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Jiyushugi: Japanese Liberalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Fang-quei Quo
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Extract

The beginnings of Japanese liberalism date from the middle of the nineteenth century and appear as a product of the enlightenment movement during the Meiji Restoration. But the term Jiyushugi, today understood as equivalent to liberalism in English, has quite a different meaning in traditional Japanese usage. Jiyu consists of two Chinese characters Ji and yu meaning “to follow oneself” or “to use self as the only source of judgment for one's behavior”; shugi is translated as “principle” or “doctrine”. Thus, the word has traditionally been used, with very rare exceptions, to mean egoistic and selfish behavior that deviates from social norms and is specifically heedless of others.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , October 1966 , pp. 477 - 492
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1966

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References

* This article is based partially on the writer's unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Japanese Liberalism: A Case Study in the Transplantation of Alien Political Ideas, submitted to the Government Department, Southern Illinois University, August, 1963. The writer thanks the members of his Doctoral Committee and Dr. Gray L. Dorsey, Negal Professor of International Law & Jurisprudence, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., for their advice and encouragement. To my colleague Dr. Robert A. Frederick go my thanks for reading the manuscript and valuable criticism.

1 For an excellent treatment of the traditional usage of the word Jiyu see “Usage of the word Jiyu (Jiyu to iwu go no yorei)”, in Tsuda, Saukichi'sShiso, Bungei, Nihhongo (Thought, Literature, and Japanese) (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 74–84Google Scholar.

2 George B. Sansom has pointed out that there are no Japanese words to represent such Western concepts as liberty, democracy, popular rights, and equality. See George B. Sansom, Japan in World History.

In my article Japanese names will be presented in their Japanese order, with the family name first and the personal name last.

3 See Sabine, George H., A History of Political Theory (New York, 1960), Chapter XXXIIGoogle Scholar.

4 The shift of Kato's political belief also corresponds to the shift of his status in the Meiji Government. Edward Shils's theory of stages in the politics progres of intellectuals in the underdeveloped countries—from constitutional liberalism to politicized nationalism and finally to schism—can be validly applied to Kato's case. For details see the writer's dissertation, Chapter Two; also Shils, Edward, “The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States”, in Kautsky, John H., ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1962), pp. 195–234Google Scholar.

5 The Charter Oath consists of five articles issued on April 7, 1868, in the name of Emperor Meiji and meant to be the guiding principles for the Restoration Government.

6 To cite an example: the proposal to establish a popularly elected parliament stated that “The proposal is not to extend the right to elect representatives to all of the people in general. It is only aimed to be given to the gentry class (shi) and to those rich agrarians and merchants. They are the classes which contributed to the success of the Restoration”. (Jiyutoshi, Vol. X, 121.)

7 Scalapino, Robert A., Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 1953), pp. 48–49Google Scholar.

8 On the political theories of Nakae Chomin and Ueki Emori, only those points significant to the later development of liberalism are mentioned. For a detailed account of the two theories, see Nobutaka Ike, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 124–137Google Scholar.

9 Shigeru, Hayashi, Kindai Nihon no Shisoka tachi (Thinkers of Modern Japan): Nakae, Kotoku and Yoshino (Tokyo, 1961), p. 10Google Scholar.

10 As Tokutomi later turned out to be a spokesman for militaristic ultranationalism, he was one of the intellectuals listed as war criminals after World War II.

11 Masaaki, Kosaka, ed., Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era. Translated and adapted by David Abosch (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 206–207Google Scholar.

12 Itagaki Taisuke, Kato Hiroyuki ni Kotafuru sho (A Reply to Kato Hiroyuki); see Tohoru, Miyakawa, Kindai Nihon Shiso-no Kozo (Structure Modem Japanese Thought) (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 37–38Google Scholar.

13 Ueki Emori, Genron Jiyu Ron (On Freedom of Speech), collected MeijiBunka Zenshu (Collections of Meiji Culture).

14 Iichiro, Tokutomi, “Kokumin no genki to kyoka no hyojun”, in Kokumin no Tomo, no. 187Google Scholar. Cited by Saburo, Ienaga, Nippon Kindai Shiso-shi Kenkyu (A Study of the History of Modern Japanese Political Thought) (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 205–206Google Scholar.

