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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
“Russian policy is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” Winston Churchill stated. But Joseph Stalin claimed: “Our policy is simple and clear.” These statements which apparently contradict each other can be reconciled. For the mysterious character of the Russian foreign policy is the result, precisely, of the apparent clearness of its principles. Since its birth, the Soviet regime has always described itself as the standard-bearer of the Marxian doctrine and the Communist world revolution; yet this aim has always permitted the use of the most varied methods. Glaring contradictions in practice were defended by the same slogans and formulas. On the one hand, the Soviet regime, apparently sacrificed Russia to the world revolution; on the other hand, it seemed to put the world revolution into the service of the proletarian fatherland. The Soviet regime utilized the German opposition to the status quo created by the treaty of Versailles as well as the French fear of German imperialism and of Germany's attempts to obtain mastery in Europe and throughout the world. The Soviet regime for years regarded moderate Socialists as its most hated enemies, but later it tried to cooperate with them in the anti-Fascist Popular Front. The leaders of the Soviets sometimes proclaimed that the world revolution was around the corner but that belief has not prevented them at other times from regarding it only as a remote possibility in a far distant future.
1 These quotations of Stalin and Churchill are the mottoes of Dallin's, David J. book: Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939–1942, New Haven, 1942Google Scholar.
2 Borkenau, F., World Communism, A History of the Communist International, New York, 1939, gives, on p. 415Google Scholar, an impressive picture of the varying attitude of the Communists towards the Socialists.
3 “Old Europe is dashing at mad speed towards the proletarian revolution,” wrote G. Zinoviev, at that time President of the Third International (executed 1936), in an article published on May 1, 1919, quoted in Florinsky, M. T., World Revolution and the USSR, New York, 1933, p. 42Google Scholar. Florinsky, notes that this pronouncement “accurately reflected the general attitude of the Soviet leaders during the period 1918–1920.” (p. 45)Google Scholar.
4 Taracouzio, T. A., War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy, New York. 1940Google Scholar. Taracouzio himself characterizes his work as “analytical rather than historical”.… “it is designed merely as an expose of the fundamental principles of Marxism” as applied in the diplomacy of the USSR.
5 Cf. Taracouzio, , loc. cit., p. 30Google Scholar presenting a detailed discussion of the Communist classification of wars.
6 Stalin is the author of “Problems of Leninism” and insists always that he is the most faithful disciple of Lenin.
7 Nikolaevski, B. discusses in his articles on the foreign policy of Moscow (in Russian, , Novyi Journal, New York, 1942–1943, No. IV, p. 302f)Google Scholar the moderate views which Bukharin held after 1925. He preached peace, demanded by the peasants cooperating with the Soviet Union. It would be interesting to compare these views of Bukharin —executed 1938—with his former belief in revolutionary war helping to bring about the destruction of Capitalism.
8 Cf. Lenin's, famous pamphlel against Left Wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder. (1921)Google Scholar.
9 Cf. Hazard, John N. in Zink, H. and Cole, Taylor, ed. Government in Wartime Europe, New York, 1941. p. 123Google Scholar. and Florinsky, in Shotwell, James T. ed. Governments of Continental Europe, New York, 1940Google Scholar, who quotes Stalin's report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, held in March, 1939 (p. 923–5).
10 The fact that contrary to the communistic expectations religion is not disappearing in U.S.S.R. after the disappearance of “social conditions” in which it was allegedly exclusively rooted, compel the communistic rules to extend more and more a transition period in which they have to take in account—for practical reasons—the existence of religion. The best study on religion in Soviet Russia is the book by Timasheff, New York, 1942.
11 Cf. Wheeler-Bennet, T. W., The Forgotten Peace, Brest-Litovsk, 03 1918. New York, 1939Google Scholar. Similar tactics that made concessions in order to win time for preparing the expected world revolution, were used by the Bolshevists during the Paris Peace Conference. They were inclined to make very far reaching concessions to the Allies. Cf. Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, New York, 1930. Vol. I, p. 167fGoogle Scholar.“The policy which allowed of these compromises represented a repetition of Lenin's tactics during the Best Litovsk period.” (168)—F. Epstein, of the Widener Library, has a study in preparation “Decisive Year's in World Politics, the Fate of Russia 1914–1920,” dealing with the treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Paris Peace Conference and Russia, Intervention by the Allies in Russia, etc.—On German-Russian Relations Since 1918, cf. the article of Fraenkel, Ernst, The Review of Politics, 01 1940. 2:34ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Florinsky, , World Revolution and the USSR, p. 53Google Scholar.
