholar.
52 A point emphasized in Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Folgen der Bevölkerungsvermehrung, p. 10.
53 Cf. Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951), pp. 133–35Google Scholar.
54 Naumann had defended Peters during his trial. Cf. Hilfe, II (1896), No. 13Google Scholar; also see Baumont, Maurice, “Carl Peters,” Les Techniciens de la Colonisation (XIXe-XXe Siècles) (Paris, 1947), pp. 17–34Google Scholar.
55 Naumann's letters of July 31, 1907 and Aug. 13, 1907 may be found in Heuss, , op. cit., pp. 539–41Google Scholar; for Brentano's, reaction see Mein Leben im Kampf um die soziale Entwicklung Deutschlands, pp. 276–77Google Scholar.
56 Ibid., p. 277; Hahn, Robert accused Naumann of raising Social Darwinism to the level of a Weltanschauung. Hilfe, XII (1906), No. 26Google Scholar.
57 In 1914 Naumann still believed that France's best interests required a separate peace with Germany. Deutschland und Frankreich (Stuttgart, 1914), pp. 13, 20Google Scholar. For earlier statements see Protokoll … des Nationalsozieden Vereins (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1899), p. 34Google Scholar; also ibid., 1902, p. 34, which develop the theme of a Franco-German program to “contain” England's drive for world empire. On the same theme see Maurenbrecher, Max, “Deutschlands Haltung im Burenkrieg,” Patria, I (1901), 1–14Google Scholar.
58 Cf. Deutschland und Oesterreich (Berlin, 1900), pp. 4–5, 7–10, 12, 16, 32Google Scholar.
59 Conze, , op. cit., p. 365Google Scholar. The German intelligentsia's understanding of Germany's world mission is discussed in Dehio, Ludwig, “Gedanken über die Deutsche Sendung 1900–1918,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXIV (1952), 481–87Google Scholar.
60 Cf. Ausgewählte Schriften, pp. 361–62, 363, 365–67, 386. Contemporary studies deny Naumann's firm belief in an inherent or automatic trend toward internationalism or a world community. Deutsch, Consult Karl W. and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957), pp. 22 ffGoogle Scholar.
61 Naumann did not endorse capitalism uncritically. His “New Liberalism” denied cartels and trusts the legal protection which civil rights afforded to individuals. He caused a furor when he publicly denounced cartelized industries as a “state within the state” allied to the agrarian-feudal interests. Cf. Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik (Leipzig, 1906), CXVI, 360–67, 377, 420, 432–34Google Scholar.
62 Ausgewählte Schriften, pp. 374–77. In 1915 Naumann expected to realize Mitteleuropa by the convergence of economic interests and the binding force of suprapolitical associations. Cf. Meyer, , op. cit., pp. 199, 204–05Google Scholar.
63 Ausgewählte Schriften, pp. 367–74, 377–81, 386. On the international role of capitalism see Das Blaue Buch, pp. 254 ff.; also Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 422–31.
64 Cf. Die Politik Kaiser Wilhelms II (Munich, 1903), p. 17Google Scholar.
65 Hilfe, VI (1900), No. 32Google Scholar.
66 Cf. Demokratie und Kaisertum, pp. 214–16; Hilfe, V (1899), No. 13Google Scholar; and Die Politik Kaiser Wilhelms II.
67 The Kaiser had permitted the Daily Telegraph to publish a candid interview at a time of mounting tension over the Anglo-German naval race. He had tactlessly praised his own service to the British, both in the military conduct of the Boer War, and in averting Franco-Russian intervention. His self-congratulation only aroused scorn in Great Britain and provoked a storm of liberal protest at home. For Max Weber's criticism of the Kaiser see Weber, Marianne, Max Weber Ein Lebensbild (Tübingen, 1926), pp. 408–10Google Scholar.