15 Hall, Walter P. and Davis, William S., The Course of Europe Since Waterloo (New York, 1947), p. 9Google Scholar.

16 Ibid.

17 According to the peace treaty signed at Shimonoseki between Japan and China, Japan was to obtain the Liaotung Peninsula in addition to Formosa and the Pescadores. But France, Germany and Russia, fearing Japanese overexpansion in mainland China, intervened and forced Japan to give up Liaotung and in lieu of the territory to accept an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 tales from China. See Vinacke, Harold M., A History of the Far East In Modern Times (4th ed., New York, 1961), pp. 142–144. Also,Google ScholarSzburo, Ienaga, Nipponjin no Shiso no ayumi (The Pace of Japanese Thought) (Tokyo, 1961), p. 62Google Scholar. Also see Yusuke, Tsurumi, Present Day Japan (New York, 1924), p. 67Google Scholar.

18 Between 1914 and 1918 the tremendous development of the Japanese economy showed increases of about 550 per cent in textile industry, 800 per cent in machine manufacturing, and 800 per cent in the metals industry. The production of pig iron had increased about 240 per cent, steel production 250 per cent, and electricity 206 per cent. (Sogoro, Tanaka, Yoshino Sakuzo (Tokyo, 1958), p. 207)Google Scholar whose statistics provide the bases for the percentages I give.) The formation of monopolistic capitalism in Japan is illustrated by the following statistics:

Capital of the four major Zaibatsu—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, and Sumitomo in each major industry, 1934.

See also Shigeki, Toyama and others, Showa Shi (Showa History) (2nd ed., Tokyo, 1959), p. 30Google Scholar.

19 Kokkagakuha or the school of the science of state is one of the two major schools in the discipline of political science in Japan. The other school is called Shakaigakuha or the sociological school, which is the descendant of the Jitsugakuha or Empiricist school of the Meiji Era. Kokkagakuha is sometimes called the bureaucratic school or Kangaku and was prevalent in the imperial universities from which most high-ranking government officials were drawn. The Kokkagakuha, greatly influenced by German scholars of Staatswissenschaft, emphasized the study of the administrative state mainly from the viewpoint of jurisprudential theory. In contrast with the liberal tendency of the Shakaigakuha which was prevalent in the private universities and emphasized the study of the functional state from the practical policy viewpoint, Kokkagakuha traditionally represents the most conservative idea in Japan. See, Masamichi, Royama, Development of Modern Political Science in Japan (Nippon ni okeru Kindai Seijigaku no hattatsu) (Tokyo, 1949)Google Scholar; Shigetaka, Uchida, “A Short History of Political Thought in Japan”, Waseda Political Studies, I (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 26–54, or the same authorGoogle Scholar, Nippon Seiji Shakai Shiso-shi (History of Japanese Political and Social Thought) (Tokyo, 1960), Chapter VGoogle Scholar.

20 See, Miller, Frank O., Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley, 1965)Google Scholar.

21 Eitaro, Kishimoto, and others, Nihon Kindai Shakai Shiso-shi (History of Modern Japanese Social Thought) (Tokyo, 1959), Chapter VGoogle Scholar.

22 Hatsunosuke, Hirabayashi, ’Nippon ni okeru Jiyushugi no shimei” (Mission of Liberalism in Japan), Seiji Kenkyu (Political Study), 12, 1924, 18–29Google Scholar.

23 See Tanaka Sogoro, op. cit.

24 The Imperial Ordinance of May, 1900, established the rule that the service ministers should be recruited from the generals in active service. This provision made the military capable of dictating the life of cabinets by refusing to recommend generals for the service ministries.

25 With the exception of the Okuma-Itagaki coalition government in 1898, the premiership had been monopolized by the Genros.

26 The Suffrage Act was accompanied by the Peace Preservation Code which later became the instrument for suppressing freedom of speech and association. See footnote 32 of this paper.

27 Veblen, T. B., “The Opportunity of Japan”, Journal of Race Development, VI (07 1915)Google Scholar; reprinted in Veblen's Essays in Our Changing Order, ed. by Leon Ardzrooni (New York, 1943), pp. 248–266.

28 Ibid.

29 For the detailed inside story of Minobe's persecution see Ryokichi, Minobe (the only son of Minobe Tatsukichi), Kumon suru domocrasi (Democracy in Agony) (Tokyo, 1961), Chapter 3Google Scholar. Also, Shigeo, Saegusa, Genron Showa-shi (History of Freedom of Speech During the Showa Era) (Tokyo, 1958)Google Scholar.

30 Eijiro, Kawai, Watakushi no Shakai-shugi (My Socialism) (Tokyo, 1952)Google Scholar.

31 Kawai's study of British socialism and liberalism resulted in several volumes of publication on the subject. Among them Tomas Hil Grin no Shiso Taikei (The Thought System of T. H. Green), 3 vols., Shakai Shisoka Hyoden (Biography and Criticism of Some Social Thinkers), 2 vols. and Jiyushugi no Rekishi to Riron (History and Theories of Liberalism) are the most important. The categorization of liberties made by Kawai corresponds closely to that made by Hobhouse, L. T. in Liberalism (London, 1923), pp. 21–49Google Scholar.

