Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
This study examines the ideological and truth-seeking aspects of Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State. Ackerman begins in a truth-seeking fashion by requiring all power and all distributive claims to be justified. In developing principles of social justice from imaginary dialogues that are assumed to be neutral toward the good, he defends the “neutrality principle” inadequately and employs it ideologically. The fundamental distributive principle, undominated equality, is derived from dialogues that are manipulated to prevent other principles from passing the “neutrality test.” Although Ackerman discusses issues of citizenship and birthrights that are ordinarily ignored, his attempt to protect the liberal state leads to ideological formulations.
1 For their helpful comments on this essay, we would like to thank Calvin Jillson, James Davidson, John Clark and Norton Nelkin.
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4 It is now fashionable to label as “secular religions” those orientations that are called ideologies. It is undoubtedly true, for example, that Marxism and liberalism have replaced religion for many people, and these commitments are sustained by nonrational motives. But contemporary ideologies are not simply disguised religions. The truth claims of religions are based on faith (with reason playing an auxiliary role), revelatory events, sacred writings, personal experience, and the claims of charismatic leadership. The truth claims of movements like liberalism or Marxism rest on reason and science. This is also true of “irrationalist” bodies of thought. After all, the Nazis made “scientific” claims for their racist doctrines. Moreover, the territorial claims of nationalists are based on purported historical facts.
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8 Ibid., p. 4.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
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12 Ibid., p. 19.
13 Ibid., p. 369.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 368.
16 Ibid., p. 10–11.
17 Ibid., chap. 2.
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19 Ibid., p. 400.
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21 Ibid., p. 38.
22 Ibid., p. 45–64.
23 Ibid., p. 183–86.
24 Ibid., p. 69–74.
25 Ibid., p. 102.
26 Ibid., p. 103.
27 Ibid., p. 74, 79–80.
28 Ibid., p. 96.
29 Ibid., p. 109–111.
30 Ibid., p. 108.
31 Ibid., p. 131–32.
32 Ibid., p. 201–21.
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34 An example of a rigidly egalitarian society would be one in which people exercise the right Ackerman gives them to destroy the surplus, that amount over and above what is necessary to give second-generation members at least as much as members of the first generation started with.
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36 Ibid., p. 153.
37 Ibid., p. 152–53.
38 Ibid., p. 174–77.
39 Ibid., chap. 8.
40 Ibid., p. 258.
41 Ibid., p. 218.