13 For details of the foreign policy of the Soviets, cf. Fischer, Louis, op. cit. Dallin, D. J., op. cit. and Scott, John, Duel for Europe, Stalin versus Hitler. Boston: 1942Google Scholar.
14 Vernadsky, G. writes in his article: “A Review of Russian Policy” (Yale Review, 31, 1941–1942)Google Scholar “The lands forming the eastern provinces of pre-war Poland belonged from the purely ethnic point of view not to Poland but to White Russia and the Ukraine. These lands lay east of the so-called “Curzon Line.” By suggesting that line as a boundary the British had tried to set a limit on that line to Polish expansion in 1920. Disregarding this British suggestion the Poles at that time seized large sections of what had been White Russia and Ukraine.” (p. 527) Buell, R. L., Poland Key to Europe, New York, 1939, notes (p. 73)Google Scholar that the Curzon Line was fixed by the Allied Supreme Council “as a minimum boundary in December 1919.… following ethnic considerations.” He mentions (p. 77) that Poland accepted (1920) “grudgingly” the Curzon Line as the war was going against her, Soviet Russia rejected it at that time. But Russia was finally defeated and had to make in the Peace treaty of Riga concessions to Poland beyond the Curzon Line.
15 Cf. Souvarine, B., Stalin, New York, 1939, pp. 300fGoogle Scholar, who discusses the friction between Lenin and Stalin concerning the methods of rule in Georgia. Stalin, as a native of Georgia, was particularly interested in her fate.
16 Hardy, G. M. Gathorne, A Short History of International Affairs 1920–1938, New York, 1938, give, on p. 371Google Scholar, a survey of the treaties concluded by Litvinov before Hitler came into power and the Soviet Union tried to protect herself against a German attack by a friendship with France and by participation in the League of Nations. These treaties aimed at preventing the formation of a power system directed against Russia and to “secure the western frontiers of Russia” in the case of complications in the Far East. Russia never recognized the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania.
17 Dallin, , loc. cit., gives a valuable survey of the Russo-Japanese Relations since 1917, pp. 215ffGoogle Scholar. For example, Russia sold the Chinese Eastern Railway under unfavorable humiliating conditions to the Japanese puppet state Manchukuo (1935). On the other hand, the USSR was not willing to admit an advance of Japan in the borders of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, as the Russo-Japanese test fighting of summer 1939 showed, (p. 244).
18 Ambassador Davies remarks correctly in his Mission to Moscow New York, 1941: “The Soviets were humiliated and deeply hurt by being excluded from Munich.”Google Scholar
19 Cf. the detailed discussion in Dallin, loc. cit., and the description of the steps by which the Baltic States became Soviet Republics, by Hazard in Zink and Cole, ed. loc. cit. A plea for the liberty of the Baltic States is the pamphlet of the former Estonian Foreign Minister Pusta, K. P.The Soviet Union and the Baltic States, New York, s.d. (1942)Google Scholar But the question remains unanswered. Are the Baltic States able to maintain their independent existence?” Their great admirer Reddaway, W. F. seems not to believe it. (Problems of the Baltic, Cambridge, 1940, p. 116)Google Scholar.
20 Cf. The remarks of Scott, , loc. cit., pp. 78ffGoogle Scholar. “Only the name of the official candidate (that is, of the pro-Soviet candidate) appeared on the ballot.”
21 On Kuusinen's, “Government” which disappeared as Russia concluded peace with Finland, 1940Google Scholar. Cf. Dallin, , op. cit., pp. 133ffGoogle Scholar.
22 The Relations of the Soviet government with the new Turkey of Mustapha Kemal Pascha (Atta Turk) were particularly friendly—Russia supported her in order to oppose England. Turkish-Russian relations deteriorated as Russia became actively interested in the Dardanelles question, a development which was prepared by the conference of Montreaux (1936) but broke into the open after the Russo-German non-aggression treaty of 1939. Turkey refused to accept Russian demands which would make friendly relations with the Allies impossible. Hitler has (1941) pretended that he had to refuse Russian demands which had meant a subjugation of Turkey. Russian interests in the Straits is a proof of the return of the Soviets to the traditional Russian policy, after a period of their abandonment in consequence not so much of ideological reasons as of weakness and of the endeavor to demonstrate the break with the (imperialistic) past. On the conference of Montreux, cf. Gathorne Hardy, pp. 421ff, on the Russo-Turkish negotiation? of 1939, Dallin, pp. 105ff.
