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The Jordan River Controversy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Fred J. Khouri
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Extract

The Jordan River has recently become one of the most politically important and controversial rivers of the present day. Ever since the late 1950's, when the Arabs became fully aware of Israel's determination to implement her long-range plans to divert Jordan River water to irrigate the Negev, UN and Western officials concerned with Middle Eastern affairs have looked forward with great foreboding to the time when the first major stage of Israel's project would near its completion, for they expected this to produce another Middle Eastern crisis. Arab-Israeli tension over the water question has grown steadily and began to reach alarming proportions by late 1963 and early 1964. Fortunately the decision of the Arab leaders, in an unprecedented summit meeting held in January, 1964, to use means other than military force to frustrate Israel's water diversion plans precluded any immediate threat of an armed conflict between the contending parties. Nevertheless, because the fundamental disagreements remain unresolved, there is great likelihood that, for a long time to come, the world will find the Middle Eastern water dispute a potentially explosive situation. But few Westerners are adequately aware of the many complex and serious ramifications that are actually involved. In the past, even UN and Western officials tended oversimplify and overlook many aspects of this controversy and naively sought to deal with it on a technical and economic level despite the fact that the primary obstacles were emotional and political in nature.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , January 1965 , pp. 32 - 57
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1965

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References

* The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Arts and Sciences Research Committee at the American University of Beirut for the Rockefeller Research grant which made possible research trips in the last year to many of the countries primarily concerned with the Jordan River question. On the basis of these trips, as well as those made in earlier years, the author was able to visit some of the key Arab and Israeli areas involved in the Jordan River controversy and to interview numerous government officials on both sides.

1 Glueck, Nelson, The River Jordan (Philadelphia, 1964), pp. 17 f., 29 f., 35 f., 61 f., 83, 119, 127, 179Google Scholar; Main, Charles T., The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley (Boston, 1953), pp. 13 ffGoogle Scholar.

2 Ionides, M. G., “The Disputed Waters of the Jordan,” The Middle East Journal, VII (Spring, 1953), 155Google Scholar.

3 UN, General Assembly Doc. A/AC.25/6. Dec. 28, 1949, Part I, p. 3; A/992, Sept. 22, 1949, p. 11; A/1252, Dec. 14, 1949, p. 2.

4 The Ghor refers to the upper level, flat terraced areas of the Jordan Valley.

5 The League of Arab States Secretariat General, The Development of the Jordan River (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 13 ff.Google Scholar; UNRWA, Special Report on the Jordan (Beirut, 1956), p. 84Google Scholar.

6 Baker, Michael and Harza Engineering Co., Yarmuk-Jordan Valley: Master Plan Report (Rochester, Pa., 1955)Google Scholar.

7 This will be discussed later in relation to the Johnston Mission.

8 Stevens, Georgiana G., “The Jordan Valley,” International Conciliation, No. 506, 1956, pp. 255, 258Google Scholar.

9 UN, Official Records of the Security Council, 630th Meeting, 10. 27, 1953Google Scholar; 633rd, Oct. 30; 636th, Nov. 10; 639th, Nov. 18; 640th, Dec. 1; 648th, Dec. 16; 649th, Dec. 17; 650th, Dec. 18; 656th, Jan. 22, 1954; S/3106, Oct. 13, 1953; S/3108, Oct. 18; S/3122, Oct. 23; New York Times, Oct. 30, 1953. See also Khouri, Fred, “Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian Front,” The Middle East Journal, Winter–Spring, 1963, pp. 30–31Google Scholar.

10 Main, op. cit. pp. 5 ff.

11 U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 729 (06 15, 1953), 832Google Scholar; Palestine Refugee Problem: Report of the Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 4; Stevens, op. cit., p. 260Google Scholar.

12 UN, Official Records of the Security Council, 630th Meeting, 10. 27, 1953; pp. 7 ff.; S/3122, Oct. 23, 1953Google Scholar.

13 Peretz, Don, ”Development of the Jordan Valley Waters,” The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1955, p. 400Google Scholar; Stevens, , op. cit., p. 264Google Scholar; The League of Arab States Secretariat General, op. cit., p. 24Google Scholar; The Arab Palestine Office, Commentary on Water Develdpment in the Jordan Valley Region (Beirut, 1954), p. 11Google Scholar.