68 Both Barth and Naumann also knew that the revival of liberalism required mass support from Social Democratic voters. Cf. Barth, Theodor and Naumann, Friedrich, Die Erneuerung des Liberalismus (Berlin-Schoeneberg, 1906), pp. 16–17, 24, 28Google Scholar.
69 Cf. Hilfe, XIV (1908), No. 45Google Scholar.
70 Cf. Patria, X (1910), pp. 6 ffGoogle Scholar. Naumann‘s belief is still vital. The New York Times' editorial of Feb. 6, 1958 on “Privacy in Peacemaking” proclaimed the power of public opinion to shape the general course of diplomatic negotiations and hold them on a moral plane. At the opposite pole is Emil Lederer's opinion that foreign affairs supply means for modern governments to keep “the masses” at a high emotional pitch. State of the Masses (New York, 1940), pp. 122–23Google Scholar.
71 Both SirNicolson's, HaroldThe Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, 1954Google Scholar) and Carr's, E. H.Nationalism and After (New York, 1945Google Scholar) condemn democratic diplomacy, but not for the same reasons.
72 And perhaps socialist. Otto Bauer, the Austrian Social Democrat, had pointed out in 1907 that international disagreements would intensify, not diminish, with the advance of socialism.
73 Protokoll … des Nationalsozialen Vereins (1899), p. 35; Zar und Weltfrieden, pp. 3–4, 9, 11–2; Das Blaue Buch, pp. 20, 96–97.
74 Prewar statesmen, as Norman Angell observed, spoke glibly about the “collapse” or “ruin” that would attend failure in foreign affairs. Angell's originality — in contrast to Naumann's mimicry — consisted in his readiness to analyze the contemporary rhetoric of foreign relations. Cf. The Great Illusion (3rd ed.; New York and London, 1912), espec. Chap. II, “The Axioms of Modern Statecraft,” 15 ffGoogle Scholar.
75 Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 363, 365.
76 Rohrbach's foreign policy analysis provided Naumann's model. But its professed realism merely cloaked Rohrbach's nationalistic value judgments. He believed that the great powers made “pure calculations” based on their armed strength, population growth, imports and exports, and the loyalty of colonial peoples or national minorities. By these means he cloaked Anglo-German rivalry with the prediction that the United States, not Germany, would be the first to clash with Great Britain. Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern, p. 180.
77 At present, especially in the United States, public opinion respects the cultural ingredients of national power. A technological failure, or some neglect in displaying national cultural achievement, is invariably deplored because it may weaken the prospect of some specific task of foreign policy. Whether this is actually so deserves analysis. Perhaps these cultural gambits do have some effect on wavering opinion in a time of great spiritual uncertainty.
78 Paraphrased from Dehio, , “Gedanken über die Deutsche Sendung 1900–1918,” op. cit., p. 487Google Scholar.
79 Das Blaue Buch, pp. 260–61, 264–65. Other Europeans echoed his sentiment. SirBarclay, Thomas commented that, “Militarism on the Continent has thus become allied with the very factors which made for the reign of reason.” Article on “Peace,” in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed.; New York, 1911), XXI, 7Google Scholar.
80 Ritter, Gerhard, Die Dämonie der Macht (5th ed.; Stuttgart, 1947), p. 164Google Scholar.
81 Kuhlemann told the Heidelberg Liberal Congress of 1907 that to improve and strengthen the national culture served mankind's highest goals. Die Grundlagen des Liberalismus (Munich, 1908), p. 95Google Scholar.
82 Troeltsch, Ernst, “The Idea of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics,” in Gierke, Otto, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500–1800 (Cambridge, 1934), I, 211Google Scholar.
83 For comment, see Dorpalen, Andreas, Heinrich von Treitschke (New Haven, Conn., 1957), pp. 292, 296–98Google Scholar. As an illustration, note Rohrbach's assertion that “Foreign policy amounts to the sum of the means adopted by a people in order to realize its national ideas (sic) in world affairs.” Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, p. 206.