23 For many details, cf. Chamberlin's, W. H. article in Harper's Magazine, 03, 1942Google Scholar.
24 The official condemnation of the anti-national historical school of Pokrovski is typical of this return to nationalism. J. Fedotoff White characterises very correctly the significance of this condemnation: “Pokrovski's brand of historiography, dedicated to the ‘debunking’ of the historians who had preceded him, was void of emotional content to a generation that had not taken any part in the demolition of the old regime.… When his useful (from the Soviet viewpoint) role as wrecker of the old historical concepts was over, it was found by those in charge of the guidance of the Soviet ship of state, that the engine of demolition was not a useful tool for the construction of rite new facade of the edifice of Russian historiography.” (The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXI, No. 56, 03, 1943, p. 263)Google Scholar.
25 Cf. Borkenau, loc. cit. who distinguishes three periods in the history of the Comintern: “During the first period the Comintern is mainly an instrument to bring about revolution. During the second period (fight between Stalin and Trotsky, W. G.) it is mainly an instrument in the Russian national struggles. During the third period (after Stalin's victory, W. G.) it is mainly an instrument of Russian foreign policy.” (p. 419) Borkenau says bluntly: “The history of the Comintern can be summed up as a series of hopes and disappointments.… It contains.… not a single lasting success.” (p. 413) “Every defeat of revolution in the West and in the East is accompanied by an increase of admiration for Russia.” (p. 418)
26 Spykman, , America's Strategy in World Politics, New York, 1942Google Scholar, proposes support of Japan (of course after her defeat in this war) and not as “a one-sided treaty of alliance” (470) to counterbalance China; and he is worried about the “balancing of Germany and Russia.” (466) If a common Russo-German frontier proves impossible, he is for “a great eastern European federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.” But how keep this federation together? It would be a difficult task for “a British-Scandinavian group around the Baltic.” (467).
27 Kluchevsky's, V. D. (1841–1911) classic work, A History of Russia (Engl. 5 vols., London, 1911–1931)Google Scholar emphasizes the cruel and inhuman character of Russian history where the state power always used the people disregarding sufferings: “Moscow (period of Moscow rule before Peter the Great, W.G.) only oppressed the people and so was feared and respected, but not loved. As for St. Petersburg (period after Peter the Great, W. G.) it is neither feared nor respected and loved.” (I, 124) Particularly important is Volume III, pp. 6ff, where the opposition between the needs of the State (in Russian History) and the means which lay at the disposition of the nation for their fulfillment are emphasized. The state has to turn to foreigners, and, the exigency of the state admitted no delay, therefore, “forced sacrifices which sapped the popular substance.” Cf. the famous characteristic of Peter the Great who imposed his reforms disregarding the sufferings of the people in Vol. IV. Karpovich, Michael (The Slavonic and East European Review, I.c., p. 35)Google Scholar notes that “Kluchevsky has a tendency to treat the state power as something external, superimposed upon the people,” but this tendency corresponds to most important real trends in Russian history. The Bolshevist inhumanity is rooted in traditions of Russian history—and is particularly striking because Bolshevist rule was introduced in the name of an ideology which claimed that the state would wither away, but resulted in the rise of a state which is much more brutal and ruthless than the modern tsarism. (Cf. my book, Bolshevism, Theory and Practice, New York, 1932)Google Scholar. Florinsky (in Governments of Continental Europe) calls attention to the fact that the rule of the Soviets is “the continuation of a tradition that has been the curse of Russian history.…” (p. 929.) It is, therefore, not only an exterior traditionalism which has seduced Stalin into making comparisons between himself and Peter the Great or which has resulted in praises of Ivan IV which were not possible in tsarist Russia: The increase of power of the State was not only obtained by imposing extraordinary demands on the people, but—as the anti-Boyar policy of Ivan IV illustrates—by ruthless attacks against hitherto leading groups.
28 , W. P. and Coates, Zelda write: “The policy of the Soviet Government has been consistently based on the maintenance of and promotion of peace since it first came into power in 1917,” (World Affairs and USSR, London, 1939)Google Scholar. This statement is of interest only to the student of pro-Soviet propaganda. B. and Webb's, S.The Truth About Russia, New York, 1942Google Scholar, is an impressive proof of the distortions of reality to which an uncritical approach to the Soviet Union leads.
29 The English refusal to accept provisions which could result in the abandonment of the Baltic States to the U.S.S.R. was one of the factors responsible for the breakdown of the Allied-Russian negotiations in 1939. 1942 England was ready to recognize their incorporation in the U.S.S.R. But this recognition was not insterted in the text of the British-Russian Alliance treaty of May 26, 1942, because as it is alleged (Krock, Arthur, “How the Atlantic Charter Survived a Crisis,” New York Times, 06 13, 1942)Google Scholar, President Roosevelt was not inclined to stir up a discussion about the application of the Atlantic Charter, accepted by Russia. Russia claimed that the Baltic States had voluntarily become memberstates of the U.S.S.R.