14 The League of Arab States Secretariat General, op. cit., pp. 26 f.Google Scholar; Peretz, , op. cit., p. 409Google Scholar; Stevens, , op. cit., p. 273Google Scholar.

15 Dulles, John Foster, “The Middle East,” U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 845 (09. 5, 1955), 378 ff.Google Scholar; Stevens, , op. cit., pp. 277 f.Google Scholar; S/3516, Dec. 20, 1955; S/3530/Rev. 2, Jan. 17, 1956; S/3538, Jan. 19; S/3596, May 9; S/3638, Aug. 21; S/3659, Sept. 27; S/3660, Sept. 27; S/3670, Oct. 13; Lt.-General Burns, E.L.M., Between Arab and Israeli (London, 1962), pp. 112 f.Google Scholar; John, Robert St., Ben Gurion (Garden City, 1959), pp. 55, 168, 282, 292, 335 f.Google Scholar; New York Times, April 9, 1951; July 20, 31; Dec. 14, 17, 1955.

16 Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 24, 26; Feb. 2, 22, 25; April 16, 1964.

17 UNRWA, op. cit., pp. 95 ff.Google Scholar; S/3596, May 9, 1956, pp. 27 f.; U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIV, No. 880 (05 7, 1956), 751Google Scholar; New York Times, Feb. 25, 1956, Sept. 21, 1957; Oct. 19, 1958; March 19, 1960; Feb. 6, 1961; Daily Star, Jan. 18, 1963; “Inside Israel,” New Outlook (Tel Aviv), 10, 1962, p. 64Google Scholar. See the next footnote on the legal situation.

18 This particular contention of the Arabs could be used against them once they seriously begin to divert Jordan waters because then they too would be threatening to cause a substantial injury to Israel, a riparian state. Ironically, Israel's claim that International Law allows a state to use waters under her sovereign control as she sees fit could also be used by the Arabs to justify their own diversion plans. In short, the original legal arguments used by each side will prove embarrassing as the positions of the contending parties reverse themselves. Since the International Law principles that would be involved in the Jordan water dispute have not yet become firmly enough established to provide for general agreement as to the exact rules to be applied, a neutral observer must wait for some concrete developments (such as a World Court decision or an international convention having world-wide application) to provide an authoritative decision on this matter.

19 New York Times, Feb. 28; March 3, 1962; Dec. 30, 1963; Jan. 14, 1964; Daily Star, March 1, 20, 1963; Jan. 14, 22, 28; Feb. 8, 1964; League of Arab States Secretariat General, op. cit., pp. 36 ffGoogle Scholar.

20 Ibid., pp. 34 f.; New York Times, Feb. 6, 1961; Jan. 14, 1964; Arab News and Views (New York, Arab Information Office), 02 1, 1961, p. 1Google Scholar; Daily Star, April 19, 1962; March 8, 1963; Jan. 14, 1964; Khouri, , op. cit., p. 32Google Scholar.

21 Ibid., Jan. 12; March 8; Aug. 31, 1963.

22 Ibid., Sept. 28; Dec. 8, 11, 21, 1963.

23 Ibid., Dec. 24, 28, 1963; Feb. 1, 1964; New York Times, Dec. 30, 1963; Jan. 14, 1964; Flapan, Simha, “Long Term Strategy on the Carrier,” New Outlook, 02, 1964, pp. 4, 7. Because the heads of state of Lebanon and Libya were too ill to attend the conference they delegated others to represent themGoogle Scholar.

24 For the Record (Cairo, Arab League Press and Information Department), No. 189, 01 20, 1964, pp. 1 f.Google Scholar; New York Times, Jan. 14, 23, 1964; Daily Star, Jan. 7, 18, 29; Feb. 1; March 6; April 22; May 9, 1964; Nahumi, Mordechai, “The United States and the Middle East,” New Outlook, 02, 1964, p. 32Google Scholar. Arab newspapers reported later that the completed diversion scheme ultimately would cost between $200 million and $235 million, would “make between 35 and 40 per cent of the Jordan River waters bypass Israeli territory” and would seriously increase the salinity of the water reaching Israel. (Daily Star, April 8, 10, 11, 1964. Also see New York Times, April 20, 1964.)

25 After a study in 1957, Lebanese engineers concluded that it was feasible to channel Hasbani waters into the Litani River. However, because of the absence of military protection against Israel and the lack of funds, no further action was taken on this matter (New York Times, Jan. 23, 1964).