32 According to The Situation of Social Movement in 1939, a top-secret classification report issued by the Police and Security Section, Ministry of Interior, 1940, Kawai showed “no regret at all” after the prosecution began but became “regretful” after his suspension from his position. The following table lists the number of persons arrested under the Peace Preservation Law.

Statistics up to 1943 are based upon the information in Jurist No. 14 and the figure for 1944 is based on Kobayshi Goro, Secret Record of Tokko Police. (Tokko police was the secret police in charge of the special mission for thought control.) Quoted by Toyama, and others, Showa History (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 96 and 229Google Scholar.

33 The Potsdam Declaration stated: “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be establishedr”.

34 For a discussion of the role played by the Occupation authority in the “democratization of Japan”, see Maki, John M., Government and Politics in Japan: The Road to Democracy (New York, 1962)Google Scholar, and Kazuo, Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago, 1960)Google Scholar.

35 Ichioku Sozange (Confession by the One Hundred Million Population) was the slogan issued by the Japanese Government immediately after the War. The intellectuals' “self-criticism” movement resulted in several important writings which include: Masao Maruyama's Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism (Cho-kokkashugi no Ronri to Sinri) revealed the basic cause of Japanese political absolutism; Takeyoshi Kawashima's Family Structure in Japanese Society (Nippon Shakai no Kazokuteki Keisei) pointed out how the Japanese family order had produced quasi-familial relationships in social organizations; and Hisao Otsuka's Human Foundation in Modernization (Kindaika no Ningen-teki Kiso) advocated the necessity of “change in subjective condition” or “creation of modern-man” for the democratization of Japan rather than merely changes in political institutions. See, Arase, Toyo's “aSengo Shiso to Sono Tenkai (Post-war Thought and its Development)” in Kindai Nihon Shiso-shi Koza (Lectures on the History of Modern Japanese Thought), Vol. I. (Tokyo, 1961)Google Scholar.

36 Tsurumi Shunsuke and his study of mass communication represents this emphasis. See, Arase, op. cit.

37 Ibid.

38 Bennett, John W., Passin, Herbert, and McKnight, Robert K., In Search of Identity: The Japanese Overseas Scholars in America and Japan (Minneapolis, 1958), pp. 87–88Google Scholar.

39 Matsumoto, and Scott, Y., “Contemporary Japan—The Individual and the Group, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 01, 1960Google Scholar.

40 For example, John Dewey, “The Future of Liberalism,” in What is Democracy? (Cooperative Books, Series 1, no. 2 ). The most recent work on this topic is Mayo, Henry B., An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York, 1960.) See Chapter XIGoogle Scholar.

41 The best example is Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. (eds.), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois, 1961). See Part IV, Section CGoogle Scholar.

42 For example, Lipset, Seymour M., “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review, LIII (03, 1959)Google Scholar.

43 This example also suggests that borrowings from the discipline of cultural anthropology, particularly the study of acculturation, may facilitate political scientists in developing a theory of transplantation of political ideas. “The Outline for the Study of Acculturation”, suggested by Professors Redfield, Robert, Linton, Ralph, and Melville, J. Herskovits in the appendix to Herskovits', Melville J.Acculturation: The Study of Cultural Contact (Gloucester, Mass., 1958)Google Scholar, should be consulted by those interested in the study suggested here. Also, the study of “thought reform” by DrLifton, Robert J., should be of interest; see his Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China (New York, 1963)Google Scholar.

44 For instance, Macridis, Roy C. and Ward, Robert E. (eds.), Modern Political Systems: Europe, and also a volume on Asia (Englewood Cliffs, 1963)Google Scholar; Carter, G. M. and Herz, John H., Major Foreign Powers (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; and Beer, Samuel H. and Ulam, Adam B. (eds.), Patterns of Government (New York, 1962)Google Scholar. All of these standard textbooks of comparative government give much attention to the ideological aspect of the foreign political systems.

45 Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy (14th printing) (New York, 1960), p. 601Google Scholar.

46 Among recent works relevant to the topic discussed in this article the following should be of interest: LaPalombara, Joseph, “Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and An Interpretation”, American Political Science Review, Vol. LX, no. 1 (03, 1966), 5–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scalapino, Robert A., “Ideology and Modernization: The Japanese Case”, in Apter, David (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, New York, 1963, 93–127Google Scholar; and also Dore, R. P., “Japan's Place in the World”, in World Today, Vol. 22, no. 7 (07, 1966), 293–306Google Scholar.