26 Ibid., Jan. 17, 23, 1964; For the Record, op. cit.; Daily Star, Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 31; Feb. 8, 1964.

27 Ibid., Jan. 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 31, 1964; New York Times, Jan. 6, 16, 17, 19, 1964; For the Record, op. cit., p. 2.

28 Daily Star, Dec. 7, 14, 1963; Jan. 14, 15, 17, 18, 21; Feb. 8, 11, 14, 18, 23; March 1, 1964. It was reported early in March that Algerian troops were already stationed in the Sinai peninsula and that Libya had offered two battalions to the Arab League (Ibid., March 1, 10, 1964).

29 There is, of course, no certainty that the Kurdish rebellion will not break out once again as it has done in the past.

30 New York Times, Feb. 25; March 7, 8; April 15, 16, 17, 19, 27; May 10, 1964. Daily Star, Jan. 28, 30; Feb. 1, 11. 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 26, 29; March 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 17, 24, 28; April 2, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21; May 1, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 26, 27, 1964.

31 Ibid., Jan. 21, 24, 25, 27; Feb. 5, 13, 15; March 12; May 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 26; New York Times, Jan. 24; March 12; May 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 25, 1964; Katz, Ze'ev, “A Change in Soviet-Israel Relations?”, New Outlook, 03–04, 1964, pp. 6–10Google Scholar.

32 New York Times, Jan. 23, 30; Feb. 3, 6, 7, 1964; Daily Star, Jan. 22, 24, 25, 30; Feb. 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 19, 23, 28, 1964; L'Orient (Beirut), 02 17, 1964. The refusal of France to join any NATO force for Cyprus and the growth of friendlier relations between France and the UAR encouraged the Arabs to hope that France was finally ready to weaken her ties with Israel. New York Times, March 9; May 16, 17, 1964; Daily Star, Feb. 5; March 1, 5, 7; April 14, 1964Google Scholar.

33 New York Times, Jan. 14, 16, 18, 25, 1964; Daily Star, Jan. 21, 24; Feb. 2, 22, 29; March 6, 14, 18; April 18, 24, 1964; “Inside Israel,” New Outlook, 02, 1964, pp. 59fGoogle Scholar.

34 Statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister quoted in the Daily Star, Feb. 29, 1964. Since Israel could sustain a much larger population if unlimited amounts of sea water were made available to her for irrigation purposes than she could take care of merely with her Jordan River diversion project and since Arab fear of Israel's power will tend to grow in proportion to the increase in the size of Israel's population, the discovery of a cheap process for the removing of salt from sea water would probably not help lessen Arab-Israeli tensions.

35 Statement by Agricultural Minister Moshe Dayan quoted in Ibid., Feb. 4, 1964.

36 New York Times, May 6, 1964; Daily Star, May 6, 1964.

37 Ibid. Feb. 2, 19, 22, 29, 1964; New York Times, Feb. 10, 16, 1964.

38 New York Times, Sept. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1964. The Herald Tribune, Sept. 7, 8, 9, 10, 1964.

39 New York Times, Sept. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1964.

40 Ibid., Sept. 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 1964.

41 Ibid., Sept. 14, 19, 1964.

42 If the Arabs find themselves unable to carry out their own diversion plans, popular demands, especially in Syria, for the use of force against Israel will mount once again. Moreover, the situation will remain dangerous whether Arab unity survives or not. If this unity does continue undiminished, the Arabs will be encouraged to take strong action because they will then believe that they have the necessary power to do this. If bitter inter-Arab friction is revived, each Arab leader might feel that he could not take a less adamant stand towards Israel than his rivals. Thus, potential crises can develop whether the Arabs do or do not succeed in their efforts to divert the Jordan headwaters and to achieve closer concord.

43 Daily Star, Jan. 24; Feb. 18, 19, 27; March 18, 27; April 21, 29; May 8, 9, 1964; New York Times, July 6, 9, 11, 15, 20, 25, 29; Aug. 8; Oct. 1, 11, 1964.

44 Ibid., Nov. 10, 1963. UNEF forces were allowed to enter the UAR only with the understanding that they will withdraw when asked to do so by the UAR. UNEF troops are stationed in the Gaza Strip, along the Sinai border and at Sharm el Sheik at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt once used her control of Sharm el Sheik to prevent Israeli ships from using the Gulf route to the Israeli port of Elath, and this caused serious difficulties between the two states.